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Groups > comp.theory > #103826 > unrolled thread
| Started by | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2024-04-17 21:34 -0500 |
| Last post | 2024-04-18 18:33 -0400 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 263 — 10 participants |
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Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-17 21:34 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-17 23:13 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-18 09:50 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-18 18:31 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-18 20:11 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-18 21:58 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-18 21:25 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-18 22:50 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-18 22:28 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-19 07:09 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 09:18 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-19 18:41 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 11:37 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-20 12:52 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 09:34 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 13:05 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 13:11 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-04-22 11:26 +0300
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-22 09:03 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-22 18:54 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-23 09:44 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-23 21:47 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-23 09:54 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 10:28 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 13:40 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 15:01 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 13:07 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 12:15 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 11:19 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 13:58 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 12:16 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 09:38 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 08:36 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 09:52 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-19 18:51 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 13:04 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-19 19:20 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 01:05 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-20 08:56 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 10:20 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-20 11:39 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 10:26 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 12:52 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 09:44 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-22 09:10 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 10:33 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-24 19:01 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 19:17 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-24 20:49 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 19:57 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-24 22:00 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 21:16 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-24 23:38 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 22:53 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 07:32 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 22:56 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 07:32 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 21:02 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-25 09:15 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 21:50 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 14:09 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 12:19 -0400
D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 12:05 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 19:02 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 20:26 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 20:43 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 22:18 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 22:02 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 23:45 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 23:07 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 00:29 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 00:34 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 07:45 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 09:32 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 13:09 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 12:51 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 14:10 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 13:17 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 14:40 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 13:52 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 15:09 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 14:48 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 17:24 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 16:36 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 17:45 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 17:02 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 18:19 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 17:29 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 18:45 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 17:56 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 19:09 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 18:29 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 19:44 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 19:21 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 20:45 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 08:13 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-28 09:29 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-29 09:26 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-04-29 18:16 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-29 10:40 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-29 19:19 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-04-30 11:52 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-30 10:36 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-30 18:46 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-01 12:43 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-01 10:45 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-02 12:55 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-02 09:22 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-03 11:54 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-03 06:38 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-03 17:57 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-03 22:20 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2024-05-04 10:56 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 08:46 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 12:11 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 09:06 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2024-05-04 14:39 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 09:48 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2024-05-04 15:34 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 10:47 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 10:49 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 12:57 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2024-05-04 17:14 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 12:35 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 13:52 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 11:52 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 11:31 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 13:15 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 13:46 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 16:40 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 16:18 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 17:43 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 17:08 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 18:36 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 18:01 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 19:32 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 18:51 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 20:07 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 19:20 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 20:44 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 19:49 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 21:05 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 20:30 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 22:49 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 22:17 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- "Fred. Zwarts" <F.Zwarts@HetNet.nl> - 2024-05-05 12:36 +0200
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 09:23 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 13:00 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 09:30 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- joes <noreply@example.com> - 2024-05-05 15:42 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 11:22 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 12:43 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- joes <noreply@example.com> - 2024-05-05 17:03 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 13:27 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 11:29 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 12:46 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 12:28 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 13:49 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 13:32 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- joes <noreply@example.com> - 2024-05-05 16:57 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 12:23 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- immibis <news@immibis.com> - 2024-05-07 03:37 +0200
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2024-05-05 13:11 -0600
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 12:41 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 12:21 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 13:54 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 13:33 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 15:47 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 15:34 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 17:13 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 16:09 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 18:57 -0400
your system clock is still off olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 19:38 -0500
Re: your system clock is still off Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 21:05 -0400
Re: your system clock is still off olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 22:27 -0500
Re: your system clock is still off Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 23:53 -0400
Re: your system clock is still off olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 23:06 -0500
Re: your system clock is still off Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-06 06:33 -0400
Re: your system clock is still off Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-06 18:50 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 07:10 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 10:13 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 12:50 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-06 19:01 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 11:51 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2024-05-05 09:33 +0100
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2024-05-05 10:02 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 09:51 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 12:54 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2024-05-05 17:28 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 12:47 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 08:36 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-04 12:11 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 09:12 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 11:58 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-05 12:39 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 09:41 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-06 19:15 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-29 19:19 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 10:34 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 08:10 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-28 09:22 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 07:31 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 09:48 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-28 11:10 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 10:27 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-28 12:13 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 12:10 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-28 13:41 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 11:12 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 13:26 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 11:46 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 08:41 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 12:01 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-29 09:28 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-29 10:24 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-29 19:19 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-29 19:19 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-25 09:08 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 21:55 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 08:50 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 13:21 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-18 00:57 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-18 07:34 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 09:51 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 13:23 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 14:04 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 16:36 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 13:07 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 16:05 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 20:41 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 21:40 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 20:39 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 00:47 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 07:19 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 07:17 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 10:16 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 08:53 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 12:41 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 11:37 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 11:42 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 14:34 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 17:19 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 16:38 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 19:52 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 19:22 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 21:54 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 23:35 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-22 07:35 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-23 10:39 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-23 21:47 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 19:00 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 19:53 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 22:02 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 23:33 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 07:32 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-25 09:09 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-25 12:04 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-25 10:45 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-25 13:47 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 21:51 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 21:51 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-18 09:53 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-18 18:33 -0400
Page 13 of 14 — ← Prev page 1 … 11 12 [13] 14 Next page →
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 14:34 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v03poc$fc7j$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103875 |
On 4/21/2024 1:42 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> while
>>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite
>>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must
>>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto
>>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the
>>>>>>>>> distinction
>>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe
>>>>>>>> in"
>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen
>>>>>> floor
>>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are
>>>>>> true on
>>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>>
>>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>>> about things.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>>>
>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
>>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
>>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>>
>>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>>
>>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>>>
>>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>>
>>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>>
>>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>>
>>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>>
>>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>>
>>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>>
>>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>>
>>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>>
>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>>> thus no need to store
>>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>
>>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>>
>>
>> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
>> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
>> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>>
>>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>>
>>
>> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>
>>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>>
>>
>> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
>> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then we get
>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>
>>>
>>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>>> a "truth table",
>>
>> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
>> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
>> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
>> derive nonsense.
>>
>> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
>> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
>> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>>
>> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
>> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
>> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>>
>> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
>> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
>> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
>> of logic.
>>
>>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>>
>> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>>
>>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>>
>>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>>> bad ideas.
>>>
>>
>> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
>> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
>> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
>> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
>> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
>> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>>
>> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
>> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
>> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>>
>>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>>> then those _are not_.
>>>
>> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
>> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>>
>>>
>>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>>
>>
>> It is not actually largely bunk.
>> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>>
>> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
>> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
>> the actual world.
>>
>> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human understanding
>> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than yes/no
>> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
>> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>>
>>>
>>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>>
>>
>>
>
> What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
> about when the transfer principle applies and
> a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
> matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
> in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
> into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
> the result _direct implication_ carries and with
> ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
> and excludes any sort "paradox".
>
> That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
> being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
> reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
> and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
> and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
> to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
> example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
> and they're _two, different things_.
>
> I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
> 'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>
> It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
>
>
> I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material Implication
> is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
> old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules of logic
> both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is neither,
> at all.
>
>
> Russell: was never, the Pope.
>
>
>
> Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
> and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
> particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
> well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
> and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier disambiguation
> and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
> modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
>
> (Judgment.)
The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that there really
are expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning}.
We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth
floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of meaning}.
The majority of people that were convinced there is no such thing
as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that Quine utterly
failed to understand how we know that bachelors are unmarried are
simply wrong.
We must establish {true on the basis of meaning} as the ultimate
foundation of correct reasoning before we can begin to point out
how modern logic diverges from correct reasoning.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 17:19 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v03vsb$1q6tg$2@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #103876 |
On 4/21/24 3:34 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 1:42 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must
>>>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a
>>>>>>>>>> sophisticated
>>>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto
>>>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the
>>>>>>>>>> distinction
>>>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and
>>>>>>>>>> difference,
>>>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
>>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not
>>>>>>>>> believe in"
>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at
>>>>>>>>> all
>>>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen
>>>>>>> floor
>>>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are
>>>>>>> true on
>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors,
>>>>>>>> ...,
>>>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>>>
>>>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>>>> about things.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>>>>
>>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a
>>>>> form
>>>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the
>>>>> conclusion
>>>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>>>
>>>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>>>
>>>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>>>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>>>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>>>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>>>
>>>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>>>
>>>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>>>
>>>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>>>
>>>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>>>
>>>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>>>
>>>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>>>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>>>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>>>
>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>> thus no need to store
>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>
>>>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>>>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>>>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>>>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>>>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
>>> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>>>
>>>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>>>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>>>
>>>
>>> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>
>>>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>>>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>>>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>>>
>>>
>>> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
>>> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then we get
>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>
>>>>
>>>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>>>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>>>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>>>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>>>> a "truth table",
>>>
>>> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
>>> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
>>> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
>>> derive nonsense.
>>>
>>> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
>>> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
>>> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>>>
>>> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
>>> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
>>> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>>>
>>> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
>>> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
>>> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
>>> of logic.
>>>
>>>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>>>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>>>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>>>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>>>
>>> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>>>
>>>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>>>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>>>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>>>
>>>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>>>> bad ideas.
>>>>
>>>
>>> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
>>> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
>>> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
>>> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
>>> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
>>> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>>>
>>> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
>>> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
>>> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>>>
>>>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>>>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>>>> then those _are not_.
>>>>
>>> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
>>> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>>>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>>>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>>>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It is not actually largely bunk.
>>> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>>>
>>> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
>>> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
>>> the actual world.
>>>
>>> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human understanding
>>> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than yes/no
>>> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>>>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>>>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
>> about when the transfer principle applies and
>> a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
>> matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
>> in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
>> into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
>> the result _direct implication_ carries and with
>> ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
>> and excludes any sort "paradox".
>>
>> That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
>> being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
>> reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
>> and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
>> and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
>> to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
>> example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
>> and they're _two, different things_.
>>
>> I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
>> 'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>>
>> It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
>>
>>
>> I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material Implication
>> is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
>> old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules of logic
>> both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is neither,
>> at all.
>>
>>
>> Russell: was never, the Pope.
>>
>>
>>
>> Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
>> and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
>> particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
>> well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
>> and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier disambiguation
>> and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
>> modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
>>
>> (Judgment.)
>
> The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that there really
> are expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning}.
SOME statements are true based on their "meaning" (as you are defining
it), not all.
Not ALL True statements are True based on the meaning of their words.
Agaim, you are falling for the fallacy of proof by example.
The Pythagorean Theorem isn't True by the meaning of the words, but its
truth comes out of the Truth makers of Plane Geometry and a series of
valid connections from them to the Theorem.
>
> We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth
> floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
> The majority of people that were convinced there is no such thing
> as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that Quine utterly
> failed to understand how we know that bachelors are unmarried are
> simply wrong.
I don't think many people think that there are no statements that are
true by the nature of the meaning of the words, just that the "meaning
of the words" can't be the only criteria.
>
> We must establish {true on the basis of meaning} as the ultimate
> foundation of correct reasoning before we can begin to point out
> how modern logic diverges from correct reasoning.
>
Then your concept of "Correct Reasoning" can't handle fundamental true
statements like the Pythagorean Theorem, or even that 2 + 3 = 5, as
these are not true JUST by the meaning of the words.
