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Groups > linux.kernel > #1232459
| From | ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v4 4/7] fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block |
| Date | 2015-09-25 00:10 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <qcmSe-7CQ-13@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <qbYGd-6ib-9@gated-at.bofh.it> <qbYGd-6ib-15@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> writes:
> Capability sets attached to files must be ignored except in the
> user namespaces where the mounter is privileged, i.e. s_user_ns
> and its descendants. Otherwise a vector exists for gaining
> privileges in namespaces where a user is not already privileged.
>
> Add a new helper function, in_user_ns(), to test whether a user
> namespace is the same as or a descendant of another namespace.
> Use this helper to determine whether a file's capability set
> should be applied to the caps constructed during exec.
No issues with this but given that we always pass current_user_ns()
we may want to simplify the users of in_user_ns by renaming it
current_in_user_ns() and hard codeing current_user_ns().
Eric
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
> ---
> include/linux/user_namespace.h | 8 ++++++++
> kernel/user_namespace.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
> security/commoncap.c | 2 ++
> 3 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> index 8297e5b341d8..a43faa727124 100644
> --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h
> @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ extern ssize_t proc_projid_map_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t,
> extern ssize_t proc_setgroups_write(struct file *, const char __user *, size_t, loff_t *);
> extern int proc_setgroups_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v);
> extern bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns);
> +extern bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
> + const struct user_namespace *target_ns);
> #else
>
> static inline struct user_namespace *get_user_ns(struct user_namespace *ns)
> @@ -100,6 +102,12 @@ static inline bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
> {
> return true;
> }
> +
> +static inline bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
> + const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
> +{
> + return true;
> +}
> #endif
>
> #endif /* _LINUX_USER_H */
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 88fefa68c516..69fbc377357b 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -945,6 +945,20 @@ bool userns_may_setgroups(const struct user_namespace *ns)
> return allowed;
> }
>
> +/*
> + * Returns true if @ns is the same namespace as or a descendant of
> + * @target_ns.
> + */
> +bool in_userns(const struct user_namespace *ns,
> + const struct user_namespace *target_ns)
> +{
> + for (; ns; ns = ns->parent) {
> + if (ns == target_ns)
> + return true;
> + }
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> static inline struct user_namespace *to_user_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
> {
> return container_of(ns, struct user_namespace, ns);
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 1832cf701c3d..400aa224b491 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -450,6 +450,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
>
> if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
> return 0;
> + if (!in_userns(current_user_ns(), bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
> + return 0;
>
> rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
> if (rc < 0) {
--
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[PATCH v4 0/7] Initial support for user namespace owned mounts Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-09-23 22:20 +0200
[PATCH v4 4/7] fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-09-23 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 4/7] fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2015-09-25 00:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 4/7] fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-09-25 14:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 4/7] fs: Limit file caps to the user namespace of the super block ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2015-09-25 20:10 +0200
[PATCH v4 5/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-09-23 22:20 +0200
[PATCH v4 3/7] fs: Verify access of user towards block device file when mounting Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-09-23 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 3/7] fs: Verify access of user towards block device file when mounting ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2015-09-25 00:10 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 3/7] fs: Verify access of user towards block device file when mounting Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-09-25 14:50 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 3/7] fs: Verify access of user towards block device file when mounting ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2015-09-25 19:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 3/7] fs: Verify access of user towards block device file when mounting Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-09-25 19:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 3/7] fs: Verify access of user towards block device file when mounting ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2015-09-25 20:00 +0200
[PATCH v4 7/7] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-09-23 22:20 +0200
[PATCH v4 1/7] fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-09-23 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 1/7] fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2015-09-24 23:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 1/7] fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-09-25 15:00 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 1/7] fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2015-09-25 19:40 +0200
[PATCH v4 6/7] Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-09-23 22:20 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 6/7] Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2015-09-25 00:30 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 6/7] Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> - 2015-09-25 00:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 6/7] Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) - 2015-09-27 21:40 +0200
Re: [PATCH v4 6/7] Smack: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-09-28 21:50 +0200
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