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Groups > linux.kernel > #1312429
| From | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory |
| Date | 2016-01-19 19:20 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <qSIT8-33H-5@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
One of the easiest ways to protect the kernel from attack is to reduce the internal attack surface exposed when a "write" flaw is available. By making as much of the kernel read-only as possible, we reduce the attack surface. Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro() which happens after all kernel __init code has finished. This introduces __ro_after_init as a way to mark such memory, and uses it on the x86 vDSO to kill an extant kernel exploitation method. Also adds a new kernel parameter to help debug future use and adds an lkdtm test to check the results. -Kees v4: - rebased v3: - conslidated mark_rodata_ro() - make CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA always enabled on x86, mingo - enhanced strtobool and potential callers to use "on"/"off" - use strtobool for rodata= param, gregkh v2: - renamed __read_only to __ro_after_init
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[PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-01-19 19:20 +0100
[PATCH v4 7/8] lkdtm: verify that __ro_after_init works correctly Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-01-19 19:20 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory David Brown <david.brown@linaro.org> - 2016-01-22 18:30 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory Laura Abbott <laura@labbott.name> - 2016-01-22 20:20 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2016-01-22 21:00 +0100
Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 0/8] introduce post-init read-only memory Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> - 2016-01-23 10:50 +0100
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