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 16:38 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v040vp$gra8$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103877 |
On 4/21/2024 4:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/21/24 3:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/21/2024 1:42 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must
>>>>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight
>>>>>>>>>>>> into the
>>>>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a
>>>>>>>>>>> sophisticated
>>>>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First
>>>>>>>>>>> Manifesto
>>>>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the
>>>>>>>>>>> distinction
>>>>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and
>>>>>>>>>>> difference,
>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
>>>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not
>>>>>>>>>> believe in"
>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type
>>>>>>>>>>> inversion,
>>>>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing
>>>>>>>>>> at all
>>>>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of
>>>>>>>>>> all of
>>>>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be
>>>>>>>>>> able to
>>>>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking
>>>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen
>>>>>>>> floor
>>>>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are
>>>>>>>> true on
>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors,
>>>>>>>>> ...,
>>>>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>>>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>>>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>>>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>>>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>>>>> about things.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a
>>>>>> form
>>>>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the
>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>>>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>>>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>>>>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>>>>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>>>>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>>>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>>>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>>>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>>>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>>>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>>>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>>>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>>>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>>>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>>>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>>>>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>>>>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>>>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>> thus no need to store
>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>>>>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>>>>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>>>>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>>>>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
>>>> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>>>>
>>>>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>>>>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>
>>>>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>>>>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>>>>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
>>>> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then we get
>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>>>>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>>>>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>>>>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>>>>> a "truth table",
>>>>
>>>> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
>>>> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
>>>> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
>>>> derive nonsense.
>>>>
>>>> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
>>>> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
>>>> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>>>>
>>>> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
>>>> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
>>>> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>>>>
>>>> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
>>>> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
>>>> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
>>>> of logic.
>>>>
>>>>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>>>>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>>>>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>>>>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>>>>
>>>> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>>>>
>>>>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>>>>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>>>>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>>>>
>>>>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>>>>> bad ideas.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
>>>> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
>>>> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
>>>> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
>>>> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
>>>> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>>>>
>>>> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
>>>> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
>>>> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>>>>
>>>>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>>>>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>>>>> then those _are not_.
>>>>>
>>>> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
>>>> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>>>>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>>>>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>>>>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It is not actually largely bunk.
>>>> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>>>>
>>>> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
>>>> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
>>>> the actual world.
>>>>
>>>> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human understanding
>>>> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than yes/no
>>>> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
>>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>>>>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>>>>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
>>> about when the transfer principle applies and
>>> a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
>>> matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
>>> in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
>>> into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
>>> the result _direct implication_ carries and with
>>> ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
>>> and excludes any sort "paradox".
>>>
>>> That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
>>> being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
>>> reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
>>> and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
>>> and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
>>> to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
>>> example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
>>> and they're _two, different things_.
>>>
>>> I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
>>> 'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>>>
>>> It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
>>>
>>>
>>> I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material Implication
>>> is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
>>> old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules of logic
>>> both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is neither,
>>> at all.
>>>
>>>
>>> Russell: was never, the Pope.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
>>> and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
>>> particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
>>> well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
>>> and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier disambiguation
>>> and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
>>> modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
>>>
>>> (Judgment.)
>>
>> The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that there really
>> are expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
> SOME statements are true based on their "meaning" (as you are defining
> it), not all.
>
> Not ALL True statements are True based on the meaning of their words.
>
> Agaim, you are falling for the fallacy of proof by example.
>
> The Pythagorean Theorem isn't True by the meaning of the words, but its
> truth comes out of the Truth makers of Plane Geometry and a series of
> valid connections from them to the Theorem.
>
>>
>> We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth
>> floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>> The majority of people that were convinced there is no such thing
>> as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that Quine utterly
>> failed to understand how we know that bachelors are unmarried are
>> simply wrong.
>
> I don't think many people think that there are no statements that are
> true by the nature of the meaning of the words, just that the "meaning
> of the words" can't be the only criteria.
>
I never restricted it this way (to the meaning of words)
I never even restricted on on the basis of the:
*Principle of compositionality*
In semantics, mathematical logic and related disciplines, the principle
of compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a complex
expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent expressions
and the rules used to combine them.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
I have *always* meant the 100% perfectly totally complete
meaning that also includes the full discourse context.
Do you think that it is possible to:
take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy?
or would the total meaning of the expression make that impossible?
Maybe my example would have given Quine a clue about how we know
that all bachelors are unmarried. He is the one that convinced
most of the world that {true on the basis of meaning} is vacuous
and he did this almost entirely on the basis that he could not
understand exactly how we know that all bachelors are unmarried.
{true on the basis of meaning} is only relations between finite
strings thus excludes direct observations of things in the world.
*Two Dogmas of Empiricism*
https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
>>
>> We must establish {true on the basis of meaning} as the ultimate
>> foundation of correct reasoning before we can begin to point out
>> how modern logic diverges from correct reasoning.
>>
>
> Then your concept of "Correct Reasoning" can't handle fundamental true
> statements like the Pythagorean Theorem, or even that 2 + 3 = 5, as
> these are not true JUST by the meaning of the words.
>
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 19:52 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v048rh$1q6th$3@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #103878 |
On 4/21/24 5:38 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 4:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/21/24 3:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/21/2024 1:42 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must
>>>>>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not
>>>>>>>>>>>>> any
>>>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight
>>>>>>>>>>>>> into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a
>>>>>>>>>>>> sophisticated
>>>>>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First
>>>>>>>>>>>> Manifesto
>>>>>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the
>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction
>>>>>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and
>>>>>>>>>>>> difference,
>>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
>>>>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not
>>>>>>>>>>> believe in"
>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a
>>>>>>>>>>>> type,
>>>>>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type
>>>>>>>>>>>> inversion,
>>>>>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class
>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction,
>>>>>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true
>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing
>>>>>>>>>>> at all
>>>>>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of
>>>>>>>>>>> all of
>>>>>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be
>>>>>>>>>>> able to
>>>>>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking
>>>>>>>>>>> your
>>>>>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen
>>>>>>>>> floor
>>>>>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are
>>>>>>>>> true on
>>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>>>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth
>>>>>>>>>> floors, ...,
>>>>>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>>>>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>>>>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>>>>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>>>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>>>>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>>>>>> about things.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes
>>>>>>> a form
>>>>>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the
>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>>>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>>>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>>>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>>>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>>>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>>>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>>>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>>>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>>>>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>>>>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>>>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>>>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>>>>>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>>>>>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>>>>>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>>>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>>>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>>>>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>>>>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>>>>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>>>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>>>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>>>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>>>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>>>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>>>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>>>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>>>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>>>>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>>>>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>>>>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>>>>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>>>>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>>>>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>>>>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>>>>>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>>>>>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>>>>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>> thus no need to store
>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>>>>>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>>>>>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>>>>>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>>>>>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
>>>>> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>>>>>
>>>>>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>>>>>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>
>>>>>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>>>>>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>>>>>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
>>>>> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then we
>>>>> get
>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>>>>>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>>>>>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>>>>>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>>>>>> a "truth table",
>>>>>
>>>>> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
>>>>> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
>>>>> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
>>>>> derive nonsense.
>>>>>
>>>>> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
>>>>> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
>>>>> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>>>>>
>>>>> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
>>>>> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
>>>>> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>>>>>
>>>>> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
>>>>> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
>>>>> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
>>>>> of logic.
>>>>>
>>>>>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>>>>>
>>>>> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>>>>>
>>>>>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>>>>>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>>>>>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>>>>>> bad ideas.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
>>>>> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
>>>>> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
>>>>> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
>>>>> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
>>>>> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>>>>>
>>>>> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
>>>>> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
>>>>> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>>>>>
>>>>>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>>>>>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>>>>>> then those _are not_.
>>>>>>
>>>>> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
>>>>> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>>>>>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>>>>>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>>>>>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It is not actually largely bunk.
>>>>> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>>>>>
>>>>> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
>>>>> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
>>>>> the actual world.
>>>>>
>>>>> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human understanding
>>>>> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than yes/no
>>>>> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
>>>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>>>>>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>>>>>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
>>>> about when the transfer principle applies and
>>>> a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
>>>> matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
>>>> in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
>>>> into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
>>>> the result _direct implication_ carries and with
>>>> ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
>>>> and excludes any sort "paradox".
>>>>
>>>> That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
>>>> being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
>>>> reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
>>>> and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
>>>> and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
>>>> to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
>>>> example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
>>>> and they're _two, different things_.
>>>>
>>>> I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
>>>> 'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>>>>
>>>> It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material Implication
>>>> is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
>>>> old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules of logic
>>>> both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is neither,
>>>> at all.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Russell: was never, the Pope.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
>>>> and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
>>>> particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
>>>> well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
>>>> and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier disambiguation
>>>> and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
>>>> modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
>>>>
>>>> (Judgment.)
>>>
>>> The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that there really
>>> are expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>> SOME statements are true based on their "meaning" (as you are defining
>> it), not all.
>>
>> Not ALL True statements are True based on the meaning of their words.
>>
>> Agaim, you are falling for the fallacy of proof by example.
>>
>> The Pythagorean Theorem isn't True by the meaning of the words, but
>> its truth comes out of the Truth makers of Plane Geometry and a series
>> of valid connections from them to the Theorem.
>>
>>>
>>> We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth
>>> floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>> The majority of people that were convinced there is no such thing
>>> as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that Quine utterly
>>> failed to understand how we know that bachelors are unmarried are
>>> simply wrong.
>>
>> I don't think many people think that there are no statements that are
>> true by the nature of the meaning of the words, just that the "meaning
>> of the words" can't be the only criteria.
>>
>
> I never restricted it this way (to the meaning of words)
THen you DO accept that Godel's G is a true statement by its meaning
since there does not exist any number g that satisfies the defined
Primitive Recursive Relationship?
And this can be established by the infinite sequence of steps of
checking every Natural Number against that relationship, which is the
classical meaning of Semantically true,
And thus is can not be a epistemological antinomy.
> I never even restricted on on the basis of the:
>
> *Principle of compositionality*
> In semantics, mathematical logic and related disciplines, the principle
> of compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a complex
> expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent expressions
> and the rules used to combine them.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>
> I have *always* meant the 100% perfectly totally complete
> meaning that also includes the full discourse context.
How does that show that the Pathagorean Theorem is true?
The question isn't determining the "Meaning of the Words" which is what
the full discourse context would provide, but the sequence of the
logical arguement that proves it, which is something which goes beyound
"meaning" of the words.
>
> Do you think that it is possible to:
> take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy?
> or would the total meaning of the expression make that impossible?
Nope. WHich is a fallacy of proof by example.
Note, all your examples go to the most primiative form of logic, which
if that is all you have, can be complete because it will be finite.
>
> Maybe my example would have given Quine a clue about how we know
> that all bachelors are unmarried. He is the one that convinced
> most of the world that {true on the basis of meaning} is vacuous
> and he did this almost entirely on the basis that he could not
> understand exactly how we know that all bachelors are unmarried.
>
> {true on the basis of meaning} is only relations between finite
> strings thus excludes direct observations of things in the world.
>
> *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*
> https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
Since none of this relates to Formal logic or undecidability or
incompleteness, I will presume that you are just admitting that you have
no answers to the replys and are just working on Red Herring.
