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Groups > linux.kernel > #1287472
| From | Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | Re: [PATCH v4] fs: clear file privilege bits when mmap writing |
| Date | 2015-12-09 13:50 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <qDMlX-8sJ-7@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <qDzRM-nl-9@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
On Tue 08-12-15 15:28:18, Kees Cook wrote: > Normally, when a user can modify a file that has setuid or setgid bits, > those bits are cleared when they are not the file owner or a member > of the group. This is enforced when using write and truncate but not > when writing to a shared mmap on the file. This could allow the file > writer to gain privileges by changing a binary without losing the > setuid/setgid/caps bits. > > Changing the bits requires holding inode->i_mutex, so it cannot be done > during the page fault (due to mmap_sem being held during the fault). We > could do this during vm_mmap_pgoff, but that would need coverage in > mprotect as well, but to check for MAP_SHARED, we'd need to hold mmap_sem > again. > > Instead, detect the need to clear the bits during the page fault, and > actually remove the bits during final fput. Since the file was open for > writing, it wouldn't have been possible to execute it yet. > > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > --- > Here's another way? I wonder which of these will actually work. I > wish we could reject writes if file_remove_privs() fails. Yeah, the fact that we cannot do anything with file_remove_privs() failure is rather unfortunate. So open for writing may be the best choice for file_remove_privs() in the end? It's not perfect but it looks like the least problematic solution. Frankly writeable files that have SUID / SGID bits set are IMHO problems on its own, with IMA attrs which are handled by file_remove_privs() as well things may be somewhat different. > diff --git a/fs/file_table.c b/fs/file_table.c > index ad17e05ebf95..abb537ef4344 100644 > --- a/fs/file_table.c > +++ b/fs/file_table.c > @@ -191,6 +191,14 @@ static void __fput(struct file *file) > > might_sleep(); > > + /* > + * XXX: While avoiding mmap_sem, we've already been written to. > + * We must ignore the return value, since we can't reject the > + * write. > + */ > + if (unlikely(file->f_remove_privs)) > + file_remove_privs(file); > + You're missing i_mutex locking again ;). Honza -- Jan Kara <jack@suse.com> SUSE Labs, CR -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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[PATCH v4] fs: clear file privilege bits when mmap writing Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2015-12-09 00:30 +0100
Re: [PATCH v4] fs: clear file privilege bits when mmap writing Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> - 2015-12-09 13:50 +0100
Re: [PATCH v4] fs: clear file privilege bits when mmap writing Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2015-12-09 19:00 +0100
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