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Groups > linux.kernel > #1471930
| From | Robert Foss <robert.foss@collabora.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v1] mm, sysctl: Add sysctl for controlling VM_MAYEXEC taint |
| Date | 2016-08-29 17:40 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <sbwPg-BA-25@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <saskG-15l-57@gated-at.bofh.it> <sax10-41h-17@gated-at.bofh.it> <sbwPg-BA-27@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On 2016-08-29 11:25 AM, Will Drewry wrote: > > > On Fri, Aug 26, 2016 at 4:32 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov > <kirill@shutemov.name <mailto:kirill@shutemov.name>> wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 26, 2016 at 12:30:04PM -0400, robert.foss@collabora.com > <mailto:robert.foss@collabora.com> wrote: > > From: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org <mailto:wad@chromium.org>> > > > > This patch proposes a sysctl knob that allows a privileged user to > > disable ~VM_MAYEXEC tainting when mapping in a vma from a MNT_NOEXEC > > mountpoint. It does not alter the normal behavior resulting from > > attempting to directly mmap(PROT_EXEC) a vma (-EPERM) nor the behavior > > of any other subsystems checking MNT_NOEXEC. > > Wouldn't it be equal to remounting all filesystems without noexec from > attacker POV? It's hardly a fence to make additional mprotect(PROT_EXEC) > call, before starting executing code from such filesystems. > > If administrator of the system wants this, he can just mount filesystem > without noexec, no new kernel code required. And it's more fine-grained > than this. > > So, no, I don't think we should add knob like this. Unless I miss > something. > > > I don't believe this patch is necessary anymore (though, thank you > Robert for testing and re-sending!). > > The primary offenders wrt to needing to mmap/mprotect a file in /dev/shm > was the older nvidia > driver (binary only iirc) and the Chrome Native Client code. > > The reason why half-exec is an "ok" (half) mitigation is because it > blocks simple gadgets and other paths for using loadable libraries or > binaries (via glibc) as it disallows mmap(PROT_EXEC) even though it > allows mprotect(PROT_EXEC). This stops ld in its tracks since it does > the obvious thing and uses mmap(PROT_EXEC). > > I think time has marched on and this patch is now something I can toss > in the dustbin of history. Both Chrome's Native Client and an older > nvidia driver relied on creating-then-unlinking a file in tmpfs, but > there is now a better facility! > > > NAK. > > > Agreed - this is old and software that predicated it should be gone.. I > hope. :) Splendid, patch dropped! Thanks Will and Kirill! Rob. > > > > > It is motivated by a common /dev/shm, /tmp usecase. There are few > > facilities for creating a shared memory segment that can be remapped in > > the same process address space with different permissions. > > What about using memfd_create(2) for such cases? You'll get a file > descriptor from in-kernel tmpfs (shm_mnt) which is not exposed to > userspace for remount as noexec. > > > This is a relatively old patch ( https://lwn.net/Articles/455256/ > <https://lwn.net/Articles/455256/> ) which predated memfd_create(). > memfd_create() is the right solution to this problem! > > > Thanks again! > will
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[PATCH v1] mm, sysctl: Add sysctl for controlling VM_MAYEXEC taint robert.foss@collabora.com - 2016-08-26 18:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v1] mm, sysctl: Add sysctl for controlling VM_MAYEXEC taint kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> - 2016-08-26 19:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v1] mm, sysctl: Add sysctl for controlling VM_MAYEXEC taint "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> - 2016-08-26 23:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v1] mm, sysctl: Add sysctl for controlling VM_MAYEXEC taint Robert Foss <robert.foss@collabora.com> - 2016-08-29 17:40 +0200
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