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| Started by | Christoph Anton Mitterer <calestyo@scientia.org> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2021-12-29 00:40 +0100 |
| Last post | 2021-12-29 00:40 +0100 |
| Articles | 1 — 1 participant |
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Bug#1002797: initramfs-tools: UMASK option doesn't catch all cases Christoph Anton Mitterer <calestyo@scientia.org> - 2021-12-29 00:40 +0100
| From | Christoph Anton Mitterer <calestyo@scientia.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2021-12-29 00:40 +0100 |
| Subject | Bug#1002797: initramfs-tools: UMASK option doesn't catch all cases |
| Message-ID | <Dzuet-ul-1@gated-at.bofh.it> |
Package: initramfs-tools Version: 0.140 Severity: normal Tags: security Hi. AFAIU, the UMASK option is there for cases like e.g. when dm-crypt keys are included in the initramfs. I played a bit with it, and found that it already doesn't just affect the final initramfs image, but also parts below /var/tmp/mkinitramfs_*/ . With "parts" I mean: - the top level temp dir (/var/tmp/mkinitramfs_*/) is still world-readable - and even below that, only directories seem affected, while files included e.g. via copy_file are not. So I think,the top level dir should be created with the UMASK as well, or perhaps even generally with root ownership ... That should also protect all files not added with initramfs-tools functions, as well as files included with copy_file but at the root of the initramfs (which is the top level temp dir... so no intermediate dir would get created with a securing UMASK). Thanks, Chris.
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