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Groups > comp.theory > #103826 > unrolled thread
| Started by | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2024-04-17 21:34 -0500 |
| Last post | 2024-04-18 18:33 -0400 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 263 — 10 participants |
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Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-17 21:34 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-17 23:13 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-18 09:50 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-18 18:31 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-18 20:11 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-18 21:58 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-18 21:25 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-18 22:50 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-18 22:28 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-19 07:09 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 09:18 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-19 18:41 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 11:37 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-20 12:52 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 09:34 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 13:05 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 13:11 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-04-22 11:26 +0300
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-22 09:03 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-22 18:54 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-23 09:44 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-23 21:47 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-23 09:54 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 10:28 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 13:40 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 15:01 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 13:07 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 12:15 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 11:19 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 13:58 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 12:16 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 09:38 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Mendelson-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 08:36 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 09:52 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-19 18:51 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 13:04 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-19 19:20 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 01:05 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-20 08:56 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 10:20 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-20 11:39 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 10:26 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 12:52 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 09:44 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --Tarski Proof-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-22 09:10 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 10:33 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-24 19:01 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 19:17 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-24 20:49 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 19:57 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-24 22:00 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 21:16 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-24 23:38 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 22:53 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 07:32 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 22:56 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 07:32 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 21:02 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-25 09:15 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 21:50 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 14:09 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 12:19 -0400
D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 12:05 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 19:02 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 20:26 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 20:43 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 22:18 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 22:02 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-26 23:45 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 23:07 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 00:29 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 00:34 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 07:45 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 09:32 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 13:09 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 12:51 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 14:10 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 13:17 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 14:40 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 13:52 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 15:09 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 14:48 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 17:24 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 16:36 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 17:45 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 17:02 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 18:19 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 17:29 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 18:45 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 17:56 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 19:09 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 18:29 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 19:44 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 19:21 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 20:45 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 08:13 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-28 09:29 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-29 09:26 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-04-29 18:16 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-29 10:40 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-29 19:19 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-04-30 11:52 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-30 10:36 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-30 18:46 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-01 12:43 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-01 10:45 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-02 12:55 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-02 09:22 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-03 11:54 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-03 06:38 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-03 17:57 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-03 22:20 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2024-05-04 10:56 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 08:46 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 12:11 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 09:06 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2024-05-04 14:39 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 09:48 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2024-05-04 15:34 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 10:47 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 10:49 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 12:57 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2024-05-04 17:14 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 12:35 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 13:52 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 11:52 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 11:31 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 13:15 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 13:46 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 16:40 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 16:18 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 17:43 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 17:08 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 18:36 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 18:01 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 19:32 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 18:51 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 20:07 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 19:20 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 20:44 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 19:49 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 21:05 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 20:30 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 22:49 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 22:17 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- "Fred. Zwarts" <F.Zwarts@HetNet.nl> - 2024-05-05 12:36 +0200
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 09:23 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 13:00 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 09:30 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- joes <noreply@example.com> - 2024-05-05 15:42 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 11:22 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 12:43 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- joes <noreply@example.com> - 2024-05-05 17:03 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 13:27 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 11:29 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 12:46 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 12:28 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 13:49 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 13:32 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- joes <noreply@example.com> - 2024-05-05 16:57 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 12:23 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- immibis <news@immibis.com> - 2024-05-07 03:37 +0200
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2024-05-05 13:11 -0600
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 12:41 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 12:21 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 13:54 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 13:33 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 15:47 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 15:34 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 17:13 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 16:09 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 18:57 -0400
your system clock is still off olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 19:38 -0500
Re: your system clock is still off Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 21:05 -0400
Re: your system clock is still off olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 22:27 -0500
Re: your system clock is still off Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 23:53 -0400
Re: your system clock is still off olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 23:06 -0500
Re: your system clock is still off Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-06 06:33 -0400
Re: your system clock is still off Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-06 18:50 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 07:10 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 10:13 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 12:50 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 --- Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-06 19:01 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 11:51 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2024-05-05 09:33 +0100
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2024-05-05 10:02 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 09:51 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-05 12:54 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2024-05-05 17:28 +0000
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 12:47 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 08:36 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-04 12:11 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-04 09:12 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-05-04 11:58 -0400
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-05 12:39 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-05-05 09:41 -0500
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Mikko <mikko.levanto@iki.fi> - 2024-05-06 19:15 +0300
Re: D simulated by H never halts no matter what H does V3 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-29 19:19 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-26 10:34 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 08:10 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-28 09:22 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 07:31 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 09:48 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-28 11:10 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 10:27 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-28 12:13 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 12:10 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-28 13:41 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 11:12 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 13:26 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 11:46 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 08:41 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-28 12:01 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-29 09:28 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-29 10:24 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-29 19:19 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-29 19:19 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-25 09:08 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 21:55 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-27 08:50 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-27 13:21 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-18 00:57 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-18 07:34 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 09:51 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 13:23 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 14:04 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-19 16:36 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 13:07 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 16:05 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 20:41 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 21:40 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-20 20:39 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 00:47 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 07:19 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 07:17 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 10:16 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 08:53 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 12:41 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 11:37 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 11:42 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 14:34 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 17:19 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 16:38 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 19:52 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 19:22 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 21:54 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 23:35 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-22 07:35 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-23 10:39 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-23 21:47 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 19:00 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-21 19:53 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-21 22:02 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-24 23:33 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 07:32 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-25 09:09 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-25 12:04 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> - 2024-04-25 10:45 -0700
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-25 13:47 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 21:51 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --correct reasoning-- Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-25 21:51 -0400
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> - 2024-04-18 09:53 -0500
Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> - 2024-04-18 18:33 -0400
Page 12 of 14 — ← Prev page 1 … 10 11 [12] 13 14 Next page →
| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-27 13:21 -0400 |
| Subject | Re: Undecidability based on epistemological antinomies V2 --H(D,D)-- |
| Message-ID | <v0jc7m$2djoe$2@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #103948 |
On 4/27/24 9:50 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/27/2024 3:41 AM, Mikko wrote:
>> On 2024-04-26 16:21:21 +0000, olcott said:
>>
>>> That is like saying we cannot know that 2 + 3 = 5 because people
>>> simply do not "believe in" numbers or arithmetic.
