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Groups > linux.kernel > #1429270

[PATCH 4.4 49/75] sched: panic on corrupted stack end

From Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Newsgroups linux.kernel
Subject [PATCH 4.4 49/75] sched: panic on corrupted stack end
Date 2016-06-23 01:20 +0200
Message-ID <rMZB7-1wq-5@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
References <rMZ85-15H-3@gated-at.bofh.it>
Organization linux.* mail to news gateway

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4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>

commit 29d6455178a09e1dc340380c582b13356227e8df upstream.

Until now, hitting this BUG_ON caused a recursive oops (because oops
handling involves do_exit(), which calls into the scheduler, which in
turn raises an oops), which caused stuff below the stack to be
overwritten until a panic happened (e.g.  via an oops in interrupt
context, caused by the overwritten CPU index in the thread_info).

Just panic directly.

Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

---
 kernel/sched/core.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -3008,7 +3008,8 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(stru
 static inline void schedule_debug(struct task_struct *prev)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK
-	BUG_ON(task_stack_end_corrupted(prev));
+	if (task_stack_end_corrupted(prev))
+		panic("corrupted stack end detected inside scheduler\n");
 #endif
 
 	if (unlikely(in_atomic_preempt_off())) {

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[PATCH 4.4 49/75] sched: panic on corrupted stack end Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2016-06-23 01:20 +0200

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