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Groups > linux.kernel > #1550303
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing |
| Date | 2017-01-04 00:50 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <sVH05-4YR-17@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <sVGdI-4qo-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <sVGQq-4Vk-19@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Tue, Jan 3, 2017 at 3:34 PM, Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael@kernel.org> wrote: > On Tue, Jan 3, 2017 at 11:58 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote: >> From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com> >> >> Various attacks are made possible due to the large attack surface of >> kernel drivers and the easy availability of hotpluggable hardware that can >> be programmed to mimic arbitrary devices. This allows attackers to find a >> single vulnerable driver and then produce a device that can exploit it by >> plugging into a hotpluggable bus (such as PCI or USB). This violates user >> assumptions about unattended systems being secure as long as the screen >> is locked. >> >> The kernel already has support for deferring driver binding in order >> to avoid problems over suspend/resume. By exposing this to userspace we >> can disable probing when the screen is locked and simply reenable it on >> unlock. >> >> This is not a complete solution - since this still permits device >> creation and simply blocks driver binding, it won't stop userspace >> drivers from attaching to devices and it won't protect against any kernel >> vulnerabilities in the core bus code. However, it should be sufficient to >> block attacks like Poisontap (https://samy.pl/poisontap/). > > It also looks like this may be worked around by tricking the user to > unlock the screen while the malicious device is still attached to the > system. It certainly changes the temporal aspect of the attack (i.e. there is a delay and must be "silent" in that the local user cannot notice it). > If that really is the case, I wonder if it's worth the extra complexity. I think so, since it's not that much more complexity (it uses the existing deferral mechanism). -Kees -- Kees Cook Nexus Security
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[PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-01-04 00:00 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> - 2017-01-04 00:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2017-01-04 00:50 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org> - 2017-01-04 02:50 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-01-04 10:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com> - 2017-01-04 19:20 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com> - 2017-01-04 19:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-01-04 20:50 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com> - 2017-01-04 21:10 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-01-04 21:50 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com> - 2017-01-04 23:00 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com> - 2017-01-04 23:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2017-01-04 20:50 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Matthew Garrett <mjg59@coreos.com> - 2017-01-04 21:10 +0100
Re: [PATCH] Allow userspace control of runtime disabling/enabling of driver probing Tomeu Vizoso <tomeu.vizoso@collabora.com> - 2017-01-05 09:20 +0100
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