>>
>> There really are that kind of people. They usually don't believe
>> that 2 + 3 = 5 because they learned it before they learned that
>> one can disbelieve. But people often disbelieve logical proofs
>> because they learned about proofs only when they already had
>> learned to disbelieve, and even then not very much about proofs,
>> just enough to disbelieve. Consequently, there are people posting
>> in various newgroups that they have found a solution to a problem
>> that is proven unsolvable.
>>
>
> Likewise most people have been indoctrinated to believe that the
> errors of logic are not errors.
>
> When we encode the principle of explosion as a syllogism:
> Socrates is a man.
> Socrates is not a man.
> Therefore, Socrates is a butterfly.
> The conclusion does not follow from the premises,
> thus the non-sequitur error.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
But you skipped the steps of the actual proof.
The POE logic would be:
Since Socrates is a Man, then we can also say as a true statement that
Socrates is either a Man or a butterfly.
(DO you disagree with that, if so why?)
Now, Given that Socrates is either a Man or a Butterfly, if we combine
that with the second statement, that he is not a man, since he was
either a Man or a Butterfly, if he isn't a Man, then he MUST be a butterfly.
(Again, what is wrong with that step of logic?)
Thus, YES, we can get from Socrates is a Man, and Socrates is NOT a Man,
to the statement that Socrates is a Butterfly by conventional logic.
Note, The "absurd" answer comes out of the fact that we have an "absurd"
truthmaker, that Socrates, who is a Man, is also NOT a Man.
Thus, what every system that came from, FAILS to meet the requirements
of the Law of Non-Contradiction, as it is a Contradictory system.
And the Principle of Explosion says that in a system with the "normal"
logic rules, once it fails to be non-contradictory on one point, then
any false statement can be proven.
There are various forms of logic that restrict the forms of logical
arguements that can be used the limit the principle of explosion, but
the principle of explosion only applies to a system that has already
developed at least one contradiction in it.
>
> In logic, the law of non-contradiction (LNC) (also known as the law of
> contradiction, principle of non-contradiction (PNC), or the principle of
> contradiction) states that contradictory propositions cannot both be
> true in the same sense at the same time, e. g. the two propositions "p
> is the case" and "p is not the case" are mutually exclusive.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_noncontradiction
>
> {A, ~A} ⊨ FALSE fixes this problem
>
Nope, because such a statment doesn't enforce that A and ~A have
opposite values, it just states that for the system to remain
consistantt they must have opposite value.
This just shows that you fundamentally don't understand how logic works.
That statement is just the requirement for a system to be
non-contradictory. And yes, IF The system obeys it, then POE has no
affect. The problem is that with the standard logic, if just ONE
statement fails that test, then it can be shown that for ANY statement
(that is truth bearing) it can also be shown to fail that test.
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-18 00:57 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <uvqcoo$23umj$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103826 |
On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote: "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44) is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it <is> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally. > *Parphrased as* > Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the > formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false. > Which shows that X is undecidable in F. > It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F). > Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a > proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. > > A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, > semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary > bearer of truth or falsity. > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition > -- Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-18 07:34 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <uvr0f9$1fet8$1@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #103829 |
On 4/18/24 1:57 AM, olcott wrote: > On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote: > "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar > undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44) > > is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it <is> > literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally. > >> *Parphrased as* >> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the >> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false. >> Which shows that X is undecidable in F. >> > > It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and > irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F). Right, which is why Godel's G is NOT a "self-contradictory" statement. You don't even understand the meaning of "Incomplete" here, as a self-contradictory statement, and thus a statement which is neither true or false, says nothing about incompleteness, since incompleteness is only about the ability to prove or disprove truth bearers. Note, since your "Parphrased" statement is an INCORRECT restatement of the statement that Godel made (maybe the best you know, but you are still incorrect) your whole logic falls down. The fact that you REFUSE to look at the facts pointed out to you, just prove why people believe things that are not true, it isn't a failing of the logic system, but a refusal of some people (like you) to actually look at the truth. Of course, since "The Truth" is what run this universe, rejecting it causes the person rejecting it to be in a very bad place, even if they don't realize it yet., > >> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a >> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. >> >> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary >> bearer of truth or falsity. >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition >> >
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| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-19 09:51 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <RpicnfvEovBXPb_7nZ2dnZfqn_udnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103829 |
On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote: > On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote: > "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar > undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44) > > is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it <is> > literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally. > >> *Parphrased as* >> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the >> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false. >> Which shows that X is undecidable in F. >> > > It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and > irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F). > >> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a >> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false. >> >> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language, >> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary >> bearer of truth or falsity. >> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition >> > Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" then as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough, comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the truth". Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things, one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model, as with regards to expectations, a statistical model. For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe, temporal. Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and the first-class typing, of these things. The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement, after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally. Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth, of what is, "A Theory", at all. One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.) One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it. A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, though. "Bigger: not always worse."
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| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-19 13:23 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <uvucr5$34u3m$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103843 |
On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>
>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it <is>
>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>
>>> *Parphrased as*
>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that the
>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false.
>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>
>>
>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>
>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>
>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the primary
>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>
>>
>
> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" then
> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the truth".
>
> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>
> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
> temporal.
>
>
> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
> the first-class typing, of these things.
>
In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
"fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
truth.
Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
The only other element required to define the entire body of
{expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>
> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>
> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>
> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>
>
> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, though.
>
> "Bigger: not always worse."
>
>
>
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
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| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-19 14:04 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <ZZadndJs5rWzQb_7nZ2dnZfqnPadnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103845 |
On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a similar
>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>
>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it <is>
>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>
>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that
>>>> the
>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false.
>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>
>>>
>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>
>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>
>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>> primary
>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" then
>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the truth".
>>
>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>
>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
>> temporal.
>>
>>
>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>
>
> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>
> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>
> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
> truth.
>
> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>
> The only other element required to define the entire body of
> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>
>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>
>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>
>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>
>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>
>>
>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, though.