Note, Quine doesn't say that we can't show that all bachelors are
unmarried, but that bachelor and unmarried are not SYNONYMS replaceable
with each other, and that logic that is based on that is too imprecise,
and we need to better define the rules of logic when doing such things.
The key point here is that while the classical definition of a bachelor
is a never married man (though some uses of the words might include a
man that was married but now nolonger has a wife), the word "unmarried"
also has ranges of meaning from "never married" to "currently not
married" and thus the two words can't be considered truely equivalent words.
It seems, your problem is that you just don't understand the nuances of
the papers, and in your stupidity assume this means the other people are
just wrong, when the error is on YOUR part.
To re-iterate, every challenge I have put to you, asking you to defend
your position has been ignored, and I will treat that as your admission
that you have no response, and an admission that you accept that your
claim is invalid, and thus that you repeated making the disproven claims
are just proof of your being a liar and an idiot (for thinking people
will believe your lies).
>
>>>
>>> We must establish {true on the basis of meaning} as the ultimate
>>> foundation of correct reasoning before we can begin to point out
>>> how modern logic diverges from correct reasoning.
>>>
>>
>> Then your concept of "Correct Reasoning" can't handle fundamental true
>> statements like the Pythagorean Theorem, or even that 2 + 3 = 5, as
>> these are not true JUST by the meaning of the words.
>>
>
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 19:22 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v04ajj$iolb$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103879 |
On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/21/24 5:38 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/21/2024 4:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 4/21/24 3:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/2024 1:42 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> sophisticated
>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Manifesto
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his
>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophical
>>>>>>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
>>>>>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not
>>>>>>>>>>>> believe in"
>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>> {fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-class.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type
>>>>>>>>>>>>> inversion,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class
>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing
>>>>>>>>>>>> at all
>>>>>>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of
>>>>>>>>>>>> all of
>>>>>>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be
>>>>>>>>>>>> able to
>>>>>>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of
>>>>>>>>>>>> taking your
>>>>>>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the
>>>>>>>>>> fifteen
>>>>>>>>>> floor
>>>>>>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are
>>>>>>>>>> true on
>>>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>>>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>>>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>>>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>>>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>>>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>>>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>>>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist,
>>>>>>>>>>> too.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>>>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth
>>>>>>>>>>> floors, ...,
>>>>>>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>>>>>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>>>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>>>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>>>>>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>>>>>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>>>>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>>>>>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>>>>>>> about things.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes
>>>>>>>> a form
>>>>>>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the
>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>>>>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>>>>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>>>>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>>>>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>>>>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>>>>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>>>>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>>>>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>>>>>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>>>>>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>>>>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>>>>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>>>>>>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>>>>>>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>>>>>>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>>>>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>>>>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>>>>>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>>>>>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>>>>>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>>>>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>>>>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>>>>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>>>>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>>>>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>>>>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>>>>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>>>>>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>>>>>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>>>>>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>>>>>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>>>>>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>>>>>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>>>>>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>>>>>>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>>>>>>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>>>>>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>> thus no need to store
>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>>>>>>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>>>>>>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>>>>>>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>>>>>>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
>>>>>> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>>>>>>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>>>>>>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>>>>>>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
>>>>>> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then
>>>>>> we get
>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>>>>>>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>>>>>>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>>>>>>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>>>>>>> a "truth table",
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
>>>>>> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
>>>>>> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
>>>>>> derive nonsense.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
>>>>>> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
>>>>>> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
>>>>>> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
>>>>>> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
>>>>>> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
>>>>>> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
>>>>>> of logic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>>>>>>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>>>>>>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>>>>>>> bad ideas.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
>>>>>> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
>>>>>> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
>>>>>> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
>>>>>> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
>>>>>> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
>>>>>> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
>>>>>> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>>>>>>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>>>>>>> then those _are not_.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
>>>>>> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>>>>>>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>>>>>>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>>>>>>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is not actually largely bunk.
>>>>>> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
>>>>>> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
>>>>>> the actual world.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human
>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than
>>>>>> yes/no
>>>>>> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
>>>>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>>>>>>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>>>>>>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
>>>>> about when the transfer principle applies and
>>>>> a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
>>>>> matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
>>>>> in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
>>>>> into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
>>>>> the result _direct implication_ carries and with
>>>>> ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
>>>>> and excludes any sort "paradox".
>>>>>
>>>>> That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
>>>>> being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
>>>>> reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
>>>>> and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
>>>>> and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
>>>>> to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
>>>>> example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
>>>>> and they're _two, different things_.
>>>>>
>>>>> I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
>>>>> 'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>>>>>
>>>>> It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material Implication
>>>>> is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
>>>>> old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules of logic
>>>>> both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is
>>>>> neither,
>>>>> at all.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Russell: was never, the Pope.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
>>>>> and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
>>>>> particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
>>>>> well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
>>>>> and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier disambiguation
>>>>> and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
>>>>> modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
>>>>>
>>>>> (Judgment.)
>>>>
>>>> The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that there really
>>>> are expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>> SOME statements are true based on their "meaning" (as you are
>>> defining it), not all.
>>>
>>> Not ALL True statements are True based on the meaning of their words.
>>>
>>> Agaim, you are falling for the fallacy of proof by example.
>>>
>>> The Pythagorean Theorem isn't True by the meaning of the words, but
>>> its truth comes out of the Truth makers of Plane Geometry and a
>>> series of valid connections from them to the Theorem.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth
>>>> floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>
>>>> The majority of people that were convinced there is no such thing
>>>> as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that Quine utterly
>>>> failed to understand how we know that bachelors are unmarried are
>>>> simply wrong.
>>>
>>> I don't think many people think that there are no statements that are
>>> true by the nature of the meaning of the words, just that the
>>> "meaning of the words" can't be the only criteria.
>>>
>>
>> I never restricted it this way (to the meaning of words)
>
> THen you DO accept that Godel's G is a true statement by its meaning
> since there does not exist any number g that satisfies the defined
> Primitive Recursive Relationship?
>
> And this can be established by the infinite sequence of steps of
> checking every Natural Number against that relationship, which is the
> classical meaning of Semantically true,
>
How do we use this to show that we know it is true that we
cannot take the elevator of a puppy to its fifteenth floor?
When you say
> checking every Natural Number against that relationship, which is the
> classical meaning of Semantically true,
you totally ignore 99.9999999% of semantics.
That it like saying counting to three is ALL of mathematics.
> And thus is can not be a epistemological antinomy.
>
Observe that, in terms of the standard interpretation
(∀x2) ¬𝒫𝑓 (x2, ⌜G⌝) says that there is no natural number
that is the Gödel number of a proof in K of the wf G, which is
equivalent to asserting that there is no proof in K of G.
Hence, G is equivalent in K to an assertion that G is unprovable
in K. In other words, G says “I am not provable in K”.
This is an analogue of the liar paradox: “I am lying”
(that is, “I am not true”). However, although the liar paradox
leads to a contradiction, Gödel (1931) showed that G is an
undecidable sentence of K. We shall refer to G as a Gödel
sentence for K. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
Mendelson, Elliott 2015. Introduction to Mathematical Logic sixth
edition CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group Boca Raton, FL
When G says “I am not provable in K”.
any proof of G in K requires a sequence of inference
steps in K that prove that they themselves do not exist.
Meta_K can see this and confirms that G is unprovable in K.
*Gödel's proof hides all of these details*
>> I never even restricted on on the basis of the:
>>
>> *Principle of compositionality*
>> In semantics, mathematical logic and related disciplines, the principle
>> of compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a complex
>> expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent expressions
>> and the rules used to combine them.
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>
>> I have *always* meant the 100% perfectly totally complete
>> meaning that also includes the full discourse context.
>
> How does that show that the Pathagorean Theorem is true?
>
> The question isn't determining the "Meaning of the Words" which is what
> the full discourse context would provide, but the sequence of the
> logical arguement that proves it, which is something which goes beyound
> "meaning" of the words.
>
>
>>
>> Do you think that it is possible to:
>> take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy?
>> or would the total meaning of the expression make that impossible?
>
> Nope. WHich is a fallacy of proof by example.
>
> Note, all your examples go to the most primiative form of logic, which
> if that is all you have, can be complete because it will be finite.
>
>>
>> Maybe my example would have given Quine a clue about how we know
>> that all bachelors are unmarried. He is the one that convinced
>> most of the world that {true on the basis of meaning} is vacuous
>> and he did this almost entirely on the basis that he could not
>> understand exactly how we know that all bachelors are unmarried.
>>
>> {true on the basis of meaning} is only relations between finite
>> strings thus excludes direct observations of things in the world.
>>
>> *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*
>> https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
>
>
> Since none of this relates to Formal logic or undecidability or
> incompleteness, I will presume that you are just admitting that you have
> no answers to the replys and are just working on Red Herring.
>
>
> Note, Quine doesn't say that we can't show that all bachelors are
> unmarried, but that bachelor and unmarried are not SYNONYMS replaceable
> with each other, and that logic that is based on that is too imprecise,
> and we need to better define the rules of logic when doing such things.
>
> The key point here is that while the classical definition of a bachelor
> is a never married man (though some uses of the words might include a
> man that was married but now nolonger has a wife), the word "unmarried"
> also has ranges of meaning from "never married" to "currently not
> married" and thus the two words can't be considered truely equivalent
> words.
>
> It seems, your problem is that you just don't understand the nuances of
> the papers, and in your stupidity assume this means the other people are
> just wrong, when the error is on YOUR part.
>
The bottom line of all of this (even if my summation is not
precisely accurate) is the Quine convinced most people that
{true on the basis of meaning} is not a viable notion.
It has never been the case that the precise nuances of detail
have ever mattered at all. It has always been the case that
the gist of the matter is crucial.
{True on the basis of meaning} is the actual ultimate foundation
of correct reasoning.
> To re-iterate, every challenge I have put to you, asking you to defend
> your position has been ignored, and I will treat that as your admission
> that you have no response, and an admission that you accept that your
> claim is invalid, and thus that you repeated making the disproven claims
> are just proof of your being a liar and an idiot (for thinking people
> will believe your lies).
>
>>
>>>>
>>>> We must establish {true on the basis of meaning} as the ultimate
>>>> foundation of correct reasoning before we can begin to point out
>>>> how modern logic diverges from correct reasoning.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Then your concept of "Correct Reasoning" can't handle fundamental
>>> true statements like the Pythagorean Theorem, or even that 2 + 3 = 5,
>>> as these are not true JUST by the meaning of the words.
>>>
>>
>
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 21:54 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v04g19$1q6tg$3@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #103880 |
On 4/21/24 8:22 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> It seems, your problem is that you just don't understand the nuances
>> of the papers, and in your stupidity assume this means the other
>> people are just wrong, when the error is on YOUR part.
>>
>
> The bottom line of all of this (even if my summation is not
> precisely accurate) is the Quine convinced most people that
> {true on the basis of meaning} is not a viable notion.
Or, to paraphrase you, you think everyone else is as stupid as you.
Fortunately, that isn't true.
>
> It has never been the case that the precise nuances of detail
> have ever mattered at all. It has always been the case that
> the gist of the matter is crucial.
And you think it isn't important to be totally correct.
>
> {True on the basis of meaning} is the actual ultimate foundation
> of correct reasoning.
