Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > linux.kernel > #1373536
| From | Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization |
| Date | 2016-04-07 18:40 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <rll8m-6JT-13@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <rl1t0-n7-21@gated-at.bofh.it> <rl3uN-1KQ-5@gated-at.bofh.it> <rlkOZ-6z5-15@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
That's a use after free. The randomization of the freelist should not have much effect on that. I was going to quote this exploit that is applicable to SLAB as well: https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/09/10/linux-kernel-can-slub-overflow Regards. Thomas On Thu, Apr 7, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@debian.org> wrote: > On mer., 2016-04-06 at 14:45 -0700, Kees Cook wrote: >> > This security feature reduces the predictability of >> > the kernel slab allocator against heap overflows. >> >> I would add "... rendering attacks much less stable." And if you can >> find a specific example exploit that is foiled by this, I would refer >> to it. > > One good example might (or might not) be the keyring issue from earlier this > year (CVE-2016-0728): > > http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-ker > nel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/ > > Regards, > -- > Yves-Alexis >
Back to linux.kernel | Previous | Next — Previous in thread | Next in thread | Find similar | Unroll thread
[RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-04-06 21:40 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-04-06 23:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-04-06 23:10 +0200
Re: [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-04-06 23:50 +0200
Re: [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-04-07 17:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Yves-Alexis Perez <corsac@debian.org> - 2016-04-07 18:20 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> - 2016-04-07 18:40 +0200
Re: [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> - 2016-04-07 23:20 +0200
Re: [RFC v1] mm: SLAB freelist randomization Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-04-08 04:40 +0200
csiph-web