>>
>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>
>>
>>
>
"Understanding" doesn't mean much here
except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
We only have "true axioms" because in
all their applications they've held up.
They "withstand", and, "overstand".
There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
for the class of predicates where it applies.
Which is not all of them.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-19 16:36 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <uvuo4e$3779f$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103846 |
On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>> similar
>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>
>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>> <is>
>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>
>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that
>>>>> the
>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or false.
>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>
>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>
>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>> primary
>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" then
>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>> truth".
>>>
>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>
>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
>>> temporal.
>>>
>>>
>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>
>>
>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>
>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>
>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>> truth.
>>
>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>
>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>
>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>
>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>
>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>
>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>
>>>
>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that, though.
>>>
>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>
> We only have "true axioms" because in
> all their applications they've held up.
> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>
>
We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
the scope to every natural language expression.
When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
possibly be false.
When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the nature
of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>
> Which is not all of them.
>
>
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-20 13:07 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <i5qcnf8VINzAvbn7nZ2dnZfqn_idnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103847 |
On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>> similar
>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>
>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>>> <is>
>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>
>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that
>>>>>> the
>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>> false.
>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>
>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>> primary
>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth" then
>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>> truth".
>>>>
>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>
>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
>>>> temporal.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>
>>>
>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>
>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>
>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>> truth.
>>>
>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>
>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>
>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>
>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>
>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>
>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>> though.
>>>>
>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>
>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>> all their applications they've held up.
>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>
>>
>
> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
> the scope to every natural language expression.
>
> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
> possibly be false.
>
> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the nature
> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>
>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>
>> Which is not all of them.
>>
>>
>
Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
not a vulgar one".
It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
basically that space is infinite and words finite,
there's though a space of words and words of space.
Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
theory, at all.
So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-20 16:05 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <v01amb$3s3ut$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103857 |
On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>> similar
>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves that
>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly be a
>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>> then
>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>> truth".
>>>>>
>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>
>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>
>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>
>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>> truth.
>>>>
>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>
>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>
>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>
>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>
>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>
>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>> though.
>>>>>
>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>
>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>
>>>
>>
>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>
>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>> possibly be false.
>>
>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the nature
>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>
>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>
>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>
>>>
>>
>
> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
> not a vulgar one".
>
> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>
> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>
A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
{true on the basis of meaning}.
We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>
> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>
> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>
> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>
> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>
> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>
>
> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>
> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
> theory, at all.
>
> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>
> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>
>
A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-20 20:41 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <eoSdnZcCbrZJF7n7nZ2dnZfqn_ednZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103858 |
On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>> then
>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>
>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>
>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>> truth.
>>>>>
>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>
>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>
>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>
>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>
>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>>> possibly be false.
>>>
>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the nature
>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>
>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>
>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>> not a vulgar one".
>>
>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>
>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>
>
> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
>>
>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>
>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>
>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>
>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>
>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>
>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>
>>
>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>
>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>> theory, at all.
>>
>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>
>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>
>>
>
> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>
> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>
So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
it's not quasi-modal?
You proved to yourself.
One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
"anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
objectivity.
You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
in some places.
I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
true and false up there, and here in the middle is
a sort of Objectivism.
What's above is as what is below,
a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-20 21:40 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <2f6cnd92PfDmBbn7nZ2dnZfqnPQAAAAA@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103859 |
On 04/20/2024 08:41 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>
>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>
>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>
>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>> nature
>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>
>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>
>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>
>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>
>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>
>>
>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>>>
>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>
>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>
>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>
>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>
>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>
>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>
>>>
>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>
>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>> theory, at all.
>>>
>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>
>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>
>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>
>
> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
> it's not quasi-modal?
>
> You proved to yourself.
>
> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
>
>
> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>
> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>
> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>
>
> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
> objectivity.
>
> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
> in some places.
>
>
> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>
>
> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
> a sort of Objectivism.
>
> What's above is as what is below,
> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>
>
>
>
That said, some of the controversies you raise with respect to Halting
problem, Entscheidungs or the Branching problem, Russell, Church-Rosser,
Rice, incompleteness, decide-ability, and so on, are not absent reason,
yet it's inferred you're lacking language and formalism, of the
"extra-ordinary", which lifts such notions of the non-standard to the
extra-ordinary, providing reason and rationality for the rulial and
regular in the dually-self-infraconsistent, a theory with (all the)
truth in it arising from axiomless natural deduction.
So, the extra-ordinary, is, rather super-standard, with regards to the
standard, with regards to the standard.
Then, notions of the objects of mathematics, like continuity and
infinity, are definitely related to such structures of the objects of
mathematical logic.
That modern mathematics has one definition of a continuous domain, the
complete ordered field, yet there are at least three definitions of
continuous domains, the line-reals field-reals signal-reals, after the
Integer Continuum a la Duns Scotus and Spinoza and within the Long-Line
Continuum of duBois-Reymond, helps to establish that the space of 0's
and 1's is of forms including regular old Sparse Cantor Space, a Square
Cantor Space, and a Signal Cantor Space, of all the sequences of 0's and
1's.
So, the notions of these greater completions in the theory, first must
accommodate a thoroughly consistent theory and the resolution of all
logical paradoxes, then, achieve a replete notion of the complete in
mathematical continuity for the Linear Continuum, if you are to arrive
at greater things than the usual incomplete standard with its
undecide-ables as singularities, their richer multiplicity, and,
consistently.
So, from my perspective I already have this sort of theory, yet, I sort
of had to put it together because no-one seemed to have done so.
It's the same for all, though, that there is one at all, "A Theory".
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-20 20:39 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <Z26dnazyRdP6F7n7nZ2dnZfqn_WdnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103858 |
On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable and
>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>> then
>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal universe,
>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>
>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>
>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>> truth.
>>>>>
>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>
>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>
>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>
>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>
>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>>> possibly be false.
>>>
>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the nature
>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>
>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>
>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>> not a vulgar one".
>>
>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>
>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>
>
> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>
>>
>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>
>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>
>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>
>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>
>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>
>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>
>>
>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>
>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>> theory, at all.
>>
>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>
>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>
>>
>
> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>
> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>
So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
it's not quasi-modal?
