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Groups > linux.kernel > #1522412
| From | Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v2] tile: handle __ro_after_init like parisc does |
| Date | 2016-11-15 08:50 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <sDGFb-1YS-7@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <sB8Rj-6fz-1@gated-at.bofh.it> <sDw37-3m0-17@gated-at.bofh.it> <sDwPw-3SH-23@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Mon, Nov 14, 2016 at 01:12:05PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote: > At some point here, I want to collect all the arch maintainers and > discuss the options for correctly reflecting the three data > memory-protection needs we have: > > - always read-only > - read-only after init > - read-only except during rare updates > > (The latter one doesn't exist all yet...) > > x86, arm, and arm64 use mark_rodata_ro() after init finishes, so they > don't technically implement "always read-only". parisc, tile, powerpc, > others have "always read-only", but disable read-only-after-init since > they don't use mark_rodata_ro(). I think s390 has recently implemented > both, but I have to double-check... Yes, s390 has both: an early always read-only support, which is effective as soon as paging_init() has set up and enabled page tables. Our mark_rodata_ro() implementation only makes the ro_after_init section read-only.
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[PATCH v2] tile: handle __ro_after_init like parisc does Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@mellanox.com> - 2016-11-14 21:30 +0100
Re: [PATCH v2] tile: handle __ro_after_init like parisc does Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-11-14 22:20 +0100
Re: [PATCH v2] tile: handle __ro_after_init like parisc does Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> - 2016-11-15 08:50 +0100
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