Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]


Groups > linux.kernel > #1466090

[PATCH 3.12 100/100] module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules

From Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Newsgroups linux.kernel
Subject [PATCH 3.12 100/100] module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules
Date 2016-08-19 09:20 +0200
Message-ID <s7MfU-2xj-25@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
References <s7MfU-2xj-3@gated-at.bofh.it>
Organization linux.* mail to news gateway

Show all headers | View raw


From: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>

3.12-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

===============

commit bca014caaa6130e57f69b5bf527967aa8ee70fdd upstream.

Signing a module should only make it trusted by the specific kernel it
was built for, not anything else.  Loading a signed module meant for a
kernel with a different ABI could have interesting effects.
Therefore, treat all signatures as invalid when a module is
force-loaded.

Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
---
 kernel/module.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index ec40f03aa473..a8c4d4163a41 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -2491,13 +2491,18 @@ static inline void kmemleak_load_module(const struct module *mod,
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
 	int err = -ENOKEY;
 	const unsigned long markerlen = sizeof(MODULE_SIG_STRING) - 1;
 	const void *mod = info->hdr;
 
-	if (info->len > markerlen &&
+	/*
+	 * Require flags == 0, as a module with version information
+	 * removed is no longer the module that was signed
+	 */
+	if (flags == 0 &&
+	    info->len > markerlen &&
 	    memcmp(mod + info->len - markerlen, MODULE_SIG_STRING, markerlen) == 0) {
 		/* We truncate the module to discard the signature */
 		info->len -= markerlen;
@@ -2519,7 +2524,7 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
 	return err;
 }
 #else /* !CONFIG_MODULE_SIG */
-static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info)
+static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info, int flags)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -3247,7 +3252,7 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
 	struct module *mod;
 	long err;
 
-	err = module_sig_check(info);
+	err = module_sig_check(info, flags);
 	if (err)
 		goto free_copy;
 
-- 
2.9.3

Back to linux.kernel | Previous | Next | Find similar | Unroll thread


Thread

[PATCH 3.12 100/100] module: Invalidate signatures on force-loaded modules Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> - 2016-08-19 09:20 +0200

csiph-web