You proved to yourself.
One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
"anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
objectivity.
You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
in some places.
I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
true and false up there, and here in the middle is
a sort of Objectivism.
What's above is as what is below,
a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 00:47 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <v029a8$5ga4$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103860 |
On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally. Since it
>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean unprovable
>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their meaning}
>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>
>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>
>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>
>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>> nature
>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>
>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>
>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>
>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>
>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>
>>
>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>
>>>
>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>
>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>
>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>
>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>
>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>
>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>
>>>
>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>
>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>> theory, at all.
>>>
>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>
>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>
>>>
>>
>> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>
>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>
>
> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
> it's not quasi-modal?
>
> You proved to yourself.
>
If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor
of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
>
There are billions of things just like puppyies are
not fifteen story office buildings.
>
> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>
There is no reason why it can't have those things.
> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>
> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>
>
> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
> objectivity.
>
> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
> in some places.
>
The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>
> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>
It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
natural language would be tree walks.
>
> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
> a sort of Objectivism.
>
> What's above is as what is below,
> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>
>
>
>
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Richard Damon <richard@damon-family.org> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 07:19 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <v02so5$1pdvi$1@i2pn2.org> |
| In reply to | #103862 |
On 4/21/24 1:47 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>
>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>
>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>> nature
>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>
>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>
>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>
>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>
>>>
>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>
>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>
>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>
>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>
>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>
>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>
>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>
>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>
>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>
>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>
>>
>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>
>> You proved to yourself.
>>
>
> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor
> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
You assume stupidity on others, when the problem is actually a stupidity
of yourself which you refuse to beleive.
>
>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
>>
>
>
> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
> not fifteen story office buildings.
But, as been shown, the "Meaning of Words" doesn't provide a complete
definition for what is true.
You still haven't shown how you establish the Pythagorean Theorem from
the "Meaning of the Words", so either that isn't true or your logic is
incomplete,
>
>>
>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>
>
> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
How are you sure? It could be just another point of your ignorance.
>
>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>
>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>
>>
>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>> objectivity.
>>
>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>> in some places.
>>
> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
Quine knew full well that all bachelors are unmarried, but was pointing
out the WEAKNESS of just the "Meaning of Words" method.
>
>>
>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>
> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
> natural language would be tree walks.
>
>>
>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>
>> What's above is as what is below,
>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 07:17 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <jfucnazyRdNcgrj7nZ2dnZfqn_GdnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103862 |
On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of language,
>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident proposition is
>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the assignment of
>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of meaning
>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>
>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that cannot
>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>
>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>> nature
>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>
>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>
>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>
>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>
>>>
>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines the
>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>
>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>
>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>
>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>
>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>
>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>
>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>
>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>
>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>
>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>
>>
>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>
>> You proved to yourself.
>>
>
> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor
> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>
>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
>>
>
>
> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
> not fifteen story office buildings.
>
>>
>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>
>
> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>
>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>
>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>
>>
>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>> objectivity.
>>
>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>> in some places.
>>
> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>
>>
>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>
> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
> natural language would be tree walks.
>
>>
>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>
>> What's above is as what is below,
>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
in terms among common types.
Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
about things.
I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
relations, which of course must be non-circular and
non-contradictory.
It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
account after modern fundamental formalisms
results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 10:16 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <v03aki$c3h7$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103864 |
On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as the
>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the truth"
>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the fundamental
>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its meaning
>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of every
>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>>> nature
>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>
>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto ..."
>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>
>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that self-defines
>>>> the
>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>
>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>
>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>
>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>
>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>
>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>
>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>
>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>
>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>
>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> A complete https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>>> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>
>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>
>>>
>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>
>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>
>>
>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor
>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>
>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not invincible.
>>>
>>
>>
>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>
>>>
>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>
>>
>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>
>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>
>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>
>>>
>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>> objectivity.
>>>
>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>>> in some places.
>>>
>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>
>>>
>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>
>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>
>>>
>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>
>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>
>
>
> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
> in terms among common types.
>
Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
> about things.
>
Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
{The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>
> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>
> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
> non-contradictory.
>
The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
would take humans millions of man-years.
> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>
The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>
> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
I am not sure what you mean by MI.
> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
> account after modern fundamental formalisms
> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
to have the Boolean value of true.
We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
{Cats} <are> {Animals}
{Animals} <are> {Living Things}
thus no need to store
{Cats} <are> {Living Things}
This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 08:53 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <fv6dnVGaiaq3q7j7nZ2dnZfqn_SdnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103867 |
On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used for a
>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false proves
>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is true or
>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific model,
>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the reflections on
>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of
>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any type
>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto
>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most people
>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>
>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> A complete
>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>
>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>
>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>
>>>
>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen floor
>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>
>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>> invincible.
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>
>>>
>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>
>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>
>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>> objectivity.
>>>>
>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>>>> in some places.
>>>>
>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>
>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>
>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>> in terms among common types.
>>
>
> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>
>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>> about things.
>>
>
> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>
> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>
> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>
>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>
>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>
>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>> non-contradictory.
>>
>
> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
> would take humans millions of man-years.
>
>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>
>
> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>
>>
>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>
> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>
>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>
> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>
> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
> to have the Boolean value of true.
>
> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>
> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
> thus no need to store
> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>
> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>
>
>
>
>
A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
that the premises have to be drawable as random
draws and that it results the same deduction
regardless the order of the draws.
So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
"material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
a "truth table", with regards to why a usual "model"
in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
bad ideas.
The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
then those _are not_.
The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
a model of reasoning can be very compact.
Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <polcott333@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 12:41 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <v03j47$duff$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #103869 |
On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive, thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger logical
>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth is
>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific
>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a model of
>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the same
>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency and
>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are some
>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world stipulations
>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite strings.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of
>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only that,
>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must broaden
>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto
>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
>>>>>> people
>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>
>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen
>>>> floor
>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are true on
>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>
>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>
>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>>
>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>
>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>
>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>
>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>
>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>> in terms among common types.
>>>
>>
>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>
>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>> about things.
>>>
>>
>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>
>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>
>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>
>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>
>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>
>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>> non-contradictory.
