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Groups > linux.kernel > #1457276
| From | Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] kexec: extend kexec_file_load system call |
| Date | 2016-08-05 22:50 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <s2Ue5-44z-5@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <rTUQ2-6xe-19@gated-at.bofh.it> <rZkTv-By-3@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
Hi,
Am Dienstag, 26 Juli 2016, 21:24:29 schrieb Thiago Jung Bauermann:
> Notes:
> This is a new version of the last patch in this series which adds
> a function where each architecture can verify if the DTB is safe
> to load:
>
> int __weak arch_kexec_verify_buffer(enum kexec_file_type type,
> const void *buf,
> unsigned long size)
> {
> return -EINVAL;
> }
>
> I will then provide an implementation in my powerpc patch series
> which checks that the DTB only contains nodes and properties from a
> whitelist. arch_kexec_kernel_image_load will copy these properties
> to the device tree blob the kernel was booted with (and perform
> other changes such as setting /chosen/bootargs, of course).
Is this approach ok? If so, I'll post a patch next week adding an
arch_kexec_verify_buffer hook for powerpc to enforce the whitelist, and also
a new version of the patches implementing kexec_file_load for powerpc on top
of this series.
Eric, does this address your concerns?
--
[]'s
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center
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[PATCH v2 3/3] kexec: extend kexec_file_load system call Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-07-27 02:30 +0200 Re: [PATCH v2 3/3] kexec: extend kexec_file_load system call Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.vnet.ibm.com> - 2016-08-05 22:50 +0200
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