Which means, as has been pointed out, your idea of "Correct Reasoning"
is insufficient for most actual logic problems, as it can only handle
the very simple cases.
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 23:35 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v04pef$p2s8$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103882 |
On 4/21/2024 8:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/21/24 8:22 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>
>>> It seems, your problem is that you just don't understand the nuances
>>> of the papers, and in your stupidity assume this means the other
>>> people are just wrong, when the error is on YOUR part.
>>>
>>
>> The bottom line of all of this (even if my summation is not
>> precisely accurate) is the Quine convinced most people that
>> {true on the basis of meaning} is not a viable notion.
>
> Or, to paraphrase you, you think everyone else is as stupid as you.
>
> Fortunately, that isn't true.
>
Point to my mistake if you can. I have spoken about this with very
many people very many times. Quine did convince most people that
{true on the basis of meaning} is problematic.
>>
>> It has never been the case that the precise nuances of detail
>> have ever mattered at all. It has always been the case that
>> the gist of the matter is crucial.
>
> And you think it isn't important to be totally correct.
>
>>
>> {True on the basis of meaning} is the actual ultimate foundation
>> of correct reasoning.
>
> Which means, as has been pointed out, your idea of "Correct Reasoning"
> is insufficient for most actual logic problems, as it can only handle
> the very simple cases.
>
It has not been pointed out it has been baselessly claimed.
I spent a long time studying Montague Grammar and the Cyc
project. I know that everything that can be said in English
can be precisely mathematically formalized.
I proved exactly how Quine was wrong about synonymity
between bachelor and unmarried adult male and you
could show nothing wrong with my approach when applied
to bachelor and unmarried adult male.
On 4/21/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> So, if you want to define your "Natural Language" logic to NOT be
> actaully based on "Natural Language" but this marked up version where
> every word needs to be fully qualified to precisely state its meaning,
> this just shows you don't understand the meaning of the words you are
> using.
I proved exactly how bachelor and unmarried adult male are
synonymous and you could not point out any error. The error
that you tried to get away with was that I was too precise.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-22 07:35 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v05i21$1q6tg$4@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #103885 |
On 4/22/24 12:35 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 8:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/21/24 8:22 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>
>>>> It seems, your problem is that you just don't understand the nuances
>>>> of the papers, and in your stupidity assume this means the other
>>>> people are just wrong, when the error is on YOUR part.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The bottom line of all of this (even if my summation is not
>>> precisely accurate) is the Quine convinced most people that
>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is not a viable notion.
>>
>> Or, to paraphrase you, you think everyone else is as stupid as you.
>>
>> Fortunately, that isn't true.
>>
>
> Point to my mistake if you can. I have spoken about this with very
> many people very many times. Quine did convince most people that
> {true on the basis of meaning} is problematic.
>
Godel doesn't mean what you say he means. PERIOD.
That is shown because his actual statement that he claims to be true and
unprovable is NOT an "epistomological antinomy" as you claim, but a
stetement of the form:
G asserts that no number g exists that satisfies the particular
primative recursive relationship.
That is a statement that MUST be a truthbeared, as the relationship is
computable, so every number can be tested, and thus either a number
exists that statisfies it, or not.
This has been explained, and ignored, showing you are too stupid to
understand that.
You seem to think that Godel is too "stupid" to know what he is talking
about, while instead, the issue is that YOU are the stupid one, and do
not understand the arguement, and thus just presume that , because you
don't like the answer, must be wrong.
>>>
>>> It has never been the case that the precise nuances of detail
>>> have ever mattered at all. It has always been the case that
>>> the gist of the matter is crucial.
>>
>> And you think it isn't important to be totally correct.
>>
>>>
>>> {True on the basis of meaning} is the actual ultimate foundation
>>> of correct reasoning.
>>
>> Which means, as has been pointed out, your idea of "Correct Reasoning"
>> is insufficient for most actual logic problems, as it can only handle
>> the very simple cases.
>>
>
> It has not been pointed out it has been baselessly claimed.
> I spent a long time studying Montague Grammar and the Cyc
> project. I know that everything that can be said in English
> can be precisely mathematically formalized.
What you call "Baseless claims" are infact PROOFS of what is being said.
You don't understand them, so call them baseless.
>
> I proved exactly how Quine was wrong about synonymity
> between bachelor and unmarried adult male and you
> could show nothing wrong with my approach when applied
> to bachelor and unmarried adult male.
Nope, you think you did, because you don't understand the actual issue
being discussed.
>
> On 4/21/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> > So, if you want to define your "Natural Language" logic to NOT be
> > actaully based on "Natural Language" but this marked up version where
> > every word needs to be fully qualified to precisely state its meaning,
> > this just shows you don't understand the meaning of the words you are
> > using.
>
> I proved exactly how bachelor and unmarried adult male are
> synonymous and you could not point out any error. The error
> that you tried to get away with was that I was too precise.
>
Nope, you missed his point, because it when right over your head.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-23 10:39 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v08ko9$1mqui$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103887 |
On 4/22/2024 6:35 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/22/24 12:35 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/21/2024 8:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 4/21/24 8:22 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>
>>>>> It seems, your problem is that you just don't understand the
>>>>> nuances of the papers, and in your stupidity assume this means the
>>>>> other people are just wrong, when the error is on YOUR part.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> The bottom line of all of this (even if my summation is not
>>>> precisely accurate) is the Quine convinced most people that
>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is not a viable notion.
>>>
>>> Or, to paraphrase you, you think everyone else is as stupid as you.
>>>
>>> Fortunately, that isn't true.
>>>
>>
>> Point to my mistake if you can. I have spoken about this with very
>> many people very many times. Quine did convince most people that
>> {true on the basis of meaning} is problematic.
>>
>
> Godel doesn't mean what you say he means. PERIOD.
>
We cannot tell what the Hell that Gödel really means because all of the
actual semantics is hidden behind diagonalization and arithmetization.
We can tell that Mendelson sums it up like this:
G says “I am not provable in K”. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
*The details of what Gödel's G actually mean are irrelevant*
*Because we can see that epistemological antinomies do derive*
*undecidability, thus proving the the notion of undecidability*
*has a vacuous philosophical foundation*
An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
Undecidable(K, ℬ) ≡ ∃ℬ ∈ K ((K ⊬ ℬ) ∧ (K ⊬ ¬ℬ))
Mendelson, Elliott 2015. Introduction to Mathematical Logic sixth
edition CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group Boca Raton, FL
> That is shown because his actual statement that he claims to be true and
> unprovable is NOT an "epistomological antinomy" as you claim, but a
> stetement of the form:
>
> G asserts that no number g exists that satisfies the particular
> primative recursive relationship.
>
> That is a statement that MUST be a truthbeared, as the relationship is
> computable, so every number can be tested, and thus either a number
> exists that statisfies it, or not.
>
> This has been explained, and ignored, showing you are too stupid to
> understand that.
>
> You seem to think that Godel is too "stupid" to know what he is talking
> about, while instead, the issue is that YOU are the stupid one, and do
> not understand the arguement, and thus just presume that , because you
> don't like the answer, must be wrong.
>
>
>>>>
>>>> It has never been the case that the precise nuances of detail
>>>> have ever mattered at all. It has always been the case that
>>>> the gist of the matter is crucial.
>>>
>>> And you think it isn't important to be totally correct.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> {True on the basis of meaning} is the actual ultimate foundation
>>>> of correct reasoning.
>>>
>>> Which means, as has been pointed out, your idea of "Correct
>>> Reasoning" is insufficient for most actual logic problems, as it can
>>> only handle the very simple cases.
>>>
>>
>> It has not been pointed out it has been baselessly claimed.
>> I spent a long time studying Montague Grammar and the Cyc
>> project. I know that everything that can be said in English
>> can be precisely mathematically formalized.
>
> What you call "Baseless claims" are infact PROOFS of what is being said.
>
> You don't understand them, so call them baseless.
>
This always works except for unknowns:
True(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ F(F ⊢ x)
False(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ F(F ⊢ ¬x)
L is an accurate model of the actual world
Proposition(L,x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (True(L,x) ∨ False(L,x))
As long as the accurate model of the actual world is sufficiently
populated it could prove that there is zero publicly available
evidence of election fraud that could have possibly changed the
outcome of the 2020 presidential election.
>>
>> I proved exactly how Quine was wrong about synonymity
>> between bachelor and unmarried adult male and you
>> could show nothing wrong with my approach when applied
>> to bachelor and unmarried adult male.
>
> Nope, you think you did, because you don't understand the actual issue
> being discussed.
>
We already covered this and I fully addressed this.
You said that the issue was that Quine could not understand
the details of the synonymity between the term "bachelor"
and the terms the comprise the meaning of the term "bachelor".
You rejected my answer because it was too precisely accurate.
>>
>> On 4/21/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> > So, if you want to define your "Natural Language" logic to NOT be
>> > actaully based on "Natural Language" but this marked up version where
>> > every word needs to be fully qualified to precisely state its meaning,
>> > this just shows you don't understand the meaning of the words you are
>> > using.
>>
>> I proved exactly how bachelor and unmarried adult male are
>> synonymous and you could not point out any error. The error
>> that you tried to get away with was that I was too precise.
>>
>
> Nope, you missed his point, because it when right over your head.
>
You habit of using rhetoric instead of reasoning seems dishonest.
What are all of the details of exactly how I missed his point?
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-23 21:47 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v09oar$222fe$2@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #103893 |
On 4/23/24 11:39 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/22/2024 6:35 AM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/22/24 12:35 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/21/2024 8:54 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/24 8:22 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>>
>>>>>> It seems, your problem is that you just don't understand the
>>>>>> nuances of the papers, and in your stupidity assume this means the
>>>>>> other people are just wrong, when the error is on YOUR part.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The bottom line of all of this (even if my summation is not
>>>>> precisely accurate) is the Quine convinced most people that
>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is not a viable notion.
>>>>
>>>> Or, to paraphrase you, you think everyone else is as stupid as you.
>>>>
>>>> Fortunately, that isn't true.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Point to my mistake if you can. I have spoken about this with very
>>> many people very many times. Quine did convince most people that
>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is problematic.
>>>
>>
>> Godel doesn't mean what you say he means. PERIOD.
>>
>
> We cannot tell what the Hell that Gödel really means because all of the
> actual semantics is hidden behind diagonalization and arithmetization.
Of course we can, if we understand what those things actually are.
They do not HIDE the semantics, except to people who don't understand
what he is talking about. In fact, a key part of the proof is showing
that the logic of arithmetic is powerful enough to "arithmetize" an
arbitray statement and check a proof.
The fact that YOU can't figure out what he is saying isn't his fault,
but shows YOU LACK of understanding.
Yes, the proof isn't designed for someone who only understand the first
week of first year logic, like your understanding seems to be. It seems
that you don't understand how Formal Logic works.
>
> We can tell that Mendelson sums it up like this:
> G says “I am not provable in K”. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
Right, IN META-F.
You are just too stupid to understand what that means,
>
> *The details of what Gödel's G actually mean are irrelevant*
> *Because we can see that epistemological antinomies do derive*
> *undecidability, thus proving the the notion of undecidability*
> *has a vacuous philosophical foundation*
Nope. You don't understand the actual meaning of the word,
"Undecidability" in computation refers to having an ACTUAL MAPPING that
can not have finite algorithm compute it. That is not "Vacuoise"
In the more moder logic field, it referes to there being a sentence in
the langugage of the field (and thus should be a truth bearer) not being
able be proven or refuted. And, since the statement thus HAS a truth
value, it is NOT an "epistemological antinomy" as you talk about.
