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Groups > comp.theory > #23621 > unrolled thread
| Started by | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2020-09-28 16:22 -0500 |
| Last post | 2020-09-29 13:18 -0500 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 408 — 15 participants |
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Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-28 16:22 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-28 15:29 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-28 16:36 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-28 16:31 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-28 19:00 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-28 19:04 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-28 22:00 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 01:48 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 10:49 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 12:34 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 14:17 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 11:31 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 12:40 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 14:34 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 14:06 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 15:47 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 16:44 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-29 23:26 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 19:40 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 02:12 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 21:38 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 12:43 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 11:38 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 20:07 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 14:42 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 21:24 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 15:45 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 21:32 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 22:47 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Keith Thompson <Keith.S.Thompson+u@gmail.com> - 2020-09-29 21:29 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 22:54 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Keith Thompson <Keith.S.Thompson+u@gmail.com> - 2020-09-29 22:47 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-30 06:33 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 16:40 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 19:51 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 02:38 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 21:46 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-09-30 06:45 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 12:40 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 10:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 19:55 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 14:25 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 21:01 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 15:12 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-09-30 15:30 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-30 08:57 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 12:04 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 19:40 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 14:21 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 20:50 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 14:57 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-09-30 15:42 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 21:25 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 22:41 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 22:22 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 00:54 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Richard Damon <Richard@Damon-Family.org> - 2020-09-30 09:08 -0400
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 10:39 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-09-29 21:04 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 22:28 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 11:42 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 14:03 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 20:44 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 14:55 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 21:40 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 17:48 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-01 01:17 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 19:33 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-30 16:22 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 17:51 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-30 19:10 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 20:41 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-30 20:06 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 21:37 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-01 12:15 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-01 14:34 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-01 14:32 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-01 16:29 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-03 11:11 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-05 08:04 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Malcolm McLean <malcolm.arthur.mclean@gmail.com> - 2020-10-05 07:37 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-05 09:43 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-05 12:27 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-07 10:18 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-07 12:44 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-07 13:10 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-07 15:44 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-07 16:26 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-07 19:39 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-07 20:45 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-08 00:56 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-08 15:42 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-08 20:15 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-08 22:33 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-09 00:31 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 09:04 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-09 10:39 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 11:55 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-09 13:23 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 15:06 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-08 23:53 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-08 23:44 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 09:28 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-09 09:26 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 11:17 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-09 10:40 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 15:28 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-09 14:39 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 16:26 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-09 15:00 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 19:11 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-09 21:35 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 00:24 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-10 03:37 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-10 07:00 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-10 10:26 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-10 16:43 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-12 07:23 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-10 17:29 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 13:17 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-10 18:51 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 14:37 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-10 20:24 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 19:09 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-11 09:01 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 10:12 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-11 16:51 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 17:31 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-12 09:59 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) R Kym Horsell <kym@kymhorsell.com> - 2020-10-12 11:13 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-12 05:40 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) R Kym Horsell <kym@kymhorsell.com> - 2020-10-12 13:18 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-12 09:23 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-12 16:27 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-12 20:21 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-12 22:48 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 01:05 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Smaill <smaill@foxtrot.inf.ed.ac.uk> - 2020-10-13 09:29 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 10:18 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Kaz Kylheku <793-849-0957@kylheku.com> - 2020-10-13 16:31 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 12:43 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-13 11:14 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-13 07:51 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-13 20:56 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 15:07 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-14 08:09 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-14 08:39 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-14 09:28 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-14 12:17 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 10:12 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-13 09:55 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 16:47 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-14 00:25 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 10:34 