>>>
>>
>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>
>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>
>>
>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>
>>>
>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>
>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>
>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>
>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>
>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>
>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>
>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>> thus no need to store
>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>
>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
> that the premises have to be drawable as random
> draws and that it results the same deduction
> regardless the order of the draws.
>
I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
{Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>
This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
{The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>
If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then we get
{The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>
> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
> a "truth table",
I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
derive nonsense.
I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
steps of logic are inherently infallible.
They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
of logic.
> with regards to why a usual "model"
> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>
> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
> bad ideas.
>
You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
> then those _are not_.
>
Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
or there is no connection between inference steps.
>
> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>
It is not actually largely bunk.
It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
the actual world.
This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human understanding
that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than yes/no
questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>
> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>
--
Copyright 2024 Olcott "Talent hits a target no one else can hit; Genius
hits a target no one else can see." Arthur Schopenhauer
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 11:37 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <84qdnZs5Kqdfwbj7nZ2dnZfqnPudnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103873 |
On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a
>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are
>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite
>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only
>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must
>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto
>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen
>>>>> floor
>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are
>>>>> true on
>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>
>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>
>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>
>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>
>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>
>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>> about things.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>>
>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>
>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>
>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>>
>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>
>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>
>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>
>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>
>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>
>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>
>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>
>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>
>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>> thus no need to store
>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>
>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>
>
> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>
>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>
>
> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>
>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>
>
> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then we get
> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>
>>
>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>> a "truth table",
>
> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
> derive nonsense.
>
> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>
> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>
> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
> of logic.
>
>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>
> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>
>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>
>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>> bad ideas.
>>
>
> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>
> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>
>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>> then those _are not_.
>>
> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>
>>
>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>
>
> It is not actually largely bunk.
> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>
> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
> the actual world.
>
> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human understanding
> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than yes/no
> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>
>>
>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>
>
>
What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
about when the transfer principle applies and
a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
the result _direct implication_ carries and with
ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
and excludes any sort "paradox".
That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
and they're _two, different things_.
I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material Implication
is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules of logic
both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is neither,
at all.
Russell: was never, the Pope.
Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier disambiguation
and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
(Judgment.)
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ross Finlayson <ross.a.finlayson@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2024-04-21 11:42 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <PjKdnaQ6_-5iwLj7nZ2dnZfqn_SdnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #103873 |
On 04/21/2024 10:41 AM, olcott wrote:
> On 4/21/2024 10:53 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>> On 04/21/2024 08:16 AM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 4/21/2024 9:17 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>> On 04/20/2024 10:47 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 4/20/2024 10:39 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>> On 04/20/2024 02:05 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>> On 4/20/2024 3:07 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 02:36 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 4:04 PM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> On 04/19/2024 11:23 AM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/19/2024 11:51 AM, Ross Finlayson wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> On 04/17/2024 10:57 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> On 4/17/2024 9:34 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>>> "...14 Every epistemological antinomy can likewise be used
>>>>>>>>>>>>> for a
>>>>>>>>>>>>> similar
>>>>>>>>>>>>> undecidability proof..." (Gödel 1931:43-44)
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> is literally true whether or not Gödel meant it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>> Since it
>>>>>>>>>>>>> <is>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> literally true I am sure that he did mean it literally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> *Parphrased as*
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Every expression X that cannot possibly be true or false
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proves
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> formal system F cannot correctly determine whether X is
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> true or
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that X is undecidable in F.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>> It is easy to understand that self-contradictory mean
>>>>>>>>>>>>> unprovable and
>>>>>>>>>>>>> irrefutable, thus meeting the definition of Incomplete(F).
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Which shows that F is incomplete, even though X cannot
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> possibly
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> be a
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> proposition in F because propositions must be true or false.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> A proposition is a central concept in the philosophy of
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> language,
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> semantics, logic, and related fields, often characterized as
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> the
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> primary
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> bearer of truth or falsity.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proposition
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Most common-sense types have "the truth is the truth is the
>>>>>>>>>>>> truth"
>>>>>>>>>>>> then
>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to logical positivism and a sensitive,
>>>>>>>>>>>> thorough,
>>>>>>>>>>>> comprehensive, reasoned account of rationality and the
>>>>>>>>>>>> fundamental
>>>>>>>>>>>> objects of the logical theory, makes for again a stonger
>>>>>>>>>>>> logical
>>>>>>>>>>>> positivism, reinvigorated with a minimal "silver thread" to a
>>>>>>>>>>>> metaphysics, all quite logicist and all quite positivist, while
>>>>>>>>>>>> again structuralist and formalist, "the truth is the truth
>>>>>>>>>>>> is the
>>>>>>>>>>>> truth".
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Plainly, modeling bodies of knowledge is at least two things,
>>>>>>>>>>>> one is a formal logical model, and another is a scientific
>>>>>>>>>>>> model,
>>>>>>>>>>>> as with regards to expectations, a statistical model.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> For all the things to be in one modality, is that, as a
>>>>>>>>>>>> model of
>>>>>>>>>>>> belief, is that belief is formally unreliable, while at the
>>>>>>>>>>>> same
>>>>>>>>>>>> time, reasoned and rational as for its own inner consistency
>>>>>>>>>>>> and
>>>>>>>>>>>> inter-consistency, all the other models in the entire modal
>>>>>>>>>>>> universe,
>>>>>>>>>>>> temporal.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Axioms are stipulations, they're assumptions, and there are
>>>>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>>>>> very well-reasoned ones, and those what follow the
>>>>>>>>>>>> reflections on
>>>>>>>>>>>> relation, in matters of definition of structural relation, and
>>>>>>>>>>>> the first-class typing, of these things.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In epistemology (theory of knowledge), a self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>> proposition is
>>>>>>>>>>> a proposition that is known to be true by understanding its
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>>>> without proof https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-evidence
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> In the case of the correct model of the actual world
>>>>>>>>>>> stipulations
>>>>>>>>>>> are not assumptions. In this case stipulations are the
>>>>>>>>>>> assignment of
>>>>>>>>>>> semantic meaning to otherwise totally meaningless finite
>>>>>>>>>>> strings.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> We do not merely assume that a "dead rat" is not any type of
>>>>>>>>>>> "fifteen story office building" we know that it is a
>>>>>>>>>>> self-evident
>>>>>>>>>>> truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> Expressions of language that are stipulated to be true for the
>>>>>>>>>>> sole purpose of providing semantic meaning to otherwise totally
>>>>>>>>>>> meaningless finite strings provide the ultimate foundation of
>>>>>>>>>>> every
>>>>>>>>>>> expression that are true on the basis of its meaning.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> The only other element required to define the entire body of
>>>>>>>>>>> {expressions of language that are true on the basis of their
>>>>>>>>>>> meaning}
>>>>>>>>>>> is applying truth preserving operations to stipulated truths.
