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Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings

From Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Newsgroups linux.kernel
Subject Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings
Date 2015-10-21 22:50 +0200
Message-ID <qm8uD-5O3-19@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
References (6 earlier) <qm1CP-4fn-41@gated-at.bofh.it> <qm1CQ-4fn-51@gated-at.bofh.it> <qm2Iy-5OI-27@gated-at.bofh.it> <qm6Ct-346-7@gated-at.bofh.it> <qm8uD-5O3-17@gated-at.bofh.it>
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On Wed, Oct 21, 2015 at 1:45 PM, Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> wrote:
> On Wed, 21 Oct, at 11:46:53AM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>
>> If the UEFI stuff is mapped in its own PGD entry, we could just RO
>> that entire PGD entry everywhere except the UEFI pgd (and make sure to
>> clear G so that the TLB entries get zapped).
>
> What would be the benefit of making it RO as opposed to not having it
> mapped at all?

Nothing.

> The mappings only exist in the trampoline_pgd right now
> for x86 which minimizes the potentially vulnerable code paths to the
> EFI runtime calls and the suspend/resume code.

Oh, I didn't realize it.

So what's the problem here?  Honestly, while UEFI is full of
questionable things, I don't really see how an unprivileged user
program should be able to cause malicious input to be send to UEFI
code, so it should be quite difficult to exploit a buffer overflow or
other errant write in UEFI to escalate privileges from user to
anything else.  (Kernel -> SMM escalation is a whole different story,
but preventing that is SMM's business, not the kernel's.  I've
actually been a wee bit tempted to write a /dev/smram driver to expose
SMRAM using a portfolio of old known exploits.)

--Andy

-- 
Andy Lutomirski
AMA Capital Management, LLC
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Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2015-10-21 11:50 +0200
  Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> - 2015-10-21 14:50 +0200
    Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2015-10-21 15:00 +0200
      Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> - 2015-10-21 15:30 +0200
        Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> - 2015-10-21 15:30 +0200
          Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> - 2015-10-21 16:40 +0200
            Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2015-10-21 20:50 +0200
              Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2015-10-21 22:50 +0200
              Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2015-10-21 22:50 +0200
  Re: [PATCH v2] x86/mm: warn on W+x mappings Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk> - 2015-10-21 22:40 +0200

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