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-14 10:47 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 13:12 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 19:14 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 05:55 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 09:35 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 10:31 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 11:40 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 11:02 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 12:46 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 12:26 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 14:07 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 13:26 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 14:46 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 13:49 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 14:59 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 14:25 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 15:41 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 21:29 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 23:30 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-16 03:07 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 09:19 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-16 08:34 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 09:50 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-16 09:07 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 10:27 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-16 09:43 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 11:45 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-16 10:50 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 12:27 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-16 21:03 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 15:20 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 15:25 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-16 22:15 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 16:32 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 16:56 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-17 00:33 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 18:54 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-17 01:33 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 19:53 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-17 13:32 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 09:36 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-18 02:25 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 21:23 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-17 21:31 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 22:53 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 14:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-18 15:34 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:24 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 10:42 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 15:01 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 14:18 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 17:21 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 21:11 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 01:21 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Keith Thompson <Keith.S.Thompson+u@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 00:48 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 09:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-18 16:07 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:18 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 09:05 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:16 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 10:44 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 13:04 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 15:55 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 18:05 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-19 01:17 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 20:52 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-19 21:29 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 15:59 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-20 01:53 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 20:16 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-20 02:56 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 21:43 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-21 02:04 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-20 20:22 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-21 03:13 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-20 23:41 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-21 14:25 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 08:13 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 10:16 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 09:40 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 11:57 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 11:25 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 13:00 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 12:29 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 14:59 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 14:42 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-21 14:05 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 19:41 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-21 20:57 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 23:12 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-21 17:29 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 12:10 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 11:41 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 13:16 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 12:49 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-21 21:13 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 20:13 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-22 03:00 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 18:54 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 21:33 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-19 09:39 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 11:41 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Malcolm McLean <malcolm.arthur.mclean@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 09:44 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 13:47 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:12 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-18 21:25 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 21:28 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-19 09:38 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 11:38 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-19 11:05 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 12:19 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-19 11:43 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 12:57 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-19 11:41 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 14:09 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Malcolm McLean <malcolm.arthur.mclean@gmail.com> - 2020-10-19 12:46 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 14:52 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-19 13:08 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 14:36 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-19 14:21 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 16:24 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-20 01:49 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-20 10:42 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-20 21:50 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-17 07:33 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 09:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 14:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-16 22:00 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 16:16 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-17 07:23 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 09:46 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 01:14 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:09 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 10:40 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 14:21 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-18 20:59 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 21:00 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-19 21:47 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 17:27 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-16 11:29 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) R Kym Horsell <kym@kymhorsell.com> - 2020-10-16 18:42 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-16 19:02 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 13:11 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-17 07:26 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-17 17:07 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 13:45 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-15 20:32 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 15:36 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-13 21:20 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 15:37 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-13 23:43 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 19:42 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-14 05:46 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 10:46 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-14 00:42 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 10:42 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-14 10:44 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 13:06 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-14 19:10 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 14:35 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-14 20:11 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 15:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 18:54 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 05:52 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 