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Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code

From Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Newsgroups linux.kernel
Subject Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code
Date 2016-07-25 19:00 +0200
Message-ID <rYRot-6Xf-1@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
References <rMhqp-6JS-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <rMhqp-6JS-9@gated-at.bofh.it> <rYwDn-2Sx-11@gated-at.bofh.it> <rYHIt-1cB-5@gated-at.bofh.it>
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On Jul 24, 2016 11:38 PM, "Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org> wrote:
>
>
> * Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:
>
> > On Mon, Jun 20, 2016 at 4:39 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > Setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace is wrong: if we happen to do it during
> > > syscall entry, then we'll confuse seccomp and audit.  (The former
> > > isn't a security problem: seccomp is currently entirely insecure if a
> > > malicious ptracer is attached.)  As a minimal fix, this patch adds a
> > > new flag TS_I386_REGS_POKED that handles the ptrace special case.
> >
> > Hi Ingo-
> >
> > Could you apply this one patch for 4.8?  While I don't think it's a
> > significant security issue in 4.7 or earlier, leaving it unfixed in
> > 4.8 will introduce a potentially unpleasant interaction with some
> > seccomp changes that are queued up in the
> > security tree for 4.8.
> >
> > It will have a trivially-resolvable conflict with -mm.
> >
> > The rest of the series this is in can wait.
>
> I don't mind the rest of the series either - could you please repost it (with the
> review feedback addressed)?

I'm nervous about it for a couple reasons involving the fact that it's
user visible.

1. It doesn't make gdb work right in all the cases that gdb currently
gets wrong.  I haven't had time to think about whether there's a
minimal tweak that would fix this.

2. It might have annoying interactions with seccomp whitelists.  I
don't know that for sure, but I still don't love it.


Patch 1 is only user-visible in the case where the current behavior is
clearly wrong, so I'd personally be more comfortable applying just
patch 1 for 4.8.

--Andy

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Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2016-07-24 20:50 +0200
  Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2016-07-25 08:40 +0200
    Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> - 2016-07-25 18:40 +0200
    Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2016-07-25 19:00 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v3 1/3] x86/ptrace: Stop setting TS_COMPAT in ptrace code Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2016-07-26 02:30 +0200

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