Your issue only comes up in NON-FORMAL logic system (which seems to be
all you understand, as you can't seem to accept the rules of Formal
Logic) which do not apply such limits to the sentences in them.
>
> An undecidable sentence of a theory K is a closed wf ℬ of K such that
> neither ℬ nor ¬ℬ is a theorem of K, that is, such that not-⊢K ℬ and
> not-⊢K ¬ℬ. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
Right, and BEING IN theory K, means it HAS A TRUTH VALUE in Theory K.
What do you think "ℬ ∈ K" means? Note, not every ℬ IS an element of K.
>
> Undecidable(K, ℬ) ≡ ∃ℬ ∈ K ((K ⊬ ℬ) ∧ (K ⊬ ¬ℬ))
>
> Mendelson, Elliott 2015. Introduction to Mathematical Logic sixth
> edition CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group Boca Raton, FL
>
>> That is shown because his actual statement that he claims to be true
>> and unprovable is NOT an "epistomological antinomy" as you claim, but
>> a stetement of the form:
>>
>> G asserts that no number g exists that satisfies the particular
>> primative recursive relationship.
>>
>> That is a statement that MUST be a truthbeared, as the relationship is
>> computable, so every number can be tested, and thus either a number
>> exists that statisfies it, or not.
>>
>> This has been explained, and ignored, showing you are too stupid to
>> understand that.
>>
>> You seem to think that Godel is too "stupid" to know what he is
>> talking about, while instead, the issue is that YOU are the stupid
>> one, and do not understand the arguement, and thus just presume that ,
>> because you don't like the answer, must be wrong.
>>
>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It has never been the case that the precise nuances of detail
>>>>> have ever mattered at all. It has always been the case that
>>>>> the gist of the matter is crucial.
>>>>
>>>> And you think it isn't important to be totally correct.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> {True on the basis of meaning} is the actual ultimate foundation
>>>>> of correct reasoning.
>>>>
>>>> Which means, as has been pointed out, your idea of "Correct
>>>> Reasoning" is insufficient for most actual logic problems, as it can
>>>> only handle the very simple cases.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It has not been pointed out it has been baselessly claimed.
>>> I spent a long time studying Montague Grammar and the Cyc
>>> project. I know that everything that can be said in English
>>> can be precisely mathematically formalized.
>>
>> What you call "Baseless claims" are infact PROOFS of what is being said.
Nope. You have yet to actually PROVE anything.
Your START by "Paraphrasing" something to means something it does not
mean, and thus you start with a LIE and an FALSEHOOD.
You don't seem to understand what a PROOF actually is in a formal logic
system, as they are based on needing to use actual logic, and not just
rheteric like some branches of philosophy.
>>
>> You don't understand them, so call them baseless.
>>
>
> This always works except for unknowns:
> True(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ F(F ⊢ x)
> False(L, x) ≡ ∃x ∈ F(F ⊢ ¬x)
> L is an accurate model of the actual world
> Proposition(L,x) ≡ ∃x ∈ L (True(L,x) ∨ False(L,x))
But no such thing as a "accurate model of the actual world" actually
really exists.
And Formal Logic doesn't even pretend that its logic system need to be
models of the actual world.
>
> As long as the accurate model of the actual world is sufficiently
> populated it could prove that there is zero publicly available
> evidence of election fraud that could have possibly changed the
> outcome of the 2020 presidential election.
Except you begin with the error of assuming such a model could exist.
(Hint, Quantum Mechanics, as we currently understand it doesn't allow
for such a thing).
And that people would some how believe such a model when they won't
belive the evidence that you might use to try to build one.
>
>>>
>>> I proved exactly how Quine was wrong about synonymity
>>> between bachelor and unmarried adult male and you
>>> could show nothing wrong with my approach when applied
>>> to bachelor and unmarried adult male.
>>
>> Nope, you think you did, because you don't understand the actual issue
>> being discussed.
>>
>
> We already covered this and I fully addressed this.
> You said that the issue was that Quine could not understand
> the details of the synonymity between the term "bachelor"
> and the terms the comprise the meaning of the term "bachelor".
>
> You rejected my answer because it was too precisely accurate.
No, I reject it because it isn't correct.
YOU are making the exact same error as Quine was pointing out thinking
that undecidable and incomplete are somehow "exactly" the same.
>
>>>
>>> On 4/21/2024 9:02 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> > So, if you want to define your "Natural Language" logic to NOT be
>>> > actaully based on "Natural Language" but this marked up version where
>>> > every word needs to be fully qualified to precisely state its
>>> meaning,
>>> > this just shows you don't understand the meaning of the words you are
>>> > using.
>>>
>>> I proved exactly how bachelor and unmarried adult male are
>>> synonymous and you could not point out any error. The error
>>> that you tried to get away with was that I was too precise.
>>>
>>
>> Nope, you missed his point, because it when right over your head.
>>
>
> You habit of using rhetoric instead of reasoning seems dishonest.
> What are all of the details of exactly how I missed his point?
>
To begin with, Godel's G is NOT an epistemlogical antinomy, so you BEGAN
your arguement with a lie.
YOU are the one using rhetoric, because that is all you have, since you
don't actually know many of the rules and axioms of the formal systems
you are talking about, so you can't actually build an actual proof in them.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 19:00 -0700 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <rrWdndWPM-oDWbj7nZ2dnZfqn_adnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103880 |
On 04/21/2024 05:22 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/21/24 5:38 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/21/2024 4:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/24 3:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/21/2024 1:42 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautology that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Philosophy",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sophisticated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Manifesto
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> most
>>>>>>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not
>>>>>>>>>>>>> believe in"
>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> {fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arises,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-class.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inversion,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing at all
>>>>>>>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> all of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> able to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> taking your
>>>>>>>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>>>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the
>>>>>>>>>>> fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>> floor
>>>>>>>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are
>>>>>>>>>>> true on
>>>>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>>>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>>>>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a
>>>>>>>>>>>> body of
>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>>>>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>>>>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>>>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>>>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>>>>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>>>>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>>>>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>>>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>>>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>>>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>>>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>>>>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegelians.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>>>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>>>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>>>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist,
>>>>>>>>>>>> too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>>>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>>>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>>>>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>>>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth
>>>>>>>>>>>> floors, ...,
>>>>>>>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>>>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept
>>>>>>>>>>> that no
>>>>>>>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>>>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>>>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>>>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>>>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>>>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>>>>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>>>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>>>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>>>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>>>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>>>>>>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>>>>>>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>>>>>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>>>>>>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>>>>>>>> about things.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
>>>>>>>>> takes a form
>>>>>>>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the
>>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>>>>>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>>>>>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>>>>>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>>>>>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>>>>>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>>>>>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>>>>>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>>>>>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>>>>>>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>>>>>>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>>>>>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>>>>>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>>>>>>>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>>>>>>>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>>>>>>>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>>>>>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>>>>>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>>>>>>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>>>>>>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>>>>>>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>>>>>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>>>>>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>>>>>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>>>>>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>>>>>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>>>>>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>>>>>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>>>>>>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>>>>>>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>>>>>>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>>>>>>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>>>>>>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>>>>>>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>>>>>>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>>>>>>>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>>>>>>>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>>>>>>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>> thus no need to store
>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>>>>>>>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>>>>>>>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>>>>>>>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>>>>>>>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
>>>>>>> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>>>>>>>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>>>>>>>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>>>>>>>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
>>>>>>> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then
>>>>>>> we get
>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>>>>>>>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>>>>>>>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>>>>>>>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>>>>>>>> a "truth table",
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
>>>>>>> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
>>>>>>> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
>>>>>>> derive nonsense.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
>>>>>>> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
>>>>>>> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
>>>>>>> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
>>>>>>> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
>>>>>>> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
>>>>>>> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
>>>>>>> of logic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>>>>>>>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>>>>>>>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>>>>>>>> bad ideas.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
>>>>>>> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
>>>>>>> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
>>>>>>> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
>>>>>>> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
>>>>>>> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
>>>>>>> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
>>>>>>> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>>>>>>>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>>>>>>>> then those _are not_.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
>>>>>>> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>>>>>>>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>>>>>>>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>>>>>>>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is not actually largely bunk.
>>>>>>> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
>>>>>>> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
>>>>>>> the actual world.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human
>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than
>>>>>>> yes/no
>>>>>>> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
>>>>>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>>>>>>>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>>>>>>>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
>>>>>> about when the transfer principle applies and
>>>>>> a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
>>>>>> matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
>>>>>> in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
>>>>>> into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
>>>>>> the result _direct implication_ carries and with
>>>>>> ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
>>>>>> and excludes any sort "paradox".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
>>>>>> being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
>>>>>> reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
>>>>>> and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
>>>>>> and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
>>>>>> to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
>>>>>> example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
>>>>>> and they're _two, different things_.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
>>>>>> 'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material Implication
>>>>>> is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
>>>>>> old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules of logic
>>>>>> both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is
>>>>>> neither,
>>>>>> at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Russell: was never, the Pope.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
>>>>>> and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
>>>>>> particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
>>>>>> well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
>>>>>> and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier disambiguation
>>>>>> and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
>>>>>> modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (Judgment.)
>>>>>
>>>>> The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that there really
>>>>> are expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>
>>>> SOME statements are true based on their "meaning" (as you are
>>>> defining it), not all.
>>>>
>>>> Not ALL True statements are True based on the meaning of their words.
>>>>
>>>> Agaim, you are falling for the fallacy of proof by example.
>>>>
>>>> The Pythagorean Theorem isn't True by the meaning of the words, but
>>>> its truth comes out of the Truth makers of Plane Geometry and a
>>>> series of valid connections from them to the Theorem.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth
>>>>> floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>
>>>>> The majority of people that were convinced there is no such thing
>>>>> as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that Quine utterly
>>>>> failed to understand how we know that bachelors are unmarried are
>>>>> simply wrong.
>>>>
>>>> I don't think many people think that there are no statements that
>>>> are true by the nature of the meaning of the words, just that the
>>>> "meaning of the words" can't be the only criteria.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I never restricted it this way (to the meaning of words)
>>
>> THen you DO accept that Godel's G is a true statement by its meaning
>> since there does not exist any number g that satisfies the defined
>> Primitive Recursive Relationship?
>>
>> And this can be established by the infinite sequence of steps of
>> checking every Natural Number against that relationship, which is the
>> classical meaning of Semantically true,
>>
> How do we use this to show that we know it is true that we
> cannot take the elevator of a puppy to its fifteenth floor?
> When you say
>
> > checking every Natural Number against that relationship, which is the
> > classical meaning of Semantically true,
>
> you totally ignore 99.9999999% of semantics.
> That it like saying counting to three is ALL of mathematics.
>
>> And thus is can not be a epistemological antinomy.
>>
>
> Observe that, in terms of the standard interpretation
> (∀x2) ¬𝒫𝑓 (x2, ⌜G⌝) says that there is no natural number
> that is the Gödel number of a proof in K of the wf G, which is
> equivalent to asserting that there is no proof in K of G.
> Hence, G is equivalent in K to an assertion that G is unprovable
> in K. In other words, G says “I am not provable in K”.