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> The axiomless, really does make for a richer accoutrement,
>>>>>>>>>>>> after metaphysics and the canon, why the objects of reason
>>>>>>>>>>>> and rationality, "arise" from axiomless deduction, naturally.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> Then, our axiomatics and theory "attain" to this, the truth,
>>>>>>>>>>>> of what is, "A Theory", at all.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory. (Modeling all individuals and contingencies
>>>>>>>>>>>> and their models of belief as part of the world of theory.)
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> One good theory, "A Theory: at all", we are in it.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> A catalog and schema and dictionary and the finite is only
>>>>>>>>>>>> that,
>>>>>>>>>>>> though.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> "Bigger: not always worse."
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> "Understanding" doesn't mean much here
>>>>>>>>>> except lack thereof, and hypocrisy.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> We only have "true axioms" because in
>>>>>>>>>> all their applications they've held up.
>>>>>>>>>> They "withstand", and, "overstand".
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> We cannot really understand the notion of true on the basis of
>>>>>>>>> meaning
>>>>>>>>> by only examining how this applies to real numbers. We must
>>>>>>>>> broaden
>>>>>>>>> the scope to every natural language expression.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we do this then we understand that a "dead rat" is not any
>>>>>>>>> type
>>>>>>>>> of "fifteen story office building" is a semantic tautology that
>>>>>>>>> cannot
>>>>>>>>> possibly be false.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> When we understand this then we have much deeper insight into the
>>>>>>>>> nature
>>>>>>>>> of mathematical axioms, they too must be semantic tautologies.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> There's nothing wrong with Tertium Not Datur,
>>>>>>>>>> for the class of predicates where it applies.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Which is not all of them.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Leafing through Badiou's "Second Manifesto ... on Philosophy",
>>>>>>>> he sort of arrives at again "I am a Platonist, yet a sophisticated
>>>>>>>> not a vulgar one".
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It seems quite a development when after Badiou's "First Manifesto
>>>>>>>> ..."
>>>>>>>> twenty years prior, that in the maturation of his philosophical
>>>>>>>> development he came again to arrive at truth as its own truth.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Tautology, identity, and equality, are not necessarily the same
>>>>>>>> thing, with regards to deconstructive accounts, and the distinction
>>>>>>>> of extensionality and intensionality, for sameness and difference,
>>>>>>>> with regards to affirmation and negation, in usual modes of
>>>>>>>> predicativity and quantifier disambiguation.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A semantic tautology is a term that I came up with that
>>>>>>> self-defines the
>>>>>>> logical positivist notion of analytic truth. It seems that most
>>>>>>> people
>>>>>>> succumbed to Quine's nonsense and decided to simply "not believe in"
>>>>>>> {true on the basis of meaning}.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> We know that the living animal {cat} is not any type of {fifteen
>>>>>>> story office building} only because of {true on the basis of
>>>>>>> meaning}.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Geometry arising as natural and axiomless from "a geometry of
>>>>>>>> points and spaces" from which Euclid's geometry justly arises,
>>>>>>>> helps illustrate that deconstructive accounts work at the
>>>>>>>> structuralist and constructivist again, what makes for that
>>>>>>>> axiomatics is didactic, vis-a-vis, fundamentality.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Type and category are truly great ideas, it's true,
>>>>>>>> and they're modeled as first-class after a deconstructive
>>>>>>>> account of their concrete models, their abstract models.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Type, and category, have inversions, where for example
>>>>>>>> a cat is a feline animal, while a lion is king of the beasts.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The most usual sorts of is-a and has-a are copulas, there
>>>>>>>> are many sorts predicates of relation of relation, first-class.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The use/mention distinction has that a type is a type is a type,
>>>>>>>> that an instance of a type is-or-is-not an instance of a type,
>>>>>>>> that it's an instance of a type and is an instance of a type.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Distinction and contradistinction, have it so for type inversion,
>>>>>>>> that the abstract and the concrete, model each other.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then for geometry (of space) and algebra (of words), there's
>>>>>>>> basically that space is infinite and words finite,
>>>>>>>> there's though a space of words and words of space.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Then, type theory and category theory, make for great bodies
>>>>>>>> of relation of relation, that for most, theory is a relation
>>>>>>>> of relation, and that there is always a first-class abstraction,
>>>>>>>> theory, at all.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> So, an ontology is just a sample of data in a science.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The "strong metonymy", is the idea that there's a true ontology.
>>>>>>>> Of course, it's not absent a metaphysical moment.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A complete
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology_(information_science)
>>>>>>> is an accurate model of the actual world. Not the same thing at all
>>>>>>> as an ontology from philosophy:
>>>>>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontology
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> There is definitely a true ontology even if every aspect of all of
>>>>>>> reality is a figment of the imagination. You will never be able to
>>>>>>> experience what seems to be the physical sensations of taking your
>>>>>>> puppies elevator to his fifteenth floor.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> So, you use quasi-modal logic but proved to yourself
>>>>>> it's not quasi-modal?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You proved to yourself.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> If you understand that you cannot take the elevator to the fifteen
>>>>> floor
>>>>> of your puppy then you know that there are expressions that are
>>>>> true on
>>>>> the basis of their meaning. Quine could never get this.
