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Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the Operating system itself.

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  Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the Operating system itself. lkcl <luke.leighton@gmail.com> - 2022-04-17 21:50 +0200
    Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the  Operating system itself. Stephan Verbücheln <verbuecheln@posteo.de> - 2022-04-18 19:50 +0200
    Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the  Operating system itself. Adam McKenna <adam@flounder.net> - 2022-05-23 19:30 +0200
      Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the  Operating system itself. lkcl <luke.leighton@gmail.com> - 2022-05-23 20:40 +0200
        Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the  Operating system itself. Adam McKenna <adam@flounder.net> - 2022-05-23 21:10 +0200
          Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the  Operating system itself. Adam McKenna <adam@flounder.net> - 2022-05-23 21:20 +0200
          Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the  Operating system itself. lkcl <luke.leighton@gmail.com> - 2022-05-23 21:30 +0200

#12801 — Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the Operating system itself.

On 17/04/2022 19:26, Satvik Sinha wrote:

> abusing your OS's reputation?

i believe the answer is in the question. debian is based on distributed trust.  i did the analysis (took 3 weeks): it is literally the only distro in the world with an inviolate chain of trust from a large keyring dating back 20 years that is itself GPG-signed as a package, with a package distribution chain from source where all components within the chain up to release are unbroken and inviolate.

take ubuntu for example: whilst it has the exact same technology the size of the developer pool, comprising the web of trust, is both much smaller and also controlled by one Corporation: Canonical. Canonical says "jump", the developers ask "how high".

take Suse, Fedora etc: their RPM packages break the chain of trust by failing to properly include a GPG Signature of the Release (i do not recall the exact details, i did the analysis 4 years ago)

take Archlinux: their community is vulnerable to unverified github repositories being abandoned, a hacker re-registering them, and a trojan uploaded and distributed automatically.

i won't even bother going into the absolute moronic practice of "trusting" HTTPS: node, pypi, etc should be blindingly obviously untrustworthy, with the website being a prime hacking target if nothing else.

even GNU packages are hopelessly inadequately secure as far as social engineering and hacking are concerned.

debian is not a single centralised repository, it is controlled by no-one. you have to compromise hundreds of independent developers before you make any headway, and as a result it was trusted by e.g. the Venezuelan Government as the basis for their own distro, many years ago.

there is not even a centralised dependency on a website: packages may be securely distributed by Carrier Pigeon or printed out on paper and OCR scanned if you really want to because there is a full GPG Chain and Checksums, right back to the source code.

and that (GPG Chains) basically, is the key.  anyone stupid enough to do something stupid is going to be throwing away their reputation, not just within the debian project as a maintainer, but for life.

you abuse your position as a maintainer by putting in trojan code, because that trojan package had to be GPG Signed, you have to make a *public and irreversible declaration* which will remain in historical archives for the rest of your life and beyond.

this would result in catastrophic consequences for not just their involvement in debian (which would be terminated with prejudice), but because their GPG Signature on the trojan package is public, inviolate and irrevocable, it would also have catastrophic consequences for their career in IT because nobody would ever trust them in a position of responsibility, ever again. they'd be flipping burgers for the rest of their life.

fundamentally, then, you are assuming that there is "one controller of debian", which is false.  there are literally hundreds of *independent* developers, all of whom know their responsibility, all of whom know that they have all other independent developers keeping an eye on them.

this makes debian pretty much the only distro that could be trusted to remain true to humanity and to its principles and its charter. even when some of them (you know who you are) are when it comes down to it not very nice people, they can at least be trusted to do the right thing.

l.

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#12805 — Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the Operating system itself.

> i did the analysis (took 3 weeks)

Do you have a publication of that analysis? I was thinking the same
about the organization of Debian for some time but never did analysis
or compared it to other distros.

Also I like to add that reproducible builds are an excellent addition
to the mechanisms you are describing.

Regards 

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#12827 — Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the Operating system itself.

[Multipart message — attachments visible in raw view] — view raw

> i believe the answer is in the question. debian is based on distributed
trust.  i did the analysis (took 3 weeks): it is literally the only distro
in the world with an inviolate chain of trust from a large keyring dating
back 20 years that is itself GPG-signed as a package, with a package
distribution chain from source where all components within the chain up to
release are unbroken and inviolate.

