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Groups > linux.kernel > #1424731
| From | Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open |
| Date | 2016-06-17 09:00 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <rKVUZ-372-7@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <qPMzU-4ae-19@gated-at.bofh.it> <qPMzU-4ae-17@gated-at.bofh.it> <rnvGh-3Tg-9@gated-at.bofh.it> <rKNXs-5C7-23@gated-at.bofh.it> <rKNXs-5C7-21@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 03:27:55PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: > Hi guys, > > This patch wasn't originally CCed to you (I'm fixing that now). Would > you consider taking this into the perf tree? No. > It's been in active use > in both Debian and Android for a while now. Very nice of you all to finally inform us I suppose :/ > >>> When kernel.perf_event_open is set to 3 (or greater), disallow all > >>> access to performance events by users without CAP_SYS_ADMIN. > >>> Add a Kconfig symbol CONFIG_SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT that > >>> makes this value the default. > >>> > >>> This is based on a similar feature in grsecurity > >>> (CONFIG_GRKERNSEC_PERF_HARDEN). This version doesn't include making > >>> the variable read-only. It also allows enabling further restriction > >>> at run-time regardless of whether the default is changed. This Changelog is completely devoid of information. _WHY_ are you doing this? Also, hate the CONFIG.
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Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-06-17 00:30 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> - 2016-06-17 09:00 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-06-17 18:20 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org> - 2016-06-17 22:10 +0200
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 2/2] security,perf: Allow further restriction of perf_event_open Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com> - 2016-06-18 03:00 +0200
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