Groups | Search | Server Info | Keyboard shortcuts | Login | Register [http] [https] [nntp] [nntps]

Groups > linux.kernel > #1284020

Re: [PATCH 03/19] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid

Show all headers | View raw

On Wed, Dec 02, 2015 at 09:40:03AM -0600, Seth Forshee wrote:
> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
> 
> If a process gets access to a mount from a different user
> namespace, that process should not be able to take advantage of
> setuid files or selinux entrypoints from that filesystem.  Prevent
> this by treating mounts from other mount namespaces and those not
> owned by current_user_ns() or an ancestor as nosuid.
> 
> This will make it safer to allow more complex filesystems to be
> mounted in non-root user namespaces.
> 
> This does not remove the need for MNT_LOCK_NOSUID.  The setuid,
> setgid, and file capability bits can no longer be abused if code in
> a user namespace were to clear nosuid on an untrusted filesystem,
> but this patch, by itself, is insufficient to protect the system
> from abuse of files that, when execed, would increase MAC privilege.
> 
> As a more concrete explanation, any task that can manipulate a
> vfsmount associated with a given user namespace already has
> capabilities in that namespace and all of its descendents.  If they
> can cause a malicious setuid, setgid, or file-caps executable to
> appear in that mount, then that executable will only allow them to
> elevate privileges in exactly the set of namespaces in which they
> are already privileges.
> 
> On the other hand, if they can cause a malicious executable to
> appear with a dangerous MAC label, running it could change the
> caller's security context in a way that should not have been
> possible, even inside the namespace in which the task is confined.
> 
> As a hardening measure, this would have made CVE-2014-5207 much
> more difficult to exploit.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
> Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

> ---
>  fs/exec.c                |  2 +-
>  fs/namespace.c           | 13 +++++++++++++
>  include/linux/mount.h    |  1 +
>  security/commoncap.c     |  2 +-
>  security/selinux/hooks.c |  2 +-
>  5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
> index b06623a9347f..ea7311d72cc3 100644
> --- a/fs/exec.c
> +++ b/fs/exec.c
> @@ -1295,7 +1295,7 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
>  	bprm->cred->euid = current_euid();
>  	bprm->cred->egid = current_egid();
>  
> -	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
> +	if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
>  		return;
>  
>  	if (task_no_new_privs(current))
> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
> index da70f7c4ece1..2101ce7b96ab 100644
> --- a/fs/namespace.c
> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
> @@ -3276,6 +3276,19 @@ found:
>  	return visible;
>  }
>  
> +bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt)
> +{
> +	/*
> +	 * Foreign mounts (accessed via fchdir or through /proc
> +	 * symlinks) are always treated as if they are nosuid.  This
> +	 * prevents namespaces from trusting potentially unsafe
> +	 * suid/sgid bits, file caps, or security labels that originate
> +	 * in other namespaces.
> +	 */
> +	return !(mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) && check_mnt(real_mount(mnt)) &&
> +	       in_userns(current_user_ns(), mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns);
> +}
> +
>  static struct ns_common *mntns_get(struct task_struct *task)
>  {
>  	struct ns_common *ns = NULL;
> diff --git a/include/linux/mount.h b/include/linux/mount.h
> index f822c3c11377..54a594d49733 100644
> --- a/include/linux/mount.h
> +++ b/include/linux/mount.h
> @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@ extern void mntput(struct vfsmount *mnt);
>  extern struct vfsmount *mntget(struct vfsmount *mnt);
>  extern struct vfsmount *mnt_clone_internal(struct path *path);
>  extern int __mnt_is_readonly(struct vfsmount *mnt);
> +extern bool mnt_may_suid(struct vfsmount *mnt);
>  
>  struct path;
>  extern struct vfsmount *clone_private_mount(struct path *path);
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 400aa224b491..6243aef5860e 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
>  	if (!file_caps_enabled)
>  		return 0;
>  
> -	if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
> +	if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt))
>  		return 0;
>  	if (!in_userns(current_user_ns(), bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns))
>  		return 0;
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index d0cfaa9f19d0..a5b93df6553f 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -2171,7 +2171,7 @@ static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
>  			    const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
>  {
>  	int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
> -	int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
> +	int nosuid = !mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt);
>  	int rc;
>  
>  	if (!nnp && !nosuid)
> -- 
> 1.9.1
--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in
the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
Please read the FAQ at  http://www.tux.org/lkml/

Back to linux.kernel | Previous | Next — Previous in thread | Next in thread | Find similar | Unroll thread

Thread

[PATCH 00/19] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-02 16:50 +0100
  [PATCH 01/19] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-02 17:00 +0100
    Re: [PATCH 01/19] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in  lookup_bdev() "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> - 2015-12-04 17:30 +0100
  [PATCH 03/19] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-02 17:00 +0100
    Re: [PATCH 03/19] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> - 2015-12-04 18:00 +0100
  [PATCH 02/19] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> - 2015-12-02 17:00 +0100
    Re: [PATCH 02/19] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device  inode when mounting "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com> - 2015-12-04 17:30 +0100

csiph-web