Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]
Groups > linux.kernel > #1276933
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR. |
| Date | 2015-11-25 01:50 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <qywrv-75M-9@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <qwkkO-1pG-7@gated-at.bofh.it> <qwkkO-1pG-9@gated-at.bofh.it> <qywrv-75M-1@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Tue, Nov 24, 2015 at 4:40 PM, Andrew Morton
<akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Wed, 18 Nov 2015 15:20:05 -0800 Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> wrote:
>
>> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
>> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
>> @@ -1568,6 +1568,28 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
>> .mode = 0644,
>> .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
>> },
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
>> + {
>> + .procname = "mmap_rnd_bits",
>> + .data = &mmap_rnd_bits,
>> + .maxlen = sizeof(mmap_rnd_bits),
>> + .mode = 0644,
>
> Is there any harm in permitting the attacker to read these values?
>
> And is there any benefit in permitting non-attackers to read them?
I'm on the fence. Things like kernel/randomize_va_space is 644. But
since I don't see a benefit in exposing them, let's make them all 600
instead -- it's a new interface, better to keep it narrower now.
>
>> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
>> + .extra1 = &mmap_rnd_bits_min,
>> + .extra2 = &mmap_rnd_bits_max,
>> + },
>> +#endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
>> + {
>> + .procname = "mmap_rnd_compat_bits",
>> + .data = &mmap_rnd_compat_bits,
>> + .maxlen = sizeof(mmap_rnd_compat_bits),
>> + .mode = 0644,
>> + .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
>> + .extra1 = &mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min,
>> + .extra2 = &mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max,
>> + },
>> +#endif
>>
>> ...
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
>> +int mmap_rnd_bits_min = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN;
>> +int mmap_rnd_bits_max = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX;
>> +int mmap_rnd_bits = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS;
>> +#endif
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS
>> +int mmap_rnd_compat_bits_min = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN;
>> +int mmap_rnd_compat_bits_max = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX;
>> +int mmap_rnd_compat_bits = CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS;
>
> These could be __read_mostly.
>
> If one believes in such things. One effect of __read_mostly is to
> clump the write-often stuff into the same cachelines and I've never
> been convinced that one outweighs the other...
The _min and _max values should be const, actually, since they're
build-time selected. The _bits could easily be __read_mostly, yeah.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
Back to linux.kernel | Previous | Next — Previous in thread | Next in thread | Find similar | Unroll thread
[PATCH v3 0/4] Allow customizable random offset to mmap_base address. Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> - 2015-11-19 00:30 +0100
[PATCH v3 1/4] mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR. Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> - 2015-11-19 00:30 +0100
Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR. Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> - 2015-11-19 01:20 +0100
Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR. Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> - 2015-11-25 01:50 +0100
Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR. Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2015-11-25 01:50 +0100
Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR. Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> - 2015-11-25 20:20 +0100
Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR. Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> - 2015-11-25 05:50 +0100
Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] mm: mmap: Add new /proc tunable for mmap_base ASLR. Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> - 2015-11-25 20:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] Allow customizable random offset to mmap_base address. Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> - 2015-11-25 01:40 +0100
Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] Allow customizable random offset to mmap_base address. Daniel Cashman <dcashman@android.com> - 2015-11-25 20:10 +0100
Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] Allow customizable random offset to mmap_base address. Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> - 2015-11-26 16:20 +0100
Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] Allow customizable random offset to mmap_base address. Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> - 2015-11-26 08:10 +0100
csiph-web