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Groups > linux.kernel > #1285952

[PATCH v2 13/18] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb()

From Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Newsgroups linux.kernel
Subject [PATCH v2 13/18] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb()
Date 2015-12-07 22:30 +0100
Message-ID <qDbw7-1y2-41@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
References <qDbw5-1y2-3@gated-at.bofh.it>
Organization linux.* mail to news gateway

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Superblock level remounts are currently restricted to global
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, as is the path for changing the root mount to
read only on umount. Loosen both of these permission checks to
also allow CAP_SYS_ADMIN in any namespace which is privileged
towards the userns which originally mounted the filesystem.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/namespace.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
index 18fc58760aec..b00a765895e7 100644
--- a/fs/namespace.c
+++ b/fs/namespace.c
@@ -1510,7 +1510,7 @@ static int do_umount(struct mount *mnt, int flags)
 		 * Special case for "unmounting" root ...
 		 * we just try to remount it readonly.
 		 */
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (!ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 			return -EPERM;
 		down_write(&sb->s_umount);
 		if (!(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY))
@@ -2199,7 +2199,7 @@ static int do_remount(struct path *path, int flags, int mnt_flags,
 	down_write(&sb->s_umount);
 	if (flags & MS_BIND)
 		err = change_mount_flags(path->mnt, flags);
-	else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	else if (!ns_capable(sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		err = -EPERM;
 	else
 		err = do_remount_sb(sb, flags, data, 0);
-- 
1.9.1

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Thread

[PATCH v2 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-07 22:30 +0100
  [PATCH v2 15/18] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-07 22:30 +0100
  [PATCH v2 13/18] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-07 22:30 +0100
  [PATCH v2 17/18] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-07 22:30 +0100
  [PATCH v2 10/18] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-07 22:30 +0100
  [PATCH v2 04/18] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-07 22:40 +0100
  [PATCH v2 05/18] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-07 22:40 +0100
  [PATCH v2 09/18] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-07 22:40 +0100
  [PATCH v2 06/18] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-07 22:40 +0100
  [PATCH v2 01/18] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-07 22:40 +0100
  [PATCH v2 02/18] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-07 22:40 +0100

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