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Groups > linux.kernel > #1636834
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH] sgi-xp: use designated initializers |
| Date | 2017-05-06 09:20 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <tE2au-52D-1@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <sPbFD-2GI-11@gated-at.bofh.it> <sQRW9-5L4-1@gated-at.bofh.it> <sVGx4-4OV-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <tqsRc-3S4-29@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Wed, Mar 29, 2017 at 1:48 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: > On Tue, Jan 3, 2017 at 3:19 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >> On Wed, Dec 21, 2016 at 8:24 AM, Robin Holt <robinmholt@gmail.com> wrote: >>> On Fri, Dec 16, 2016 at 7:01 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >>>> Prepare to mark sensitive kernel structures for randomization by making >>>> sure they're using designated initializers. These were identified during >>>> allyesconfig builds of x86, arm, and arm64, with most initializer fixes >>>> extracted from grsecurity. >>> >>> I guess I don't understand the context enough here to give you a >>> Signed-off-by. Can you give us more background on this randomization? >> >> Sure thing! The randomization is on the order of function pointers in >> all-pointer structures (like struct xpc_interface). As long as the >> memory containing the structure isn't shared externally, this >> randomization should have no operational effect. The reason explicit >> no-op functions were added was to avoid ugly casts, etc. > > Friendly ping ... any chance this can land in -next soon? > >>> From what I see in the code here, I can see you are providing >>> equivalent functionality and I would give it a signed-off-by, but I am >>> not sure this randomization of which you speak is not going to cause >>> problems for XP, XPC, XPNET, and XPMEM (out of tree GPL kernel >>> module). >> >> Ah, hm, does this module share the structure without being built >> against the kernel? (If built with the kernel, the randomization >> plugin will keep things in the right order.) > > Regardless of your answer, this randomization can be turned off. > Switching to designated initializers here is mainly just a clean up. Any thoughts on this? I'd love to get this landed, and I'm happy to carry the patch myself, if it helps. Anyone able to Ack? Thanks! -Kees -- Kees Cook Pixel Security
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Re: [PATCH] sgi-xp: use designated initializers Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-05-06 09:20 +0200 Re: [PATCH] sgi-xp: use designated initializers Robin Holt <robinmholt@gmail.com> - 2017-05-08 19:40 +0200
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