09:29 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-13 11:41 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-13 08:53 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 16:37 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-14 00:17 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 10:14 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory [ sound argument ] olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 19:35 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory [ sound argument ] David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-14 21:42 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory [ sound argument ] olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 00:13 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-13 13:06 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-13 22:10 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-13 21:41 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-14 15:15 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-14 12:39 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-14 22:59 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-15 15:57 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 11:06 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-15 17:54 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 12:00 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-15 21:12 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 15:33 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-15 23:23 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 17:31 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-16 06:23 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 09:35 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-16 18:12 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-17 04:11 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-17 00:00 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-17 12:55 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-17 16:25 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 13:15 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-17 11:34 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 13:45 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-17 15:32 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-17 12:45 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 13:55 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-17 15:24 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 16:35 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 01:24 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Malcolm McLean <malcolm.arthur.mclean@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 06:31 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 10:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 09:18 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:13 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 10:35 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:45 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 11:14 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 15:38 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-10 13:24 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 14:59 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-10 14:20 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 15:30 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-10 20:49 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 10:02 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-10 09:58 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 21:29 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-11 06:33 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 09:49 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-11 18:05 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-11 13:52 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 09:05 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-11 17:55 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 22:45 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-11 21:56 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 23:07 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-11 22:45 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-12 00:07 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-11 23:14 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-12 01:24 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-12 03:18 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-12 09:41 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-12 08:56 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 15:01 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-13 23:36 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 19:01 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-14 01:37 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 19:42 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-14 15:19 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 10:11 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 23:09 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-10 02:09 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 09:47 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-10 09:18 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 20:40 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-02 10:22 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-09-28 23:29 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 01:02 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-09-29 01:01 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 10:20 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-09-29 12:06 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 13:18 -0500
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| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-15 17:31 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <U4ednd-JyJpXUBXCnZ2dnUU7-InNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23879 |
On 10/15/2020 5:23 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
> On 15/10/2020 21:33, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/15/2020 3:12 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>> On 15/10/2020 18:00, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 10/15/2020 11:54 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>> On 15/10/2020 17:06, olcott wrote:
>>>>>> On 10/15/2020 9:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>>>> <cut>
>>>>>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
>>>>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be
>>>>>>>>>> "clear in
>>>>>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers
>>>>>>>>>> {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are
>>>>>>>>> independent
>>>>>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in
>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
>>>>>>>> confusion
>>>>>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the
>>>>>>>> formal
>>>>>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
>>>>>>>> (up to
>>>>>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to
>>>>>>>> say
>>>>>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>>>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models
>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
>>>>>>>> sentence is
>>>>>>>> true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>>>>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in
>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>>>>>> model.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> By what-so-ever process that an expression of language is shown to be
>>>>>> true that is its proof. If an expression of language is true in the
>>>>>> standard model of arithmetic then it is provable in the standard
>>>>>> model
>>>>>> of arithmetic.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> "Provable in the standard model of arithmetic" does not make sense.
>>>>
>>>> How so?
>>>
>>> Because things are proved in formal logic systems, for example in PA
>>> or in Robinson's Q, or whatever. The standard model of arithmetic is
>>> just a language structure (a domain, with operations of addition,
>>> multiplication etc. defined). It is not a proof system, and
>>> statements are not "proved" in it.
>>>
>>
>> How can be have an operation of addition be defined for the domain of
>> natural numbers such that 2 + 3 = 5 is not proved?
>>
>
> Well, "2 + 3 = 5" is /true/ "in the standard model", because when we
> take the interpretations in the model of the terms "2" and "3" and "5",
> we get the individuals (natural numbers) 2 and 3 and 5 respectively, and
> the interpretation of "+" in the model is the operation of ordinary
> addition, and sure enough, 2 + 3 = 5 holds as a statement in the natural
> numbers.
>
So for all practical (Curry-Howard correspondence) purposes we have an
algorithm that proves the finite string "2 + 3 = 5" is true, thus
showing that true and provable cannot actually diverge.
> But I don't think that's what you were asking.
>
> No notion of proving anything in a formal system was involved in my
> first paragraph, as we haven't even made clear what formal system is
> being considered. That is, we've not specified a "proof calculus"
> (saying what constitutes a valid proof/derivation in the formal system)
> or which axioms we are employing that pin down the "theory" we are
> working within.
>
> Both the theories PA (FOL version of Peano's Axioms) and Q have axioms
> that are sufficient to enable 2 + 3 = 5 to be proved/derived within
> those logical systems. I think it's fair to say that a theory that
> lacked any derivation for "2 + 3 = 5" wouldn't warrent being referred to
> as a "theory of arithmetic".
>
> If you are asking literally how could we come up with a formal system
> which has the standard model of arithmetic as a model of that system,
> but where we can't derive "2 + 3 = 5" then one obvious way to do this
> would be to take Q or PA, and remove all axioms relating to addition and
> multiplication. It should be obvious that now that we could no longer
> derive "2 + 3 = 5" in that system.
>
> Mike.