This is not an answer to the question though, OP was asking how we prevent
abuse of that trust.

On Sun, Apr 17, 2022 at 12:42 PM lkcl <luke.leighton@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 17/04/2022 19:26, Satvik Sinha wrote:
>
> > abusing your OS's reputation?
>
> i believe the answer is in the question. debian is based on distributed
> trust.  i did the analysis (took 3 weeks): it is literally the only distro
> in the world with an inviolate chain of trust from a large keyring dating
> back 20 years that is itself GPG-signed as a package, with a package
> distribution chain from source where all components within the chain up to
> release are unbroken and inviolate.
>
> take ubuntu for example: whilst it has the exact same technology the size
> of the developer pool, comprising the web of trust, is both much smaller
> and also controlled by one Corporation: Canonical. Canonical says "jump",
> the developers ask "how high".
>
> take Suse, Fedora etc: their RPM packages break the chain of trust by
> failing to properly include a GPG Signature of the Release (i do not recall
> the exact details, i did the analysis 4 years ago)
>
> take Archlinux: their community is vulnerable to unverified github
> repositories being abandoned, a hacker re-registering them, and a trojan
> uploaded and distributed automatically.
>
> i won't even bother going into the absolute moronic practice of "trusting"
> HTTPS: node, pypi, etc should be blindingly obviously untrustworthy, with
> the website being a prime hacking target if nothing else.
>
> even GNU packages are hopelessly inadequately secure as far as social
> engineering and hacking are concerned.
>
> debian is not a single centralised repository, it is controlled by no-one.
> you have to compromise hundreds of independent developers before you make
> any headway, and as a result it was trusted by e.g. the Venezuelan
> Government as the basis for their own distro, many years ago.
>
> there is not even a centralised dependency on a website: packages may be
> securely distributed by Carrier Pigeon or printed out on paper and OCR
> scanned if you really want to because there is a full GPG Chain and
> Checksums, right back to the source code.
>
> and that (GPG Chains) basically, is the key.  anyone stupid enough to do
> something stupid is going to be throwing away their reputation, not just
> within the debian project as a maintainer, but for life.
>
> you abuse your position as a maintainer by putting in trojan code, because
> that trojan package had to be GPG Signed, you have to make a *public and
> irreversible declaration* which will remain in historical archives for the
> rest of your life and beyond.
>
> this would result in catastrophic consequences for not just their
> involvement in debian (which would be terminated with prejudice), but
> because their GPG Signature on the trojan package is public, inviolate and
> irrevocable, it would also have catastrophic consequences for their career
> in IT because nobody would ever trust them in a position of responsibility,
> ever again. they'd be flipping burgers for the rest of their life.
>
> fundamentally, then, you are assuming that there is "one controller of
> debian", which is false.  there are literally hundreds of *independent*
> developers, all of whom know their responsibility, all of whom know that
> they have all other independent developers keeping an eye on them.
>
> this makes debian pretty much the only distro that could be trusted to
> remain true to humanity and to its principles and its charter. even when
> some of them (you know who you are) are when it comes down to it not very
> nice people, they can at least be trusted to do the right thing.
>
> l.
>
>
>
>

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#12828 — Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the Operating system itself.

On Mon, May 23, 2022 at 6:28 PM Adam McKenna <adam@flounder.net> wrote:
>
> > i believe the answer is in the question. debian is based on distributed trust.  i did the analysis (took 3 weeks): it is literally the only distro in the world with an inviolate chain of trust from a large keyring dating back 20 years that is itself GPG-signed as a package, with a package distribution chain from source where all components within the chain up to release are unbroken and inviolate.
>
> This is not an answer to the question though, OP was asking how we prevent abuse of that trust.

reputation, and potentially criminal and civil proceedings.

all identities are known, and inviolate-known [through the
above-described chain].
anyone stupid enough to abuse their position may only do so once, at which
point their GPG key is revoked.

given that GPG key-signing parties require people's real-world identities
to be known, it is easy to track down who signed whose key (it's right
there in the keyring-archive], and request that the signer provide assistance
to the relevant authorities in proving that real-world identity.

this will sufficiently piss off those people that trusted them that they will
be unlikely to work with them ever again [reputation]

in addition there is the Debian Trademark which if brought into disrepute
through abuse could be utilised to seek damages against the perpetrator.

bottom line is that it would be a spectacularly stupid thing to do to violate
the trust and responsibility of being a Debian Maintainer, and the really
interesting bit to me is that this all works in an entirely distributed manner
and can all entirely be done entirely without a single centralised authority,
i.e. *not* having to trust f*****g google or f*****g github with anyone's
real-world identity in any way shape or form.

l.

