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Groups > linux.kernel > #1157535
| From | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.kernel |
| Subject | [PATCH 4.0 109/148] parisc,metag: Fix crashes due to stack randomization on stack-grows-upwards architectures |
| Date | 2015-06-03 14:40 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <pxg7H-14D-75@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <pxfOh-E4-3@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
4.0-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> commit d045c77c1a69703143a36169c224429c48b9eecd upstream. On architectures where the stack grows upwards (CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP=y, currently parisc and metag only) stack randomization sometimes leads to crashes when the stack ulimit is set to lower values than STACK_RND_MASK (which is 8 MB by default if not defined in arch-specific headers). The problem is, that when the stack vm_area_struct is set up in fs/exec.c, the additional space needed for the stack randomization (as defined by the value of STACK_RND_MASK) was not taken into account yet and as such, when the stack randomization code added a random offset to the stack start, the stack effectively got smaller than what the user defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK) which then sometimes leads to out-of-stack situations and crashes. This patch fixes it by adding the maximum possible amount of memory (based on STACK_RND_MASK) which theoretically could be added by the stack randomization code to the initial stack size. That way, the user-defined stack size is always guaranteed to be at minimum what is defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK). This bug is currently not visible on the metag architecture, because on metag STACK_RND_MASK is defined to 0 which effectively disables stack randomization. The changes to fs/exec.c are inside an "#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP" section, so it does not affect other platformws beside those where the stack grows upwards (parisc and metag). Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> --- arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h | 4 ++++ arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c | 3 +++ fs/exec.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+) --- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h +++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h @@ -348,6 +348,10 @@ struct pt_regs; /* forward declaration.. #define ELF_HWCAP 0 +#define STACK_RND_MASK (is_32bit_task() ? \ + 0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \ + 0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) + struct mm_struct; extern unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *); #define arch_randomize_brk arch_randomize_brk --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c @@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ static unsigned long mmap_upper_limit(vo if (stack_base > STACK_SIZE_MAX) stack_base = STACK_SIZE_MAX; + /* Add space for stack randomization. */ + stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT); + return PAGE_ALIGN(STACK_TOP - stack_base); } --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -659,6 +659,9 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm if (stack_base > STACK_SIZE_MAX) stack_base = STACK_SIZE_MAX; + /* Add space for stack randomization. */ + stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT); + /* Make sure we didn't let the argument array grow too large. */ if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > stack_base) return -ENOMEM; -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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[PATCH 4.0 109/148] parisc,metag: Fix crashes due to stack randomization on stack-grows-upwards architectures Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> - 2015-06-03 14:40 +0200
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