>
> This is an analogue of the liar paradox: “I am lying”
> (that is, “I am not true”). However, although the liar paradox
> leads to a contradiction, Gödel (1931) showed that G is an
> undecidable sentence of K. We shall refer to G as a Gödel
> sentence for K. (Mendelson: 2015:208)
>
> Mendelson, Elliott 2015. Introduction to Mathematical Logic sixth
> edition CRC Press Taylor & Francis Group Boca Raton, FL
>
> When G says “I am not provable in K”.
> any proof of G in K requires a sequence of inference
> steps in K that prove that they themselves do not exist.
> Meta_K can see this and confirms that G is unprovable in K.
>
> *Gödel's proof hides all of these details*
>
>>> I never even restricted on on the basis of the:
>>>
>>> *Principle of compositionality*
>>> In semantics, mathematical logic and related disciplines, the principle
>>> of compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a complex
>>> expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent expressions
>>> and the rules used to combine them.
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>>
>>> I have *always* meant the 100% perfectly totally complete
>>> meaning that also includes the full discourse context.
>>
>> How does that show that the Pathagorean Theorem is true?
>>
>> The question isn't determining the "Meaning of the Words" which is
>> what the full discourse context would provide, but the sequence of the
>> logical arguement that proves it, which is something which goes
>> beyound "meaning" of the words.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Do you think that it is possible to:
>>> take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy?
>>> or would the total meaning of the expression make that impossible?
>>
>> Nope. WHich is a fallacy of proof by example.
>>
>> Note, all your examples go to the most primiative form of logic, which
>> if that is all you have, can be complete because it will be finite.
>>
>>>
>>> Maybe my example would have given Quine a clue about how we know
>>> that all bachelors are unmarried. He is the one that convinced
>>> most of the world that {true on the basis of meaning} is vacuous
>>> and he did this almost entirely on the basis that he could not
>>> understand exactly how we know that all bachelors are unmarried.
>>>
>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is only relations between finite
>>> strings thus excludes direct observations of things in the world.
>>>
>>> *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*
>>> https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
>>
>>
>> Since none of this relates to Formal logic or undecidability or
>> incompleteness, I will presume that you are just admitting that you
>> have no answers to the replys and are just working on Red Herring.
>>
>>
>> Note, Quine doesn't say that we can't show that all bachelors are
>> unmarried, but that bachelor and unmarried are not SYNONYMS
>> replaceable with each other, and that logic that is based on that is
>> too imprecise, and we need to better define the rules of logic when
>> doing such things.
>>
>> The key point here is that while the classical definition of a
>> bachelor is a never married man (though some uses of the words might
>> include a man that was married but now nolonger has a wife), the word
>> "unmarried" also has ranges of meaning from "never married" to
>> "currently not married" and thus the two words can't be considered
>> truely equivalent words.
>>
>> It seems, your problem is that you just don't understand the nuances
>> of the papers, and in your stupidity assume this means the other
>> people are just wrong, when the error is on YOUR part.
>>
>
> The bottom line of all of this (even if my summation is not
> precisely accurate) is the Quine convinced most people that
> {true on the basis of meaning} is not a viable notion.
>
> It has never been the case that the precise nuances of detail
> have ever mattered at all. It has always been the case that
> the gist of the matter is crucial.
>
> {True on the basis of meaning} is the actual ultimate foundation
> of correct reasoning.
>
>> To re-iterate, every challenge I have put to you, asking you to defend
>> your position has been ignored, and I will treat that as your
>> admission that you have no response, and an admission that you accept
>> that your claim is invalid, and thus that you repeated making the
>> disproven claims are just proof of your being a liar and an idiot (for
>> thinking people will believe your lies).
>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> We must establish {true on the basis of meaning} as the ultimate
>>>>> foundation of correct reasoning before we can begin to point out
>>>>> how modern logic diverges from correct reasoning.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Then your concept of "Correct Reasoning" can't handle fundamental
>>>> true statements like the Pythagorean Theorem, or even that 2 + 3 =
>>>> 5, as these are not true JUST by the meaning of the words.
>>>>
>>>
>>
>
I think though all you've got is "not-false on the basis of meaning".
That's not particular, in the sense that that's all anybody's got.
"Not-False": Not-necessarily-false, not-necessarily-true.
The "Not" and "Necessarily" sort of require separate precedence
associating them with a value of "True" and/or "False".
These are matters of definitions, and inference of type,
I suppose there's always "there ain't no good guy,
there ain't no bad guy, there's just you and me".
About Goedel and incompleteness, is again that there's
this, "extra-ordinary". "The Liar" says nothing except
"I'm a prototype of a fallacy you can find in otherwise
a sea of prototype truism a Comenius language, in the
extra-ordinary". The Goedelian incompleteness, say
"there is no standard model of arithmetic", and makes
it so there's an infinite number.
Extra-ordinary, ..., super-standard.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 19:53 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v04cec$j1qt$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103879 |
On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
> On 4/21/24 5:38 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/21/2024 4:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>> On 4/21/24 3:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/2024 1:42 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> sophisticated
>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Manifesto
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his
>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophical
>>>>>>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
>>>>>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not
>>>>>>>>>>>> believe in"
>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>> {fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-class.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type
>>>>>>>>>>>>> inversion,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class
>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true
>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing
>>>>>>>>>>>> at all
>>>>>>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of
>>>>>>>>>>>> all of
>>>>>>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be
>>>>>>>>>>>> able to
>>>>>>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of
>>>>>>>>>>>> taking your
>>>>>>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the
>>>>>>>>>> fifteen
>>>>>>>>>> floor
>>>>>>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are
>>>>>>>>>> true on
>>>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>>>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>>>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>>>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>>>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>>>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>>>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>>>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist,
>>>>>>>>>>> too.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>>>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth
>>>>>>>>>>> floors, ...,
>>>>>>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>>>>>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>>>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>>>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>>>>>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>>>>>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>>>>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>>>>>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>>>>>>> about things.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes
>>>>>>>> a form
>>>>>>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the
>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>>>>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>>>>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>>>>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>>>>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>>>>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>>>>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>>>>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>>>>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>>>>>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>>>>>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>>>>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>>>>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>>>>>>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>>>>>>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>>>>>>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>>>>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>>>>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>>>>>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>>>>>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>>>>>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>>>>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>>>>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>>>>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>>>>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>>>>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>>>>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>>>>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>>>>>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>>>>>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>>>>>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>>>>>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>>>>>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>>>>>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>>>>>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>>>>>>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>>>>>>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>>>>>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>> thus no need to store
>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>>>>>>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>>>>>>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>>>>>>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>>>>>>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
>>>>>> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>>>>>>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>>>>>>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>>>>>>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
>>>>>> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then
>>>>>> we get
>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>>>>>>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>>>>>>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>>>>>>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>>>>>>> a "truth table",
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
>>>>>> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
>>>>>> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
>>>>>> derive nonsense.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
>>>>>> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
>>>>>> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
>>>>>> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
>>>>>> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
>>>>>> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
>>>>>> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
>>>>>> of logic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>>>>>>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>>>>>>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>>>>>>> bad ideas.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
>>>>>> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
>>>>>> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
>>>>>> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
>>>>>> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
>>>>>> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
>>>>>> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
>>>>>> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>>>>>>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>>>>>>> then those _are not_.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
>>>>>> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>>>>>>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>>>>>>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>>>>>>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is not actually largely bunk.
>>>>>> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
>>>>>> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
>>>>>> the actual world.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human
>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than
>>>>>> yes/no
>>>>>> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
>>>>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>>>>>>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>>>>>>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
>>>>> about when the transfer principle applies and
>>>>> a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
>>>>> matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
>>>>> in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
>>>>> into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
>>>>> the result _direct implication_ carries and with
>>>>> ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
>>>>> and excludes any sort "paradox".
>>>>>
>>>>> That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
>>>>> being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
>>>>> reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
>>>>> and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
>>>>> and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
>>>>> to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
>>>>> example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
>>>>> and they're _two, different things_.
>>>>>
>>>>> I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
>>>>> 'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>>>>>
>>>>> It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material Implication
>>>>> is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
>>>>> old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules of logic
>>>>> both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is
>>>>> neither,
>>>>> at all.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Russell: was never, the Pope.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
>>>>> and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
>>>>> particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
>>>>> well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
>>>>> and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier disambiguation
>>>>> and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
>>>>> modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
>>>>>
>>>>> (Judgment.)
>>>>
>>>> The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that there really
>>>> are expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>> SOME statements are true based on their "meaning" (as you are
>>> defining it), not all.
>>>
>>> Not ALL True statements are True based on the meaning of their words.
>>>
>>> Agaim, you are falling for the fallacy of proof by example.
>>>
>>> The Pythagorean Theorem isn't True by the meaning of the words, but
>>> its truth comes out of the Truth makers of Plane Geometry and a
>>> series of valid connections from them to the Theorem.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth
>>>> floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>
>>>> The majority of people that were convinced there is no such thing
>>>> as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that Quine utterly
>>>> failed to understand how we know that bachelors are unmarried are
>>>> simply wrong.
>>>
>>> I don't think many people think that there are no statements that are
>>> true by the nature of the meaning of the words, just that the
>>> "meaning of the words" can't be the only criteria.
>>>
>>
>> I never restricted it this way (to the meaning of words)
>
> THen you DO accept that Godel's G is a true statement by its meaning
> since there does not exist any number g that satisfies the defined
> Primitive Recursive Relationship?
>
> And this can be established by the infinite sequence of steps of
> checking every Natural Number against that relationship, which is the
> classical meaning of Semantically true,
>
> And thus is can not be a epistemological antinomy.
>
>> I never even restricted on on the basis of the:
>>
>> *Principle of compositionality*
>> In semantics, mathematical logic and related disciplines, the principle
>> of compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a complex
>> expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent expressions
>> and the rules used to combine them.
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>
>> I have *always* meant the 100% perfectly totally complete
>> meaning that also includes the full discourse context.
>
> How does that show that the Pathagorean Theorem is true?
>
> The question isn't determining the "Meaning of the Words" which is what
> the full discourse context would provide, but the sequence of the
> logical arguement that proves it, which is something which goes beyound
> "meaning" of the words.
>
>
>>
>> Do you think that it is possible to:
>> take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy?
>> or would the total meaning of the expression make that impossible?
>
> Nope. WHich is a fallacy of proof by example.
>
> Note, all your examples go to the most primiative form of logic, which
> if that is all you have, can be complete because it will be finite.
>
>>
>> Maybe my example would have given Quine a clue about how we know
>> that all bachelors are unmarried. He is the one that convinced
>> most of the world that {true on the basis of meaning} is vacuous
>> and he did this almost entirely on the basis that he could not
>> understand exactly how we know that all bachelors are unmarried.
>>
>> {true on the basis of meaning} is only relations between finite
>> strings thus excludes direct observations of things in the world.
>>
>> *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*
>> https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
>
>
> Since none of this relates to Formal logic or undecidability or
> incompleteness, I will presume that you are just admitting that you have
> no answers to the replys and are just working on Red Herring.
>
>
> Note, Quine doesn't say that we can't show that all bachelors are
> unmarried, but that bachelor and unmarried are not SYNONYMS replaceable
> with each other, and that logic that is based on that is too imprecise,
> and we need to better define the rules of logic when doing such things.