>>>>>
>>>>>> One doesn't get a free pass from the argument and rhetoric
>>>>>> and discourse of the limits of ontology without an encompassing
>>>>>> reason and discourse on the completion of an ontology, a body of
>>>>>> knowledge, that seems an insufferable ignorance and it's not
>>>>>> invincible.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There are billions of things just like puppyies are
>>>>> not fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The usual notion of the quasi-modal model of the world,
>>>>>> sort of lacks contingency and temporality and a modality
>>>>>> everywhere, why it's called quasi-modal, because it's just
>>>>>> ignorant that it's not actually modal (temporal).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> There is no reason why it can't have those things.
>>>>>
>>>>>> It's fair to say that Carnap and Quine and the Vienna school
>>>>>> and logical positivism after Boole and Shopenhauer and Derrida
>>>>>> sort of arrives at a big angsty withdrawal from a true theory
>>>>>> that's true with truth in it, while as well exploring the
>>>>>> a-letheia the traditional notion of disclosing what are not
>>>>>> un-truths, "remembering again for the first time", and all
>>>>>> these aspects of the canon of the technical philosophy that
>>>>>> are so because there's sort of before-Hegel and after-Hegel,
>>>>>> that Hegel's sort of included in before-Hegel, while at the
>>>>>> same time claimed by after-Hegel, that we are not new Hegelians.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Much like Kant leaves the Sublime _in_ the theory, as the
>>>>>> least "silver thread", connecting a proper metaphysics to
>>>>>> the physics and it's a science, Hegel makes for both a
>>>>>> fuller dialectic, and, besides Nothing, Hegel's a Platonist, too.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Then, with Wittgenstein and Nietzsche and Heidegger as,
>>>>>> "anti-Plato's, and Platonists again", then Gadamer arrives
>>>>>> at "Amicus Plato, period" and Badiou "you know, I'm a Platonist
>>>>>> again", what I think of your machine mind is that it doesn't
>>>>>> have a first-class mental maturity of an object sense of
>>>>>> objectivity.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> You know, fifteen story buildings don't have thirteenth floors, ...,
>>>>>> in some places.
>>>>>>
>>>>> The point is that because Quine could not understand how we know
>>>>> that all bachelors are unmarried he might not also accept that no
>>>>> puppy is a fifteen story office buildings.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I can surely appreciate a grand ontology, yet, in terms of
>>>>>> the Ontological Commitment, and what one makes of an
>>>>>> Ontological Commitment, that fact that you have given yours
>>>>>> to a bitmap sort of arrives that being considered lacking
>>>>>> a more thorough and reasoned goal of "Ontological Commitment:
>>>>>> Reason, Rationality, the Purely Technically Philosophical,
>>>>>> and Science, and the Empirical, the Phenomenological",
>>>>>> is something that one can leave or keep, instead of being
>>>>>> just awash and adrift in the 0's and 1's.
>>>>>>
>>>>> It would be organized such the reasoning with formalized
>>>>> natural language would be tree walks.
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It may be all 0's and 1's down there, yet it's all
>>>>>> true and false up there, and here in the middle is
>>>>>> a sort of Objectivism.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> What's above is as what is below,
>>>>>> a finite bitmap is so many scrawls
>>>>>> a stick, in the sand, of the beach, to reckon.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> That makes for "relevance logic", that syllogism only makes sense
>>>> in terms among common types.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes exactly no one else could get this because they try
>>> to hide their ignorance with insults and disparagement.
>>>
>>>> Also for "relevance logic" is that "Ex Falso Quodlibet and
>>>> Material Implication" are _not_ a thing, and that a contradiction
>>>> about un-related/ir-relevant things say absolutely _nothing_
>>>> about things.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Yes that is the exact error of modern logic.
>>> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>>> In both the principle of explosion and valid deductive inference.
>>>
>>> A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form
>>> that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion
>>> nevertheless to be false.https://iep.utm.edu/val-snd/
>>>
>>> Thus enabling 'from falsehood, anything [follows]';
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Principle_of_explosion
>>>
>>>> I.e., "Russell is not the Pope, and Russell never was the Pope".
>>>>
>>>> That works just fine for usual "common-sense" types, and
>>>> it really even reflects on "common" and "sense", and it's
>>>> why there's "relevance logic" at all from what otherwise
>>>> was just usual analysis because "classical quasi-modal
>>>> logic" has "EFQ+MI" and Principle of Explosion instead
>>>> of "Ex Falso Nihilum".
>>>>
>>>> So, one needn't have a "greater ontology" to establish
>>>> that the housecat or juvenile canine and the office tower
>>>> or a steamboat, while each things, have distinct properties
>>>> which effect their relations in usual enough is-a/has-a senses
>>>> or as with regards to any other collections of tuples in classes
>>>> and individuals and predicates that affect descriptions of
>>>> relations, which of course must be non-circular and
>>>> non-contradictory.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The purpose of the greater knowledge ontology that already exists
>>> in the minds of most people is to provide computations with human
>>> reasoning. LLM systems have already computed in a few months what
>>> would take humans millions of man-years.
>>>
>>>> It seems then first you put down the quasi-modal for
>>>> relevance logic its much more sensible framework,
>>>> then at least common-sense is much less insulted.
>>>>
>>>
>>> The https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyc project already spent
>>> 1000 labor years fully formalizing all common sense. Without
>>> the help of LLM systems it would take millions of labor years
>>> to formalize the rest of human general knowledge.
>>>
>>>>
>>>> My usual biggest gripe is about EFQ+MI which
>>>
>>> I am not sure what you mean by MI.
>>>
>>>> seems totally insouciant if not duplicitous,
>>>> and absolutely un-necessary, then about Tertium
>>>> Non Datur gets involved the multi-valent, and
>>>> the temporal and so on, then besides the usual
>>>> notions of of sputniks of quantification of the
>>>> usual roots of "logical" paradox, a deconstructive
>>>> account after modern fundamental formalisms
>>>> results a quite better approach to modern foudnations,
>>>> also modern fundamental formalist foundations.
>>>
>>> The sum total of all human general knowledge can be encoded
>>> in mostly in formalized natural language propositions. Some
>>> of this must be formalized using other formal languages.
>>> One can explain the details of writing C programs in English
>>> yet needs some actual C mixed into the explanation.