>
--
Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
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| From | Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-16 06:23 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <rmbe8j$p8r$1@news.muc.de> |
| In reply to | #23880 |
olcott <NoOne@nowhere.com> wrote: > On 10/15/2020 5:23 PM, Mike Terry wrote: >> On 15/10/2020 21:33, olcott wrote: [ .... ] >>> How can be have an operation of addition be defined for the domain of >>> natural numbers such that 2 + 3 = 5 is not proved? >> Well, "2 + 3 = 5" is /true/ "in the standard model", because when we >> take the interpretations in the model of the terms "2" and "3" and >> "5", we get the individuals (natural numbers) 2 and 3 and 5 >> respectively, and the interpretation of "+" in the model is the >> operation of ordinary addition, and sure enough, 2 + 3 = 5 holds as a >> statement in the natural numbers. > So for all practical (Curry-Howard correspondence) purposes we have an > algorithm that proves the finite string "2 + 3 = 5" is true, thus > showing that true and provable cannot actually diverge. Nothing of the kind. Just that in this particular case, a true statement is provable. In other cases, true statements are not provable. [ .... ] >> Mike. > -- > Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott -- Alan Mackenzie (Nuremberg, Germany).
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| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-16 09:35 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <mPudnZkyustVMhTCnZ2dnUU7-RnNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23883 |
On 10/16/2020 1:23 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: > olcott <NoOne@nowhere.com> wrote: >> On 10/15/2020 5:23 PM, Mike Terry wrote: >>> On 15/10/2020 21:33, olcott wrote: > > [ .... ] > >>>> How can be have an operation of addition be defined for the domain of >>>> natural numbers such that 2 + 3 = 5 is not proved? > >>> Well, "2 + 3 = 5" is /true/ "in the standard model", because when we >>> take the interpretations in the model of the terms "2" and "3" and >>> "5", we get the individuals (natural numbers) 2 and 3 and 5 >>> respectively, and the interpretation of "+" in the model is the >>> operation of ordinary addition, and sure enough, 2 + 3 = 5 holds as a >>> statement in the natural numbers. > >> So for all practical (Curry-Howard correspondence) purposes we have an >> algorithm that proves the finite string "2 + 3 = 5" is true, thus >> showing that true and provable cannot actually diverge. > > Nothing of the kind. Just that in this particular case, a true statement > is provable. In other cases, true statements are not provable. > Whether it is called a proof using the conventional terms-of-the-art or not: What-so-ever sequence of steps that shows that any expression of language is true <is> the proof of this expression of language. > [ .... ] > >>> Mike. > >> -- >> Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott > -- Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
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| From | Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-16 18:12 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <rmdctk$c95$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #23859 |
On 10/15/2020 8:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>
>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>> <cut>
>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of arithmetic
>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>
>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in some
>>> models and false in others.
>>>
>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>
>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of confusion
>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model (up to
>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to say
>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the sentence is
>> true.
>>
>
> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
> model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from wanting to
> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>
> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is true
> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply don't
> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange. (This
> isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL stuff. Maybe
> someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new question.)
>
> The key results needed are:
> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
> T + {P} is also consistent.)
> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
>
> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition to
> the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says that we
> can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it follows that
> if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be consistent.
>
> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL systems -
> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what proof
> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of variations
> here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural deduction style,
> sequent calculus and so on.)]
>
> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>
> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>
> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>
> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are models
> where G is false, and models where G is true.
Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another example:
It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural numbers,
can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
true. From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say x+y=y+x is
true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false. Does this
follow from what you said above?
--
Jeff Barnett
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| From | Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 04:11 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <B5Gdnc6LYOxT_RfCnZ2dnUU78I_NnZ2d@brightview.co.uk> |
| In reply to | #23910 |
On 17/10/2020 01:12, Jeff Barnett wrote:
> On 10/15/2020 8:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>
>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>> <cut>
>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of arithmetic
>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>
>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in some
>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>
>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>
>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of confusion
>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model (up to
>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to say
>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the sentence is
>>> true.
