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Groups > linux.kernel > #1427698
| From | David Jaša <djasa@redhat.com> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach |
| Date | 2016-06-21 14:30 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <rMsYx-5LM-7@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <rKlHP-4PC-1@gated-at.bofh.it> <rKmkx-52w-19@gated-at.bofh.it> <rL2tr-7fP-21@gated-at.bofh.it> <rLpJo-5ix-1@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | Red Hat, Inc. |
Hi, On So, 2016-06-18 at 10:44 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 03:56:13PM +0200, David Jaša wrote: > > I was thinking along the lines that "almost every important package > > supports FreeBSD as well where they have to handle the condition so > > option to switch to Rather Break Than Generate Weak Keys would be nice" > > - but I didn't expect that systemd could be a roadblock here. :-/ > > It wasn't just systemd; it also broke OpenWRT and Ubuntu Quantal > systems from booting. > > > I was also thinking of little devices where OpenWRT or proprietary > > Linux-based systems run that ended up with predictable keys way too > > ofter (or as in OpenWRT's case, with cumbersome tutorials how to > > generate keys elsewhere). > > OpenWRT and other embedded devices (a) generally use a single master > oscillator to drive everything, and (b) often use RISC architectures > such as MIPS. > > Which means that arguments of the form ``the Intel L1 / L2 cache > architecture is ****soooo**** complicated that no human could possibly > figure out how they would affect timing calculations, and besides, my > generator passes FIPS 140-2 tests (never mind AES(NSA_KEY, CNTR++) this > also passes the FIPS 140-2 statistical tests)'' --- which I normally > have trouble believing --- are even harder for me to believe. > > At the end of the day, with these devices you really badly need a > hardware RNG. and this. It seems much easier to me to embed AES(NSA_KEY, CNTR++) logic directly to HW RNG compared to tweaking of every microarchitecture to make jitter/maxwell/havege return known numbers that are going to be mixed with other entropy anyway (won't they?). So if I put the bits together correctly, HW RNG helps getting more random numbers but itself is insufficient to ensure that random numbers are truly random... Cheers, David Jaša > We can't generate randomness out of thin air. The only > thing you really can do requires user space help, which is to generate > keys lazily, or as late as possible, so you can gather as much entropy > as you can --- and to feed in measurements from the WiFi (RSSI > measurements, MAC addresses seen, etc.) This won't help much if you > have an FBI van parked outside your house trying to carry out a > TEMPEST attack, but hopefully it provides some protection against a > remote attacker who isn't try to carry out an on-premises attack. > > Cheers, > > - Ted
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Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach David Jaša <djasa@redhat.com> - 2016-06-15 18:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-15 19:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach David Jaša <djasa@redhat.com> - 2016-06-17 16:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@gmail.com> - 2016-06-17 17:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-18 10:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-18 10:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> - 2016-06-18 16:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-18 18:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach "Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@gmail.com> - 2016-06-20 19:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-20 20:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach "Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@gmail.com> - 2016-06-21 15:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-21 15:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach "Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@gmail.com> - 2016-06-21 20:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-21 20:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach "Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@gmail.com> - 2016-06-21 21:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-22 07:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach "Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@gmail.com> - 2016-06-22 15:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-22 15:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Tomas Mraz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2016-06-21 15:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-21 19:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach "Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@gmail.com> - 2016-06-21 20:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> - 2016-06-21 20:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach "Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@gmail.com> - 2016-06-21 20:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> - 2016-06-21 15:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach "Austin S. Hemmelgarn" <ahferroin7@gmail.com> - 2016-06-21 19:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 0/5] /dev/random - a new approach David Jaša <djasa@redhat.com> - 2016-06-21 14:30 +0200
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