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Groups > linux.kernel > #1637680
| From | Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode |
| Date | 2017-05-08 22:00 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tEWZ3-8eF-1@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | (1 earlier) <tDTJT-7Nn-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <tELqV-VP-1@gated-at.bofh.it> <tELKi-14K-19@gated-at.bofh.it> <tESLN-5F6-35@gated-at.bofh.it> <tESLN-5F6-43@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 8:26 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 8:22 AM, Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> wrote: >> On Mon, 2017-05-08 at 09:52 +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote: >>> >>> ... it's just not usable in that form for a regular maintenance flow. >>> >>> So what would be more useful is to add a specific Sparse check that >>> only checks >>> KERNEL_DS, to add it as a regular (.config driven) build option and >>> make sure the >>> kernel build has zero warnings. >>> >>> From that point on we can declare that this kind of bug won't occur >>> anymore, if >>> the Sparse implementation of the check is correct. >>> >>> But there's a (big) problem with that development model: Sparse is not >>> part of the >>> kernel tree and adding a feature to it while making the kernel depend >>> on that >>> brand new feature is a logistical nightmare. The overhead is quite >>> similar to >>> adding new features to a compiler - it happens at a glacial pace and >>> is only done >>> for major features really, at considerable expense. I don't think this >>> is an >>> adequate model for 'extended syntax checking' of the kernel, >>> especially when it >>> comes to correctness that has such obvious security impact. >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Ingo >> >> There's the option of using GCC plugins now that the infrastructure was >> upstreamed from grsecurity. It can be used as part of the regular build >> process and as long as the analysis is pretty simple it shouldn't hurt >> compile time much. > > Well, and that the situation may arise due to memory corruption, not > from poorly-matched set_fs() calls, which static analysis won't help > solve. We need to catch this bad kernel state because it is a very bad > state to run in. Of course, I agree with Kees points on this and previous emails. A static analysis solution is hard to scale across functions and build time can suffer. I don't think the coverage will be good enough to consider this change and static analysis as similar. > > -Kees > > -- > Kees Cook > Pixel Security -- Thomas
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[PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2017-04-28 17:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2017-05-06 00:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2017-05-08 09:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2017-05-08 10:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2017-05-08 17:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-08 17:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2017-05-08 22:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2017-05-09 09:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> - 2017-05-09 13:20 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2017-05-09 16:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-09 18:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> - 2017-05-08 14:50 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2017-05-09 08:50 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2017-05-09 11:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> - 2017-05-09 15:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2017-05-09 15:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2017-05-09 18:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-09 19:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2017-05-10 01:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-10 01:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> - 2017-05-10 04:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2017-05-10 09:20 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> - 2017-05-11 13:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2017-05-10 08:50 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2017-05-10 04:20 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2017-05-10 04:50 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2017-05-10 05:20 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2017-05-10 05:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2017-05-10 05:50 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2017-05-10 09:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2017-05-10 09:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2017-05-10 09:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2017-05-10 09:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2017-05-10 09:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> - 2017-05-10 09:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2017-05-10 09:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> - 2017-05-09 18:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> - 2017-05-10 09:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2017-05-10 10:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2017-05-10 10:20 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> - 2017-05-11 02:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-08 15:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> - 2017-05-08 16:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> - 2017-05-08 22:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2017-05-08 16:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-08 17:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2017-05-09 08:40 +0200
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