>
> The key point here is that while the classical definition of a bachelor
> is a never married man (though some uses of the words might include a
> man that was married but now nolonger has a wife), the word "unmarried"
> also has ranges of meaning from "never married" to "currently not
> married" and thus the two words can't be considered truely equivalent
> words.
*Thanks for your apt analysis. I can't tolerate wading through nonsense*
Once I understood that his conclusion was {true on the basis of meaning}
is not viable I can't tolerate carefully examining how he came up with
that. He might as well have said that 2 + 3 = 5 is not true because he
simply does not believe in numbers.
My concrete example that one cannot take the elevator of a
puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy conclusively proves
that {true on the basis of meaning} does have some instances.
*My unique insight into this issue is that*
{true on the basis of meaning} (TotBoM) is restricted to relations
between finite strings, thus making {true on the basis of meaning}
unequivocally divided from {true on the basis of observation} (TotBoO)
Bachelor is simply assigned a range of semantic meanings that
are entirely defined in terms of other defined words.
We can easily 100% precisely define 10,000 different notions
of bachelor and give them their own unique index.
Bachelor[0] = never married adult male
Bachelor[1] = not currently married adult male
Bachelor[951] having completed a four year degree.
In this case we can clearly see that the LHS is synonymous
to the RHS because the RHS is assigned to the LHS.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 22:02 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v04ggc$1q6th$4@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #103881 |
On 4/21/24 8:53 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 6:52 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>> On 4/21/24 5:38 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/21/2024 4:19 PM, Richard Damon wrote:
>>>> On 4/21/24 3:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/21/2024 1:42 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> used
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> things,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> modal
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there are
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> its
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> totally
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> body of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> their
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> reason
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> only
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not any
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautology that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> into the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Philosophy",
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> sophisticated
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Manifesto
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> philosophical
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> distinction
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> difference,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> most
>>>>>>>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not
>>>>>>>>>>>>> believe in"
>>>>>>>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> {fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> arises,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> first-class.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> type,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> inversion,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> abstraction,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ontology.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same
>>>>>>>>>>>>> thing at all
>>>>>>>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> all of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be
>>>>>>>>>>>>> able to
>>>>>>>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> taking your
>>>>>>>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>>>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the
>>>>>>>>>>> fifteen
>>>>>>>>>>> floor
>>>>>>>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are
>>>>>>>>>>> true on
>>>>>>>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>>>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>>>>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a
>>>>>>>>>>>> body of
>>>>>>>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>>>>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>>>>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>>>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>>>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>>>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>>>>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>>>>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>>>>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>>>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>>>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>>>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>>>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>>>>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new
>>>>>>>>>>>> Hegelians.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>>>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>>>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>>>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist,
>>>>>>>>>>>> too.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>>>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>>>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>>>>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>>>>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>>>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth
>>>>>>>>>>>> floors, ...,
>>>>>>>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>>>>>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept
>>>>>>>>>>> that no
>>>>>>>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>>>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>>>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>>>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>>>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>>>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>>>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>>>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>>>>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>>>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>>>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>>>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>>>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>>>>>>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>>>>>>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>>>>>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>>>>>>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>>>>>>>> about things.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it
>>>>>>>>> takes a form
>>>>>>>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the
>>>>>>>>> conclusion
>>>>>>>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>>>>>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>>>>>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>>>>>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>>>>>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>>>>>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>>>>>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>>>>>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>>>>>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>>>>>>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>>>>>>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>>>>>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>>>>>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>>>>>>>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>>>>>>>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>>>>>>>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>>>>>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>>>>>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>>>>>>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>>>>>>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>>>>>>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>>>>>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>>>>>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>>>>>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>>>>>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>>>>>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>>>>>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>>>>>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>>>>>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>>>>>>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>>>>>>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>>>>>>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>>>>>>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>>>>>>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>>>>>>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>>>>>>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>>>>>>>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>>>>>>>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>>>>>>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>> thus no need to store
>>>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>>>>>>>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>>>>>>>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>>>>>>>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>>>>>>>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
>>>>>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
>>>>>>> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>>>>>>>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>>>>>>>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>>>>>>>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
>>>>>>> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then
>>>>>>> we get
>>>>>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>>>>>>>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>>>>>>>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>>>>>>>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>>>>>>>> a "truth table",
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
>>>>>>> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
>>>>>>> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
>>>>>>> derive nonsense.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
>>>>>>> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
>>>>>>> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
>>>>>>> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
>>>>>>> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
>>>>>>> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
>>>>>>> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
>>>>>>> of logic.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>>>>>>>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>>>>>>>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>>>>>>>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>>>>>>>> bad ideas.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
>>>>>>> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
>>>>>>> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
>>>>>>> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
>>>>>>> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
>>>>>>> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
>>>>>>> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
>>>>>>> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>>>>>>>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>>>>>>>> then those _are not_.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
>>>>>>> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>>>>>>>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>>>>>>>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>>>>>>>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is not actually largely bunk.
>>>>>>> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
>>>>>>> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
>>>>>>> the actual world.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human
>>>>>>> understanding
>>>>>>> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than
>>>>>>> yes/no
>>>>>>> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
>>>>>>> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>>>>>>>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>>>>>>>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
>>>>>> about when the transfer principle applies and
>>>>>> a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
>>>>>> matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
>>>>>> in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
>>>>>> into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
>>>>>> the result _direct implication_ carries and with
>>>>>> ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
>>>>>> and excludes any sort "paradox".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
>>>>>> being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
>>>>>> reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
>>>>>> and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
>>>>>> and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
>>>>>> to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
>>>>>> example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
>>>>>> and they're _two, different things_.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
>>>>>> 'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material Implication
>>>>>> is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
>>>>>> old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules of logic
>>>>>> both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is
>>>>>> neither,
>>>>>> at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Russell: was never, the Pope.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
>>>>>> and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
>>>>>> particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
>>>>>> well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
>>>>>> and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier disambiguation
>>>>>> and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
>>>>>> modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (Judgment.)
>>>>>
>>>>> The Bottom line that you seem to be avoiding is that there really
>>>>> are expressions that are {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>
>>>> SOME statements are true based on their "meaning" (as you are
>>>> defining it), not all.
>>>>
>>>> Not ALL True statements are True based on the meaning of their words.
>>>>
>>>> Agaim, you are falling for the fallacy of proof by example.
>>>>
>>>> The Pythagorean Theorem isn't True by the meaning of the words, but
>>>> its truth comes out of the Truth makers of Plane Geometry and a
>>>> series of valid connections from them to the Theorem.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> We really cannot take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth
>>>>> floor of this puppy and this is {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>
>>>>> The majority of people that were convinced there is no such thing
>>>>> as {true on the basis of meaning} on the basis that Quine utterly
>>>>> failed to understand how we know that bachelors are unmarried are
>>>>> simply wrong.
>>>>
>>>> I don't think many people think that there are no statements that
>>>> are true by the nature of the meaning of the words, just that the
>>>> "meaning of the words" can't be the only criteria.
>>>>
>>>
>>> I never restricted it this way (to the meaning of words)
>>
>> THen you DO accept that Godel's G is a true statement by its meaning
>> since there does not exist any number g that satisfies the defined
>> Primitive Recursive Relationship?
>>
>> And this can be established by the infinite sequence of steps of
>> checking every Natural Number against that relationship, which is the
>> classical meaning of Semantically true,
>>
>> And thus is can not be a epistemological antinomy.
>>
>>> I never even restricted on on the basis of the:
>>>
>>> *Principle of compositionality*
>>> In semantics, mathematical logic and related disciplines, the principle
>>> of compositionality is the principle that the meaning of a complex
>>> expression is determined by the meanings of its constituent expressions
>>> and the rules used to combine them.
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_compositionality
>>>
>>> I have *always* meant the 100% perfectly totally complete
>>> meaning that also includes the full discourse context.
>>
>> How does that show that the Pathagorean Theorem is true?
>>
>> The question isn't determining the "Meaning of the Words" which is
>> what the full discourse context would provide, but the sequence of the
>> logical arguement that proves it, which is something which goes
>> beyound "meaning" of the words.
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Do you think that it is possible to:
>>> take the elevator of a puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy?
>>> or would the total meaning of the expression make that impossible?
>>
>> Nope. WHich is a fallacy of proof by example.
>>
>> Note, all your examples go to the most primiative form of logic, which
>> if that is all you have, can be complete because it will be finite.
>>
>>>
>>> Maybe my example would have given Quine a clue about how we know
>>> that all bachelors are unmarried. He is the one that convinced
>>> most of the world that {true on the basis of meaning} is vacuous
>>> and he did this almost entirely on the basis that he could not
>>> understand exactly how we know that all bachelors are unmarried.
>>>
>>> {true on the basis of meaning} is only relations between finite
>>> strings thus excludes direct observations of things in the world.
>>>
>>> *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*
>>> https://www.ditext.com/quine/quine.html
>>
>>
>> Since none of this relates to Formal logic or undecidability or
>> incompleteness, I will presume that you are just admitting that you
>> have no answers to the replys and are just working on Red Herring.
>>
>>
>> Note, Quine doesn't say that we can't show that all bachelors are
>> unmarried, but that bachelor and unmarried are not SYNONYMS
>> replaceable with each other, and that logic that is based on that is
>> too imprecise, and we need to better define the rules of logic when
>> doing such things.
>>
>> The key point here is that while the classical definition of a
>> bachelor is a never married man (though some uses of the words might
>> include a man that was married but now nolonger has a wife), the word
>> "unmarried" also has ranges of meaning from "never married" to
>> "currently not married" and thus the two words can't be considered
>> truely equivalent words.
>
> *Thanks for your apt analysis. I can't tolerate wading through nonsense*
> Once I understood that his conclusion was {true on the basis of meaning}
> is not viable I can't tolerate carefully examining how he came up with
> that. He might as well have said that 2 + 3 = 5 is not true because he
> simply does not believe in numbers.
>
Except that you don't understand what he actually said, because you
don;t understand the terminology, and you think because he says things
your don't understand that he must be wrong.
No, you are just too stupid to understand what he says.
> My concrete example that one cannot take the elevator of a
> puppy to the fifteenth floor of this puppy conclusively proves
> that {true on the basis of meaning} does have some instances.
And just shows that you believe the fallacy of proof by example is
actually proper logic.
>
> *My unique insight into this issue is that*
> {true on the basis of meaning} (TotBoM) is restricted to relations
> between finite strings, thus making {true on the basis of meaning}
> unequivocally divided from {true on the basis of observation} (TotBoO)
And, since you can't show how this lets you show that the Pythogrean
Theorem it true in Plane Geometery, or that 2 + 3 = 5 (since you fail to
answer the challanges) you are just admitting that your unique insight
just works for TOY problems that don't really matter, and you are just
too stupid to understand that restriction.
>
> Bachelor is simply assigned a range of semantic meanings that
> are entirely defined in terms of other defined words.
>
> We can easily 100% precisely define 10,000 different notions
> of bachelor and give them their own unique index.
But we don't, so it doesn't matter.
>
> Bachelor[0] = never married adult male
> Bachelor[1] = not currently married adult male
> Bachelor[951] having completed a four year degree.
>
> In this case we can clearly see that the LHS is synonymous
> to the RHS because the RHS is assigned to the LHS.
