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Re: [PATCH net-next 1/3] bpf: introduce current->pid, tgid, uid, gid, comm accessors

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On 6/12/15 5:03 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 4:55 PM, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> wrote:
>> On 6/12/15 4:47 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>
>>> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 4:38 PM, Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 6/12/15 4:25 PM, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It's a dangerous tool.  Also, shouldn't the returned uid match the
>>>>> namespace of the task that installed the probe, not the task that's
>>>>> being probed?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> so leaking info to unprivileged apps is the concern?
>>>> The whole thing is for root only as you know.
>>>> The non-root is still far away. Today root needs to see the whole
>>>> kernel. That was the goal from the beginning.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This is more of a correctness issue than a security issue.  ISTM using
>>> current_user_ns() in a kprobe is asking for trouble.  It certainly
>>> allows any unprivilege user to show any uid it wants to the probe,
>>> which is probably not what the installer of the probe expects.
>>
>>
>> probe doesn't expect anything. it doesn't make any decisions.
>> bpf is read only. it's _visibility_ into the kernel.
>> It's not used for security.
>> When we start connecting eBPF to seccomp I would agree that uid
>> handling needs to be done carefully, but we're not there yet.
>> I don't want to kill _visibility_ because in some distant future
>> bpf becomes a decision making tool in security area and
>> get_current_uid() will return numbers that shouldn't be blindly
>> used to reject/accept a user requesting something. That's far away.
>>
>
> All that is true, but the code that *installed* the bpf probe might
> get might confused when it logs that uid 0 did such-and-such when
> really some unprivileged userns root did it.

so what specifically you proposing?
Use from_kuid(&init_user_ns,...) instead?

> Also, as you start calling more and more non-trivial functions from
> bpf, you might need to start preventing bpf probe installations in
> those functions.

yes. may be. I don't want to blacklist stuff yet, unless it
causes crashes. Recursive check is already there. Probably
something else will be needed.

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Re: [PATCH net-next 1/3] bpf: introduce current->pid, tgid, uid,  gid, comm accessors Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> - 2015-06-13 01:30 +0200
  Re: [PATCH net-next 1/3] bpf: introduce current->pid, tgid, uid, gid,  comm accessors Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2015-06-13 01:30 +0200
    Re: [PATCH net-next 1/3] bpf: introduce current->pid, tgid, uid,  gid, comm accessors Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> - 2015-06-13 01:40 +0200
      Re: [PATCH net-next 1/3] bpf: introduce current->pid, tgid, uid, gid,  comm accessors Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2015-06-13 01:50 +0200
        Re: [PATCH net-next 1/3] bpf: introduce current->pid, tgid, uid,  gid, comm accessors Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> - 2015-06-13 02:00 +0200
          Re: [PATCH net-next 1/3] bpf: introduce current->pid, tgid, uid, gid,  comm accessors Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2015-06-13 02:10 +0200
            Re: [PATCH net-next 1/3] bpf: introduce current->pid, tgid, uid,  gid, comm accessors Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> - 2015-06-13 02:20 +0200
              Re: [PATCH net-next 1/3] bpf: introduce current->pid, tgid, uid,  gid, comm accessors Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> - 2015-06-13 02:30 +0200
              Re: [PATCH net-next 1/3] bpf: introduce current->pid, tgid, uid, gid,  comm accessors Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> - 2015-06-13 02:30 +0200

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