>>>
>>
>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>> model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from wanting to
>> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
>> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>>
>> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is true
>> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply don't
>> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange.
>> (This isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL
>> stuff. Maybe someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new
>> question.)
>>
>> The key results needed are:
>> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
>> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
>> T + {P} is also consistent.)
>> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
>> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
>>
>> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
>> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition
>> to the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says
>> that we can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it
>> follows that if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be
>> consistent.
>>
>> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
>> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL systems -
>> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what proof
>> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of
>> variations here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural deduction
>> style, sequent calculus and so on.)]
>>
>> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>>
>> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>>
>> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
>> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
>> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
>> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>>
>> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are models
>> where G is false, and models where G is true.
>
> Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another example:
> It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural numbers,
> can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
> true. From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say x+y=y+x is
> true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
> models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false. Does this
> follow from what you said above?
Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, an obvious method of proof for the
claim that Q ⊬ ∀x∀y x+y=y+x would be to exhibit a model of Q in which
this is false.
Mike.
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| From | Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 00:00 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <rme1ag$bg2$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #23913 |
On 10/16/2020 9:11 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
> On 17/10/2020 01:12, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>> On 10/15/2020 8:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>
>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>> <cut>
>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of arithmetic
>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>
>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in some
>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>
>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>
>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of confusion
>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
>>>> (up to
>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to say
>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the sentence is
>>>> true.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>> model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from wanting to
>>> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
>>> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>>>
>>> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is true
>>> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply don't
>>> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange.
>>> (This isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL
>>> stuff. Maybe someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new
>>> question.)
>>>
>>> The key results needed are:
>>> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
>>> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
>>> T + {P} is also consistent.)
>>> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
>>> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
>>>
>>> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
>>> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition
>>> to the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says
>>> that we can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it
>>> follows that if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be
>>> consistent.
>>>
>>> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
>>> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL systems -
>>> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what proof
>>> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of
>>> variations here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural deduction
>>> style, sequent calculus and so on.)]
>>>
>>> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>>>
>>> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>>>
>>> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
>>> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
>>> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
>>> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>>>
>>> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are models
>>> where G is false, and models where G is true.
>>
>> Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another example:
>> It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural numbers,
>> can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
>> true. From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say x+y=y+x is
>> true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
>> models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false. Does this
>> follow from what you said above?
>
> Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, an obvious method of proof for the
> claim that Q ⊬ ∀x∀y x+y=y+x would be to exhibit a model of Q in which
> this is false.
Thanks. I think I need to think about this some more. Oops! I wonder if
this thinking about thinking is the type of viscous self reference that
so terrifies PO?
--
Jeff Barnett
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| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 12:55 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <87pn5hjccd.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #23914 |
Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
> On 10/16/2020 9:11 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>> On 17/10/2020 01:12, Jeff Barnett wrote:
<cut>
>>> Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another example:
>>> It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural numbers,
>>> can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
>>> true. From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say x+y=y+x is
>>> true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
>>> models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false. Does this
>>> follow from what you said above?
>>
>> Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, an obvious method of proof for
>> the claim that Q ⊬ ∀x∀y x+y=y+x would be to exhibit a model of Q in
>> which this is false.
>
> Thanks. I think I need to think about this some more. Oops! I wonder
> if this thinking about thinking is the type of viscous self reference
> that so terrifies PO?
Here's one. I've put it after some space in case you don't want to see
it right away. By Q we mean:
Q1 x ≠ y → Sx ≠ Sy
Q2 0 ≠ Sx
Q3 ∃y x ≠ 0 → x = Sy
Q4 x+0 = x
Q5 x+Sy = S(x+y)
Q6 x0 = 0
Q7 xSy = xy + x
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
The usual trick is to add elements to the domain which don't commute but
otherwise satisfy the axioms. For example, with N U {i, j} as the
domain we can define the three functions like this:
Sn = n+1
Si = i
Sj = j
+ m i j
n n+m j i
i i j i
j j j i
and this multiplication table:
* 0 m i j
0 0 0 i j
n 0 nm i j
i 0 j j j
j 0 i i i
I've used n and m as generic members of N.
