Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open

From	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Newsgroups	linux.kernel
Subject	Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open
Date	2016-08-03 16:50 +0200
Message-ID	<s25EB-3Lb-21@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
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On Tue, Aug 02, 2016 at 01:51:47PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Let me take this another way instead. What would be a better way to
> provide a mechanism for system owners to disable perf without an LSM?
> (Since far fewer folks run with an enforcing "big" LSM: I'm seeking as
> wide a coverage as possible.)

Could something like a new capability bit work?

I'm thinking that applications that have network connections already
drop all possible capabilities (I know, unlikely to be true, but should
be true for most stuff I hope). This would disable perf for remote code
execution exploits, including web-browsers and the lot.

It would keep perf working for local stuff by default, although
obviously with pam_cap you can limit this when and where needed.

For Android this could mean the JVM explicitly dropping the cap for its
'children' while retaining the use itself. And this would also keep perf
working on the ADB shell stuff.

And, I think this would allow a JIT executable to gain the cap using
file caps, even when the user using it doesn't have it, which would keep
things usable even in restricted environments.

Or am I misunderstanding capabilities -- which is entirely possible.

Thread

[PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> - 2016-07-27 16:50 +0200
  Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-07-27 22:50 +0200
  Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of  perf_event_open Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2016-08-02 12:50 +0200
    Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of  perf_event_open Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> - 2016-08-02 15:20 +0200
      Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow  further restriction of perf_event_open Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-08-02 16:20 +0200
    Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow  further restriction of perf_event_open Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-08-02 15:30 +0200
    Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-08-02 23:00 +0200
      Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2016-08-03 10:30 +0200
        Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow  further restriction of perf_event_open Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-08-03 14:30 +0200
          Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow  further restriction of perf_event_open Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-08-03 15:00 +0200
          Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2016-08-03 15:40 +0200
      Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2016-08-03 16:50 +0200
        RE: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow  further restriction of perf_event_open "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com> - 2016-08-03 17:50 +0200
      Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-08-03 21:30 +0200
        Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2016-08-04 00:40 +0200
          Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2016-08-04 05:40 +0200
            Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2016-08-04 11:20 +0200
              Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2016-08-04 17:30 +0200
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2016-08-04 17:40 +0200
      Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow  further restriction of perf_event_open Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-08-03 22:00 +0200
        Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> - 2016-08-04 12:40 +0200
          Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow  further restriction of perf_event_open Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-08-04 15:50 +0200
            Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2016-08-04 16:20 +0200
              Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow  further restriction of perf_event_open Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-08-04 17:50 +0200
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2016-08-04 18:00 +0200
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> - 2016-08-04 18:20 +0200
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow  further restriction of perf_event_open Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-08-04 18:40 +0200
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> - 2016-08-04 19:20 +0200
                Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow  further restriction of perf_event_open Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-08-04 19:40 +0200
      Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2016-08-04 01:50 +0200
    Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2016-08-02 23:00 +0200
      Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> - 2016-08-02 23:20 +0200
    Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further  restriction of perf_event_open Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-08-02 23:40 +0200

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