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Re: new ...at() flag: AT_NO_JUMPS

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On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 1:30 AM, Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
> On Mon, May 01, 2017 at 07:36:52PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
>
>> Oh, nice!
>>
>> It looks like this is somewhat similar to the old O_BENEATH proposal,
>> but because the intentions behind the proposals are different
>> (application sandboxing versus permitting an application to restrict its
>> own filesystem accesses), the semantics differ: AT_NO_JUMPS
>> doesn't prevent starting the path with "/", but does prevent mountpoint
>> traversal. Is that correct?
>
> It prevents both, actually - I missed that in description, but this
>         if (unlikely(nd->flags & LOOKUP_NO_JUMPS))
>                 return -ELOOP;
> in nd_jump_root() affects absolute pathnames same way as it affects
> absolute symlinks.
>
> It's not quite O_BENEATH, and IMO it's saner that way - a/b/c/../d is
> bloody well allowed, and so are relative symlinks that do not lead out of
> the subtree.  If somebody has a good argument in favour of flat-out
> ban on .. (_other_ than "other guys do it that way, and it doesn't need
> to make sense 'cuz security!!1!!!", please), I'd be glad to hear it.

BTW, FreeBSD head now allows .. if it stays in subtree:
https://svnweb.freebsd.org/base?view=revision&revision=308212

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Re: new ...at() flag: AT_NO_JUMPS David Drysdale <drysdale@google.com> - 2017-05-18 11:00 +0200

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