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Groups > linux.kernel > #1493058
| From | Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] mm: add LSM hook for writes to readonly memory |
| Date | 2016-09-29 01:50 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <smwLU-4W8-3@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <smvZv-4rb-9@gated-at.bofh.it> <smvZv-4rb-7@gated-at.bofh.it> <smwsx-4PC-7@gated-at.bofh.it> <smwCe-4SR-33@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
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On Thu, Sep 29, 2016 at 01:32:56AM +0200, Jann Horn wrote: > On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 04:22:53PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > On Wed, Sep 28, 2016 at 3:54 PM, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> wrote: > > > SELinux attempts to make it possible to whitelist trustworthy sources of > > > code that may be mapped into memory, and Android makes use of this feature. > > > To prevent an attacker from bypassing this by modifying R+X memory through > > > /proc/$pid/mem or PTRACE_POKETEXT, it is necessary to call a security hook > > > in check_vma_flags(). > > > > If selinux policy allows PTRACE_POKETEXT, is it really so bad for that > > to result in code execution? > > Have a look at __ptrace_may_access(): > > /* Don't let security modules deny introspection */ > if (same_thread_group(task, current)) > return 0; > > This means thread A can attach to thread B and poke its memory, and SELinux > can't do anything about it. > > I guess another perspective on this would be that it's a problem that > interfaces usable for poking user memory are subject to introspection rules > (as opposed to e.g. /proc/self/maps, where it is actually useful). Ugh, I'm talking nonsense, ptrace() doesn't work on threads. (/proc/$pid/mem works though). And then, ptrace-ish APIs aside, there are those weird devices that do DMA with force=1.
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[PATCH v2 0/3] fix SELinux W^X bypass via ptrace Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-09-29 01:00 +0200
[PATCH v2 2/3] mm: add LSM hook for writes to readonly memory Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-09-29 01:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] mm: add LSM hook for writes to readonly memory Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2016-09-29 01:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] mm: add LSM hook for writes to readonly memory Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-09-29 01:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] mm: add LSM hook for writes to readonly memory Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-09-29 01:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 2/3] mm: add LSM hook for writes to readonly memory Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2016-09-29 08:30 +0200
[PATCH v2 1/3] fs/exec: don't force writing memory access Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-09-29 01:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 1/3] fs/exec: don't force writing memory access Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> - 2016-09-29 18:20 +0200
[PATCH v2 3/3] selinux: require EXECMEM for forced ptrace poke Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> - 2016-09-29 01:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] selinux: require EXECMEM for forced ptrace poke Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2016-09-29 08:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] selinux: require EXECMEM for forced ptrace poke Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> - 2016-09-29 18:50 +0200
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