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#12829 — Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the Operating system itself.

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> anyone stupid enough to abuse their position may only do so once, at
which point their GPG key is revoked.

You are talking about a deterrent though.  I think the question is, what if
someone cares more about their political cause than retaining their
uploader access?

What if someone's keys are compromised and an attacker uploads a
compromised package?

Do we have ways of detecting these breaches or do we rely solely on user
reports?

On Mon, May 23, 2022 at 11:22 AM lkcl <luke.leighton@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, May 23, 2022 at 6:28 PM Adam McKenna <adam@flounder.net> wrote:
> >
> > > i believe the answer is in the question. debian is based on
> distributed trust.  i did the analysis (took 3 weeks): it is literally the
> only distro in the world with an inviolate chain of trust from a large
> keyring dating back 20 years that is itself GPG-signed as a package, with a
> package distribution chain from source where all components within the
> chain up to release are unbroken and inviolate.
> >
> > This is not an answer to the question though, OP was asking how we
> prevent abuse of that trust.
>
> reputation, and potentially criminal and civil proceedings.
>
> all identities are known, and inviolate-known [through the
> above-described chain].
> anyone stupid enough to abuse their position may only do so once, at which
> point their GPG key is revoked.
>
> given that GPG key-signing parties require people's real-world identities
> to be known, it is easy to track down who signed whose key (it's right
> there in the keyring-archive], and request that the signer provide
> assistance
> to the relevant authorities in proving that real-world identity.
>
> this will sufficiently piss off those people that trusted them that they
> will
> be unlikely to work with them ever again [reputation]
>
> in addition there is the Debian Trademark which if brought into disrepute
> through abuse could be utilised to seek damages against the perpetrator.
>
> bottom line is that it would be a spectacularly stupid thing to do to
> violate
> the trust and responsibility of being a Debian Maintainer, and the really
> interesting bit to me is that this all works in an entirely distributed
> manner
> and can all entirely be done entirely without a single centralised
> authority,
> i.e. *not* having to trust f*****g google or f*****g github with anyone's
> real-world identity in any way shape or form.
>
> l.
>

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#12830 — Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the Operating system itself.

[Multipart message — attachments visible in raw view] — view raw

> they get one and only one chance to do something that stupid.

So the answer is that we have no way of preventing a developer from
intentionally sabotaging a package in any / as many ways as they choose and
the only risk to them is losing their uploader access after the fact?

>the response is swift: there was a debian developer wrongfully arrested
for running a TOR exit node. their key was revoked immediately.

How was this incident detected?


On Mon, May 23, 2022 at 12:07 PM lkcl <luke.leighton@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Mon, May 23, 2022 at 7:59 PM Adam McKenna <adam@flounder.net> wrote:
> > You are talking about a deterrent though.  I think the question is,
> > what if someone cares more about their political cause than
> > retaining their uploader access?
>
> they get one and only one chance to do something that stupid.
>
> > What if someone's keys are compromised
>
> the response is swift: there was a debian developer wrongfully
> arrested for running a TOR exit node. their key was revoked
> immediately.
>
> l.
>

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#12831 — Re: Concerns about Security of packages in Debain OS and the Operating system itself.

On Mon, May 23, 2022 at 7:59 PM Adam McKenna <adam@flounder.net> wrote:
> You are talking about a deterrent though.  I think the question is,
> what if someone cares more about their political cause than
> retaining their uploader access?

they get one and only one chance to do something that stupid.

> What if someone's keys are compromised

the response is swift: there was a debian developer wrongfully
arrested for running a TOR exit node. their key was revoked
immediately.

l.

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