Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > linux.kernel > #1508855
| From | Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | [RFC v4 01/18] landlock: Add Kconfig |
| Date | 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <swqvw-i6-43@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <swqlP-8qD-3@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
Initial Landlock Kconfig needed to split the Landlock eBPF and seccomp parts to ease the review. Changes from v2: * add seccomp filter or cgroups (with eBPF programs attached support) dependencies Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> --- security/Kconfig | 1 + security/landlock/Kconfig | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+) create mode 100644 security/landlock/Kconfig diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index 118f4549404e..c63194c561c5 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -164,6 +164,7 @@ source security/tomoyo/Kconfig source security/apparmor/Kconfig source security/loadpin/Kconfig source security/yama/Kconfig +source security/landlock/Kconfig source security/integrity/Kconfig diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..dec64270b06d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +config SECURITY_LANDLOCK + bool "Landlock sandbox support" + depends on SECURITY + depends on BPF_SYSCALL + depends on SECCOMP_FILTER || CGROUP_BPF + default y + help + Landlock is a stacked LSM which allows any user to load a security + policy to restrict their processes (i.e. create a sandbox). The + policy is a list of stacked eBPF programs for some LSM hooks. Each + program can do some access comparison to check if an access request + is legitimate. + + You need to enable seccomp filter and/or cgroups (with eBPF programs + attached support) to apply a security policy to either a process + hierarchy (e.g. application with built-in sandboxing) or a group of + processes (e.g. container sandboxing). It is recommended to enable + both seccomp filter and cgroups. + + Further information about eBPF can be found in + Documentation/networking/filter.txt + + If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y. -- 2.9.3
Back to linux.kernel | Previous | Next — Previous in thread | Next in thread | Find similar | Unroll thread
[RFC v4 00/18] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:00 +0200
[RFC v4 16/18] bpf/cgroup,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per cgroup Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:00 +0200
[RFC v4 11/18] seccomp,landlock: Handle Landlock hooks per process hierarchy Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:00 +0200
[RFC v4 05/18] bpf,landlock: Define an eBPF program type for Landlock Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
[RFC v4 06/18] fs: Constify path_is_under()'s arguments Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
[RFC v4 10/18] seccomp: Split put_seccomp_filter() with put_seccomp() Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
[RFC v4 14/18] bpf/cgroup: Make cgroup_bpf_update() return an error code Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
[RFC v4 13/18] bpf/cgroup: Replace struct bpf_prog with struct bpf_object Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
[RFC v4 12/18] bpf: Cosmetic change for bpf_prog_attach() Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
[RFC v4 01/18] landlock: Add Kconfig Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
[RFC v4 09/18] landlock: Add manager functions Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
[RFC v4 03/18] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 03/18] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-26 21:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 03/18] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 22:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC v4 03/18] bpf,landlock: Add a new arraymap type to deal with (Landlock) handles Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-26 22:20 +0200
[RFC v4 02/18] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
Re: [RFC v4 02/18] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> - 2016-10-26 09:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v4 02/18] bpf: Move u64_to_ptr() to BPF headers and inline it David Sterba <dave@jikos.cz> - 2016-10-26 16:00 +0200
[RFC v4 08/18] landlock: Handle file comparisons Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
[RFC v4 04/18] bpf,landlock: Add eBPF program subtype and is_valid_subtype() verifier Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
[RFC v4 17/18] landlock: Add update and debug access flags Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
[RFC v4 07/18] landlock: Add LSM hooks Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 09:10 +0200
Re: [RFC v4 00/18] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-26 17:00 +0200
Re: [RFC v4 00/18] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 19:00 +0200
Re: [RFC v4 00/18] Landlock LSM: Unprivileged sandboxing Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> - 2016-10-26 19:30 +0200
csiph-web