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Groups > linux.kernel > #1253229
| From | Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings |
| Date | 2015-10-21 22:50 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <qm8uD-5O3-19@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | (6 earlier) <qm1CP-4fn-41@gated-at.bofh.it> <qm1CQ-4fn-51@gated-at.bofh.it> <qm2Iy-5OI-27@gated-at.bofh.it> <qm6Ct-346-7@gated-at.bofh.it> <qm8uD-5O3-17@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Wed, Oct 21, 2015 at 1:45 PM, Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> wrote: > On Wed, 21 Oct, at 11:46:53AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote: >> >> If the UEFI stuff is mapped in its own PGD entry, we could just RO >> that entire PGD entry everywhere except the UEFI pgd (and make sure to >> clear G so that the TLB entries get zapped). > > What would be the benefit of making it RO as opposed to not having it > mapped at all? Nothing. > The mappings only exist in the trampoline_pgd right now > for x86 which minimizes the potentially vulnerable code paths to the > EFI runtime calls and the suspend/resume code. Oh, I didn't realize it. So what's the problem here? Honestly, while UEFI is full of questionable things, I don't really see how an unprivileged user program should be able to cause malicious input to be send to UEFI code, so it should be quite difficult to exploit a buffer overflow or other errant write in UEFI to escalate privileges from user to anything else. (Kernel -> SMM escalation is a whole different story, but preventing that is SMM's business, not the kernel's. I've actually been a wee bit tempted to write a /dev/smram driver to expose SMRAM using a portfolio of old known exploits.) --Andy -- Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2015-10-21 11:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2015-10-21 14:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2015-10-21 15:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> - 2015-10-21 15:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2015-10-21 15:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> - 2015-10-21 16:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2015-10-21 20:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2015-10-21 22:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2015-10-21 22:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2015-10-21 22:40 +0200
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