--
Ben.
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| From | Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 16:25 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <bK-dnbAHCIN2kRbCnZ2dnUU78VfNnZ2d@brightview.co.uk> |
| In reply to | #23914 |
On 17/10/2020 07:00, Jeff Barnett wrote:
> On 10/16/2020 9:11 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>> On 17/10/2020 01:12, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>> On 10/15/2020 8:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>> <cut>
>>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
>>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in
>>>>>> some
>>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>>
>>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
>>>>> confusion
>>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
>>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
>>>>> (up to
>>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to
>>>>> say
>>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
>>>>> sentence is
>>>>> true.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
>>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>>> model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from wanting to
>>>> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
>>>> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>>>>
>>>> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is true
>>>> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply don't
>>>> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange.
>>>> (This isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL
>>>> stuff. Maybe someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new
>>>> question.)
>>>>
>>>> The key results needed are:
>>>> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
>>>> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
>>>> T + {P} is also consistent.)
>>>> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
>>>> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
>>>>
>>>> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
>>>> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition
>>>> to the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says
>>>> that we can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it
>>>> follows that if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be
>>>> consistent.
>>>>
>>>> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
>>>> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL systems -
>>>> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what proof
>>>> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of
>>>> variations here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural deduction
>>>> style, sequent calculus and so on.)]
>>>>
>>>> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>>>>
>>>> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>>>>
>>>> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
>>>> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
>>>> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
>>>> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>>>>
>>>> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are models
>>>> where G is false, and models where G is true.
>>>
>>> Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another example:
>>> It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural numbers,
>>> can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
>>> true.
I should maybe have clarified this point. Ben has kindly provided an
explicit model of Q where it's apparent that there are individuals i,j
such that i+j != j+i. Since the deduction system in use with Q is
/sound/, if there were a proof within Q of x+y = y+x, then this
statement would hold in all models of Q. (That's what "sound" means for
FOL systems.) But the statement doesn't hold in Ben's model, so it
there can't be such a derivation.
That's clear enough, but what about saying we "know" it's true? Well,
"x+y = y+x" is after all a string of characters, so saying it's true in
isolation makes no sense - we can only say it's true or false when the
meaning of the expression is pinned down, and in FOL this happens when
we have pinned down the "model" being considered. The model gives the
interpretation of all the symbols, and fixes the domain under
consideration. If we leave the model unspecified, we really /don't/
"know" that it is true: mathematics has many examples of non-commutative
operations so it's not that commutative operations are some logical
necessity! (But of course it /is/ true in many contexts such as
addition of natural numbers...)
When we say "ah, but I invented Q specifically to talk about /natural
numbers/ 1,2,3,4,... so that's what I mean by 'true'! ", then there's
nothing really wrong with that! All that's going on here is that we've
settled on one specific model and decided that "true" means "true in
this specific model". If that's what's going on, it's fine to say that
some statement in the language of Q (which is ultimately a string of
characters satisfying certain formation rules) is "true". But then
we're not suggesting it must be true in some different model or in all
such models. (It will be the case that statements with a
derivation/proof within Q will be true of all models of Q, because the
logical proof system involved is sound.)
>>> From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say x+y=y+x is
>>> true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
>>> models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false. Does this
>>> follow from what you said above?
>>
>> Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, an obvious method of proof for
>> the claim that Q ⊬ ∀x∀y x+y=y+x would be to exhibit a model of Q in
>> which this is false.
> Thanks. I think I need to think about this some more. Oops! I wonder if
> this thinking about thinking is the type of viscous self reference that
> so terrifies PO?
