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Groups > linux.debian.security > #5811
| From | Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.debian.security |
| Subject | Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code |
| Date | 2020-05-01 21:40 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <A1JFT-84L-7@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | <A1Jmy-7Xm-25@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
https isn´t any more secure than http as long as you do not have a verifiably trustworthy server certificate that you can check for. As we know the certification authority system is totally broken. It is a bug if a build script tries to download something. It must work offline as well. I do not see any way than to rewrite these build scripts and pack all the necessary sources into the package for compiling it offline. Am 01.05.20 um 20:54 schrieb Rebecca N. Palmer: > Around 200 packages [0] include upstream scripts that download code via > (non-secure) http, then run it without an integrity check. > > This is obviously a security hole (network MITM => code execution), but > not necessarily one that is opened by normal use of the package. (E.g. > fetch-dependencies-and-build scripts can't download anything on a Debian > buildd, though it would still make sense to report them to upstream.) > > Some instances of this (i.e. where the download origin offers it) are > trivially improvable by replacing http with https. > > How should this be dealt with? > - Mass report? > - As BTS bugs (i.e. public) or private email? > - (imperfect) Lintian check based on [0]? > - If one is fixed, should it also be fixed in stable? (Probably depends > on how likely the script is to be used from the package) > > Previous discussions that I can find [1-2] reached no clear conclusion, > possibly because there were other issues involved (the trustworthiness > of the downloads' intended origin, and whether downloaders had to be in > contrib). > > [0] codesearch (wget|curl).*http://[^ ]*/[^ > ]*\.(pl|sh|py|gz|xz|bz2|zip)($|[^a-z]) matches 368 packages, but not all > of them are actual security problems > [1] https://lists.debian.org/debian-security/2012/12/msg00030.html > [2] https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=449497 >
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Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code "Rebecca N. Palmer" <rebecca_palmer@zoho.com> - 2020-05-01 21:20 +0200
Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code Elmar Stellnberger <estellnb@elstel.org> - 2020-05-01 21:40 +0200
Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code "Rebecca N. Palmer" <rebecca_palmer@zoho.com> - 2020-05-01 22:20 +0200
Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code Paul Wise <pabs@debian.org> - 2020-05-02 03:00 +0200
Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code estellnb@elstel.org - 2020-05-02 18:10 +0200
Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code Davide Prina <davide.prina@gmail.com> - 2020-05-02 10:20 +0200
Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code "Rebecca N. Palmer" <rebecca_palmer@zoho.com> - 2020-05-02 11:10 +0200
Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code estellnb@elstel.org - 2020-05-02 18:30 +0200
Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code Jason Fergus <leech@thefnords.org> - 2020-05-02 19:00 +0200
Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code estellnb@elstel.org - 2020-05-02 19:30 +0200
Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code Celejar <celejar@gmail.com> - 2020-05-03 16:40 +0200
Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code estellnb@elstel.org - 2020-05-02 18:20 +0200
Re: Scripts that run insecurely-downloaded code Paul Wise <pabs@debian.org> - 2020-05-02 03:20 +0200
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