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Groups > linux.kernel > #1645966
| From | riel@redhat.com |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | [PATCH 4/5] arm64: ascii armor the arm64 boot init stack canary |
| Date | 2017-05-19 23:40 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tIXMR-86v-15@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <tIXMR-86v-5@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
From: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Use the ascii-armor canary to prevent unterminated C string overflows from being able to successfully overwrite the canary, even if they somehow obtain the canary value. Inspired by execshield ascii-armor and PaX/grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> --- arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h index fe5e287dc56b..b86a0865ddf1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/stackprotector.h @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ static __always_inline void boot_init_stack_canary(void) /* Try to get a semi random initial value. */ get_random_bytes(&canary, sizeof(canary)); canary ^= LINUX_VERSION_CODE; + canary &= CANARY_MASK; current->stack_canary = canary; __stack_chk_guard = current->stack_canary; -- 2.9.3
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[PATCH 4/5] arm64: ascii armor the arm64 boot init stack canary riel@redhat.com - 2017-05-19 23:40 +0200
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