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Re: What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization?

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From Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Newsgroups linux.kernel
Subject Re: What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization?
Date Mon, 30 Jan 2017 15:00:02 +0100
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On Mon, 30 Jan, at 12:10:29PM, David Howells wrote:
> 
> Matt argues, however, that boot_params->secure_boot should be propagated from
> the bootloader and if the bootloader wants to set it, then we should skip the
> check in efi_main() and go with the bootloader's opinion.  This is something
> we probably want to do with kexec() so that the lockdown state is propagated
> there.
 
Actually what I was arguing for was that if the boot loader wants to
set it and bypass the EFI boot stub, e.g. by going via the legacy
64-bit entry point, startup_64, then we should allow that as well as
setting the flag in the EFI boot stub.

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Thread

Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6] Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2017-01-23 22:30 +0100
  Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-01-23 23:20 +0100
    Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6] Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2017-01-27 15:10 +0100
      Re: [PATCH 5/8] efi: Get the secure boot status [ver #6] David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-01-31 15:20 +0100
    What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization? David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-01-30 13:20 +0100
      Re: What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader  sentinel triggers sanitization? Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2017-01-30 15:00 +0100
        Re: What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader sentinel triggers sanitization? David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> - 2017-01-30 15:10 +0100
          Re: What should the default lockdown mode be if the bootloader  sentinel triggers sanitization? Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2017-01-31 13:00 +0100

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