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Groups > linux.kernel > #1640731
| From | Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode |
| Date | 2017-05-12 22:30 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tGpmi-1v8-9@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | (5 earlier) <tGbsZ-8fz-1@gated-at.bofh.it> <tGbMm-8mq-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <tGo6R-EW-5@gated-at.bofh.it> <tGo6R-EW-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <tGozU-Ud-5@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Fri, May 12, 2017 at 12:30:02PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > I'm clearly not explaining things well enough. I shouldn't say > "corruption", I should say "malicious manipulation". The methodology > of attacks against the stack are quite different from the other kinds > of attacks like use-after-free, heap overflow, etc. Being able to > exhaust the kernel stack (either due to deep recursion or unbounded > alloca()) I really hope we don't have alloca() use in the kernel. Do you have evidence to support that assertion? IMHO alloca() (or similar) should not be present in any kernel code because we have a limited stack - we have kmalloc() etc for that kind of thing. -- RMK's Patch system: http://www.armlinux.org.uk/developer/patches/ FTTC broadband for 0.8mile line: currently at 9.6Mbps down 400kbps up according to speedtest.net.
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Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2017-05-12 01:20 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> - 2017-05-12 01:50 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> - 2017-05-12 07:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-12 07:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> - 2017-05-12 08:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> - 2017-05-12 21:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-12 21:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk> - 2017-05-12 22:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2017-05-12 22:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk> - 2017-05-12 22:50 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-12 23:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-12 23:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2017-05-13 09:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2017-05-12 23:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2017-05-12 23:20 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-12 23:20 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2017-05-12 23:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2017-05-12 23:50 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> - 2017-05-12 23:50 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2017-05-13 01:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-13 00:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-12 21:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Russell King - ARM Linux <linux@armlinux.org.uk> - 2017-05-12 21:20 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2017-05-12 09:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> - 2017-05-12 08:20 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2017-05-12 09:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2017-05-12 19:10 +0200
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