>>>
>>> We don't really need multi-valent logic. Mostly what we need
>>> is an enormously large number of axioms that are stipulated
>>> to have the Boolean value of true.
>>>
>>> We can compress the space required for these axioms and make
>>> them much easier to process in an inheritance hierarchy knowledge
>>> ontology. We also refrain from directly encoding and facts of the
>>> world that can be derived from other facts of the world.
>>>
>>> {Cats} <are> {Animals}
>>> {Animals} <are> {Living Things}
>>> thus no need to store
>>> {Cats} <are> {Living Things}
>>>
>>> This is already in the knowledge ontology inheritance hierarchy.
>>> UML Inheritance {cat} ▷ {animal} ▷ {Living Thing}
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>> A usual idea of a more robust deduction is also
>> that the premises have to be drawable as random
>> draws and that it results the same deduction
>> regardless the order of the draws.
>>
>
> I have not idea what this could possibly mean.
> {Cats} <are> {Animals} can only be deduced from the
> axiom {Cats} <are> {Animals}.
>
>> So, I don't agree that being "valid deductive inference",
>> it not being sound given arbitrary order-senstive premises.
>>
>
> This is valid deductive inference as shown by my analysis above:
> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>
>> That is, a robust and sound and valid deductive inference,
>> has to be the same from any angle and any draw or any
>> serialization of the premises (or "premisses").
>>
>
> If we don't somehow have some aspects of semantic relevance
> directly encoded into our notion of formal systems of logic then we get
> {The Moon is made of Green Cheese} proves {Donald Trump is God}
>
>>
>> The "EFQ+MI" is "Ex False Quodlibet plus Material
>> Implication", where "Material Implication" is neither
>> "material" nor "implication" and "not p, or q" does
>> not have a "truth value", and doesn't belong in
>> a "truth table",
>
> I totally agree with you on this. All of the other people on
> these forums take the steps of logic as forming their own
> foundation and thus are inherently correct even when they
> derive nonsense.
>
> I would replace implication with is a necessary consequence of.
> Making the unary operator □ also be applied to binary relations.
> ∃!fluffy ∈ Cats | (Fluffy □ Animal).
>
> They simply stipulate that the nonsense that they derive cannot
> possibly be nonsense on basis of their religious belief that the
> steps of logic are inherently infallible.
>
> They then go on to assert that anyone that does not hold this
> religious belief is totally ignorant about logic. They never
> realize that the issue is their own ignorance of the philosophy
> of logic.
>
>> with regards to why a usual "model"
>> in such a setting also isn't a model and usual "monotonicity"
>> in such a setting also isn't and a usual "entails"
>> in such a setting also isn't, that being why what
>
> A is a necessary consequence of B: A □ B seems to be entails.
>
>> you'll find in the field called "Comte's Boole's Russell's
>> logical positivism's 'classical' logic" is renamed its
>> more proper appellation "classical _quasi-modal_ logic".
>>
>> This is like, "ass|u|me", and "e fq mi", both considered
>> bad ideas.
>>
>
> You are almost the only one that every agreed with me on this.
> The only other one the agreed that EFQ is nonsense had their
> answer voted down to oblivion on SE. Logicians and Mathematicians
> have the firmly held religious belief that the rules of logic
> are inherently infallible and utterly ridicule anyone that
> fully understands all of the reasoning that proves otherwise.
>
> When this proof is presented to them they put their hands
> over their ears making sure to not hear a single word while
> shouting your stupid fool you don't know logic at all.
>
>> > The premises, of deductive inference, if they're in
>> a given order, _is another premise_, and when they're _not_,
>> then those _are not_.
>>
> Every sequence of inference steps must be in the proper order
> or there is no connection between inference steps.
>
>>
>> The idea of "Large Language Model" is largely bunk,
>> a model of reasoning can be very compact.
>> Just having an arithmetic/vector coding of associated
>> values in types, is just an addressing scheme.
>>
>
> It is not actually largely bunk.
> It has the key issue that it lies its ass off.
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hallucination_(artificial_intelligence)
>
> Technology like this is the only feasible way that we can
> populate a knowledge ontology of the general knowledge of
> the actual world.
>
> This dialogue proves that it has the equivalent of human understanding
> that undecidable decision problems are really nothing more than yes/no
> questions defined to have no correct yes/no answer.
> https://www.liarparadox.org/ChatGPT_HP.pdf
>
>>
>> Schroedinger's cat, now, helps explores in concept
>> the nature of indeterminism, and why, inference and
>> reasoning is first-class, not follow-the-red-dot.
>>
>
>
What you get into is the box and circle modalities,
about when the transfer principle applies and
a heap is a heap is a heap or the Sorities,
matter of definition, not a paradox, disambiguated
in its quantifiers by disambiguating the universal quantifier,
into for: any/each/every/all, existential as unique or not,
the result _direct implication_ carries and with
ALL of De Morgan's rules of logic, simplifies things,
and excludes any sort "paradox".
That a cat has a kingdom and a genus and species vis-a-vis
being in a class of a kingdom and genus and speciesas is-a, just
reflects that is-a and has-a are only about the predicates
and relations, predicate logic and the predicate calculus,
and the resulting logic large of relations, and not necessarily
to be confused with Tarski's "cylindrical" bits when for
example there is algebraic GEOMETRY and ALGEBRAIC geometry
and they're _two, different things_.
I usually like to frame predicates as 'has-a' instead of
'is-a', because, things change, and "is" just "is".
It's all relations of course, predicates is relations.
I often have said "anybody who buys or shills Material Implication
is a fool or a fraud". The _direct_ implication, or just plain
old implication, first of all fills all of De Morgan's rules of logic
both ways, and, does not need "Material Implication", which is neither,
at all.
Russell: was never, the Pope.
Things have Types. So, one should be familiar with C.S. Peirce
and the Lambda Calculus, yet, in the logic of the universals and
particulars, there is the besides Type Inversion, there are as
well quantifier ambiguities, simply courtesy quantification
and schemes or schemas, to be resolved with quantifier disambiguation
and the correct and adequate book-keeping of contingency the
modality in predication the relation a stroke, evaluation.
(Judgment.)
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