>
So, if you want to define your "Natural Language" logic to NOT be
actaully based on "Natural Language" but this marked up version where
every word needs to be fully qualified to precisely state its meaning,
this just shows you don't understand the meaning of the words you are using.
Until you publish this dictionary that FULLY defines all shades of
meaning for every word, and then fully mark up every statement you
right, you are just proving yourself to be a hypocrit, and a liar.
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-24 23:33 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v0cme2$2qhje$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103883 |
On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote: The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x) specified as relations between finite strings such that a correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language. As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita. -- Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-25 07:32 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v0df0r$26ja1$3@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #103908 |
On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote: > On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote: > The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x) > specified as relations between finite strings such that a > correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every > element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language. > > As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita. > Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"? If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true. If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and thus your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE. If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for ANY finite string. That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the problem.
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| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-25 09:09 -0700 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <y4ednaL7rMisHbf7nZ2dnZfqnPjByJ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103911 |
On 04/25/2024 04:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: > On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote: >> On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote: >> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x) >> specified as relations between finite strings such that a >> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every >> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language. >> >> As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita. >> > > > Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the > stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"? > > If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus > your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true. > > If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and thus > your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE. > > If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for > ANY finite string. > > That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the problem. "In the Flat-Land of Tertium Non Datur".
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-25 12:04 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v0e2fi$34208$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103911 |
On 4/25/2024 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: > On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote: >> On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote: >> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x) >> specified as relations between finite strings such that a >> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every >> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language. >> >> As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita. >> > > > Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the > stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"? > > If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus > your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true. > > If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and thus > your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE. > > If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for > ANY finite string. > > That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the problem. ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x)) ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x)) ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L, x))) https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF I created Minimal Type Theory so that I could concisely encode actual self-reference. In all the literature it is conventional to encode self-reference incorrectly. LP := ~True(LP) Prolog rejects expressions having the same structure as LP ?- LP = not(true(LP)). LP = not(true(LP)). ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). false. Truth_Bearer(L, LP) == FALSE -- Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-25 10:45 -0700 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <5hednQcuTYsyC7f7nZ2dnZfqnPednZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103915 |
On 04/25/2024 10:04 AM, olcott wrote: > On 4/25/2024 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >> On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote: >>> On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote: >>> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x) >>> specified as relations between finite strings such that a >>> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every >>> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language. >>> >>> As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita. >>> >> >> >> Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the >> stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"? >> >> If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus >> your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true. >> >> If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and >> thus your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE. >> >> If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for >> ANY finite string. >> >> That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the problem. > > ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x)) > ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x)) > ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L, > x))) > > https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF > > > I created Minimal Type Theory so that I could concisely encode > actual self-reference. In all the literature it is conventional > to encode self-reference incorrectly. > > LP := ~True(LP) > > Prolog rejects expressions having the same structure as LP > ?- LP = not(true(LP)). > LP = not(true(LP)). > ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). > false. > > Truth_Bearer(L, LP) == FALSE > > I can understand that that may be what you want, it's a little more involved what it is. It's like Einstein the other day made a quote, and it was about making truth-makers, I saw it on Wikiquote. "Whoever undertakes to set himself up as a judge of Truth and Knowledge is shipwrecked by the laughter of the gods." - https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein#Essay_to_Leo_Baeck_(1953) Now, that goes for all of you all, because, if it's not courtesy axiomless natural deduction, and a brief metaphysics and teleology and entelechy for a broad epistemology of a thorough ontology, it's not. So, Peter, on the one hand you're grasping for some of what basically the foundations, the very foundations must provide, and, that somehow there is one, some "true" foundation, "sole" foundation, that it provides "even given free expansion of comprehension that quantifier impredicativity is not a thing", you have to confront that all fully down in an entire foundation altogether, to arrive at some of these extended goals you have in mind for yourself. Then the rest of you are sort of in a Flat-Earther's opinionated penury of Russell's retro-thesis. Of course, overgeneralizations are generally unsound, if even moreso profoundly of the counterintuition of failure. No offense, ..., keine Beleidigung beabsichticht.
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-25 13:47 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v0e8f4$35b5s$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103916 |
On 4/25/2024 12:45 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote: > On 04/25/2024 10:04 AM, olcott wrote: >> On 4/25/2024 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>> On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote: >>>> On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote: >>>> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x) >>>> specified as relations between finite strings such that a >>>> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every >>>> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language. >>>> >>>> As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita. >>>> >>> >>> >>> Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the >>> stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"? >>> >>> If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus >>> your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true. >>> >>> If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and >>> thus your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE. >>> >>> If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for >>> ANY finite string. >>> >>> That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the problem. >> >> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x)) >> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x)) >> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L, >> x))) >> >> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF >> >> >> I created Minimal Type Theory so that I could concisely encode >> actual self-reference. In all the literature it is conventional >> to encode self-reference incorrectly. >> >> LP := ~True(LP) >> >> Prolog rejects expressions having the same structure as LP >> ?- LP = not(true(LP)). >> LP = not(true(LP)). >> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >> false. >> >> Truth_Bearer(L, LP) == FALSE >> >> > > > I can understand that that may be what you want, > it's a little more involved what it is. > It is simply arranging the existing set of facts of general knowledge into a knowledge ontology of stipulated relations between finite strings. That it would take a million labor years for humans to this manually does not change the essence of this. > It's like Einstein the other day made a quote, > and it was about making truth-makers, I saw it > on Wikiquote. > > > "Whoever undertakes to set himself up as a > judge of Truth and Knowledge is shipwrecked > by the laughter of the gods." > - https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein#Essay_to_Leo_Baeck_(1953) > We keep coming back to the unassailable fact that puppies are dogs are animals and they are not in any way shape of form 15 story office buildings and you continue to assert the position that maybe they really are 15 story office buildings. Puppies are dogs and animals even if every single detail of all of reality is absolutely nothing more than a mere figment of the imagination. My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is only about the nature of meaning expressed using language. > Now, that goes for all of you all, because, > if it's not courtesy axiomless natural deduction, > and a brief metaphysics and teleology and entelechy > for a broad epistemology of a thorough ontology, > it's not. > > So, Peter, on the one hand you're grasping for > some of what basically the foundations, the very > foundations must provide, and, that somehow > there is one, some "true" foundation, "sole" foundation, > that it provides "even given free expansion of > comprehension that quantifier impredicativity > is not a thing", you have to confront that all > fully down in an entire foundation altogether, > to arrive at some of these extended goals you > have in mind for yourself. > > Then the rest of you are sort of in a Flat-Earther's > opinionated penury of Russell's retro-thesis. > > Of course, overgeneralizations are generally unsound, > if even moreso profoundly of the counterintuition > of failure. > > No offense, ..., keine Beleidigung beabsichticht. > > -- Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-25 21:51 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- |
| Message-ID | <v0f1af$28f0r$2@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #103917 |
On 4/25/24 2:47 PM, olcott wrote: > On 4/25/2024 12:45 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote: >> On 04/25/2024 10:04 AM, olcott wrote: >>> On 4/25/2024 6:32 AM, Richard Damon wrote: >>>> On 4/25/24 12:33 AM, olcott wrote: >>>>> On 4/24/2024 10:59 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote: >>>>> The only thing that I have ever been talking about is True(L,x) >>>>> specified as relations between finite strings such that a >>>>> correct and consistent True(L,x) can be defined for every >>>>> element of human knowledge that can be expressed using language. >>>>> >>>>> As far as Eastern religion goes Zen/Tao & Advaita. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Then what is the value of True(L,x) where x is defined as to be the >>>> stagtement: "Not True(L,x)"? >>>> >>>> If it is TRUE, the x is the equivalent of NOT TRUE, or FALSE and thus >>>> your True(L,x) has said a false statement was true. >>>> >>>> If it is FALSE, then x is the equivalent of NOT FALSE, or TRUE, and >>>> thus your True(L,x) has said that a TRUE statement was FALSE. >>>> >>>> If it refuses to answer, then you have lied that it can be defined for >>>> ANY finite string. >>>> >>>> That, our your logic system just can't handle the basics of the >>>> problem. >>> >>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (True(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ x)) >>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (False(L, x) ≡ (L ⊢ ~x)) >>> ∃L ∈ Formal_Systems, ∃x ∈ L (Truth_Bearer(L, x) ≡ (True(L, x) ∨ False(L, >>> x))) >>> >>> https://www.researchgate.net/publication/331859461_Minimal_Type_Theory_YACC_BNF >>> >>> >>> I created Minimal Type Theory so that I could concisely encode >>> actual self-reference. In all the literature it is conventional >>> to encode self-reference incorrectly. >>> >>> LP := ~True(LP) >>> >>> Prolog rejects expressions having the same structure as LP >>> ?- LP = not(true(LP)). >>> LP = not(true(LP)). >>> ?- unify_with_occurs_check(LP, not(true(LP))). >>> false. >>> >>> Truth_Bearer(L, LP) == FALSE >>> >>> >> >> >> I can understand that that may be what you want, >> it's a little more involved what it is. >> > > It is simply arranging the existing set of facts of general > knowledge into a knowledge ontology of stipulated relations > between finite strings. > > That it would take a million labor years for humans to > this manually does not change the essence of this. But is a process of KNOWLEDGE, not TRUTH. You don't seem to understand the difference. Encoding everything KNOWN tells us very little about what might be true but not yet known, which is part of the purpose of logic. > >> It's like Einstein the other day made a quote, >> and it was about making truth-makers, I saw it >> on Wikiquote. >> >> >> "Whoever undertakes to set himself up as a >> judge of Truth and Knowledge is shipwrecked >> by the laughter of the gods." >> - https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Albert_Einstein#Essay_to_Leo_Baeck_(1953) >> > > We keep coming back to the unassailable fact that puppies are > dogs are animals and they are not in any way shape of form > 15 story office buildings and you continue to assert the position > that maybe they really are 15 story office buildings. You just don't understand the arguements being used do you. NO ONE is saying that dogs are not animals or that they are 15 story office buildings (at least not in any system similar to our real world). > > Puppies are dogs and animals even if every single detail of all > of reality is absolutely nothing more than a mere figment of the > imagination. But not if the "reality" of the system doesn't HAVE Puppies. > > My system is not at all about the nature of reality it is > only about the nature of meaning expressed using language. And thus, you need to realize that you need to use the language of the system you are working in. So, in basic mathematics, it is NOT true that "Dogs are Animals" is a true statement, because in basic mathematics, there is no definition of a "Dog". > >> Now, that goes for all of you all, because, >> if it's not courtesy axiomless natural deduction, >> and a brief metaphysics and teleology and entelechy >> for a broad epistemology of a thorough ontology, >> it's not. >> >> So, Peter, on the one hand you're grasping for >> some of what basically the foundations, the very >> foundations must provide, and, that somehow >> there is one, some "true" foundation, "sole" foundation, >> that it provides "even given free expansion of >> comprehension that quantifier impredicativity >> is not a thing", you have to confront that all >> fully down in an entire foundation altogether, >> to arrive at some of these extended goals you >> have in mind for yourself. >> >> Then the rest of you are sort of in a Flat-Earther's >> opinionated penury of Russell's retro-thesis. >> >> Of course, overgeneralizations are generally unsound, >> if even moreso profoundly of the counterintuition >> of failure. >> >> No offense, ..., keine Beleidigung beabsichticht. >> >> >
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