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Groups > linux.kernel > #1496660
| From | "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | RE: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 |
| Date | 2016-10-06 15:50 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <sphdE-Kt-19@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <soYNI-4PT-13@gated-at.bofh.it> <sph3Y-GK-21@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
> -----Original Message----- > From: Christoph Hellwig [mailto:hch@infradead.org] > Sent: Thursday, October 6, 2016 9:32 AM > To: Roberts, William C <william.c.roberts@intel.com> > Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com; corbet@lwn.net; linux- > doc@vger.kernel.org; linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org > Subject: Re: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 > > On Wed, Oct 05, 2016 at 02:04:46PM -0400, william.c.roberts@intel.com wrote: > > From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com> > > > > Some out-of-tree modules do not use %pK and just use %p, as it's the > > common C paradigm for printing pointers. Because of this, > > kptr_restrict has no affect on the output and thus, no way to contain > > the kernel address leak. > > So what? We a) don't care about out of tree modules and b) you could just triviall > fix them up if you care. Out of tree modules still affect core kernel security. I would also bet money, that somewhere In-tree someone has put a %p when they wanted a %pK. So this method is just quite error prone. We currently have a blacklist approach versus whitelist. > > No need to bloat the kernel with crap like this. It's unconstructive comments like this that do the whole community harm. Notice how responses from Kees Cook were aimed at finding a different solution to the problem and were very constructive. As far as "bloating" goes, it really didn't change a whole lot, most of it was moved lines, and adds maybe a few lines of code.
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[PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 william.c.roberts@intel.com - 2016-10-05 20:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-10-05 21:40 +0200
RE: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com> - 2016-10-06 15:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> - 2016-10-05 23:00 +0200
RE: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com> - 2016-10-06 15:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2016-10-06 15:40 +0200
RE: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com> - 2016-10-06 15:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> - 2016-10-06 16:00 +0200
RE: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com> - 2016-10-06 17:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-10-06 23:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> - 2016-10-06 23:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-10-06 23:30 +0200
RE: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 "Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com> - 2016-10-07 16:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] RE: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-06 16:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] RE: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-06 16:50 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] RE: [PATCH] printk: introduce kptr_restrict level 3 Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-10-07 14:00 +0200
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