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Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type

From Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Newsgroups linux.kernel
Subject Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type
Date 2015-09-09 19:30 +0200
Message-ID <q6Rm2-1gb-21@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink)
References (5 earlier) <q6PWW-7yW-17@gated-at.bofh.it> <q6Q6C-7ZD-17@gated-at.bofh.it> <q6Q6C-7ZD-15@gated-at.bofh.it> <q6QzE-5Y-11@gated-at.bofh.it> <q6QT0-sK-9@gated-at.bofh.it>
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On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 9:52 AM, Alexei Starovoitov
<alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 09, 2015 at 09:37:51AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Wed, Sep 9, 2015 at 9:09 AM, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> wrote:
>> > On 09/09/2015 06:07 PM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On Wed, Sep 09, 2015 at 09:50:35AM -0600, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>> >
>> > [...]
>> >>>
>> >>> Thoughts?
>> >>
>> >>
>> >> Please do not add any per-instruction hacks. None of them are
>> >> necessary. Classic had to do extra ugly checks in seccomp only
>> >> because verifier wasn't flexible enough.
>> >> If you don't want to see any BPF_CALL in seccomp, just have
>> >> empty get_func_proto() callback for BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP
>> >> and verifier will reject all calls.
>> >> Currently we have only two non-generic instrucitons
>> >> LD_ABS and LD_IND that are avaialable for sockets/TC only,
>> >> because these are legacy instructions and we had to make
>> >> exceptions for them.
>> >
>> > Yep, +1.
>>
>> Hrmpf. This adds to the cognitive load for accepting this patch
>> series. :P Now I have to convince myself that there is no additional
>> exposure to seccomp by using the entire set of eBPF instructions.
>> While I'm pretty sure it'll be fine, I really don't want to risk being
>> wrong and opening a hole here. I will spend some time looking at the
>> new eBPF instructions...
>
> note, as was discussed many times before, there is no pointer leak
> prevention pass yet, so eBPF is root only.
> Once the pass is complete it will prevent passing addresses to
> functions, storing them in maps and returning from the program.

Tycho, are you building new eBPF filters as the root user and then
attaching them later? I was imagining you were going to need this
entirely as non-root.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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Thread

Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> - 2015-09-09 18:00 +0200
  Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> - 2015-09-09 18:10 +0200
    Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> - 2015-09-09 18:10 +0200
      Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2015-09-09 18:40 +0200
        Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com> - 2015-09-09 19:00 +0200
          Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> - 2015-09-09 19:30 +0200
            Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> - 2015-09-09 19:40 +0200
  Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> - 2015-09-09 18:10 +0200

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