Hmmm, this is all a little vague, but... I would say that we're not so
much "thinking about thinking", as "thinking about properties of
arguments/proofs" and to this end we are led to formalise what
consitutes a "proof" in a formal system, and discuss the properties of
this formal system. (I prefer the term "derivation" for such "proofs"
within a formal system.)
It is not "self reference" provided we keep clear the distinction
between derivations within the formal system, which are just a matter of
playing with character strings according to agreed rules, and "proofs"
in regular mathematics outside the formal system. The latter remain
what they've always been - basically arguments that convince other
mathematicians. Some of these regular mathematical proofs (like Godel's
incompleteness theorem) happen to relate to the properties of the formal
systems being considered, but this isn't circular in any way.
And yes, PO does not get this distinction, and also the role of models
in all this, and consequently what Godel/Tarski/everyone else understand
by "true" - I imagine he would say with some pride that it is all
extraneous complexity which he has eliminated in some way! ["Extraneous
complexity" = "stuff too complicated for PO which he wants to ignore
rather than admit he doesn't understand".]
Mike.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 13:15 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <mIOdnb9Z58I2qRbCnZ2dnUU7-aHNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23914 |
On 10/17/2020 1:00 AM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
> On 10/16/2020 9:11 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>> On 17/10/2020 01:12, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>> On 10/15/2020 8:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>> <cut>
>>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
>>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in
>>>>>> some
>>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>>
>>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
>>>>> confusion
>>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
>>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
>>>>> (up to
>>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to
>>>>> say
>>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
>>>>> sentence is
>>>>> true.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
>>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>>> model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from wanting to
>>>> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
>>>> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>>>>
>>>> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is true
>>>> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply don't
>>>> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange.
>>>> (This isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL
>>>> stuff. Maybe someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new
>>>> question.)
>>>>
>>>> The key results needed are:
>>>> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
>>>> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
>>>> T + {P} is also consistent.)
>>>> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
>>>> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
>>>>
>>>> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
>>>> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition
>>>> to the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says
>>>> that we can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it
>>>> follows that if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be
>>>> consistent.
>>>>
>>>> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
>>>> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL systems -
>>>> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what proof
>>>> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of
>>>> variations here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural deduction
>>>> style, sequent calculus and so on.)]
>>>>
>>>> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>>>>
>>>> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>>>>
>>>> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
>>>> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
>>>> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
>>>> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>>>>
>>>> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are models
>>>> where G is false, and models where G is true.
>>>
>>> Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another example:
>>> It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural numbers,
>>> can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
>>> true. From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say x+y=y+x is
>>> true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
>>> models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false. Does this
>>> follow from what you said above?
>>
>> Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, an obvious method of proof for
>> the claim that Q ⊬ ∀x∀y x+y=y+x would be to exhibit a model of Q in
>> which this is false.
> Thanks. I think I need to think about this some more. Oops! I wonder if
> this thinking about thinking is the type of viscous self reference that
> so terrifies PO?
You have done an awfully terrible job in accurately characterizing my
position. My position is that pathological self-reference specifies an
infinitely recursive evaluation that is undecidable only because it is
infinitely recursive.
--
Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 11:34 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <0d27847e-322b-4a08-9b05-524ad2f0060ao@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #23925 |
On Saturday, October 17, 2020 at 11:15:15 AM UTC-7, olcott wrote:
> On 10/17/2020 1:00 AM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
> > On 10/16/2020 9:11 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
> >> On 17/10/2020 01:12, Jeff Barnett wrote:
> >>> On 10/15/2020 8:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
> >>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
> >>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
> >>>>>
> >>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
> >>>>> <cut>
> >>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
> >>>>>>> arithmetic
> >>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
> >>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
> >>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
> >>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
> >>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
> >>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
> >>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
> >>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in
> >>>>>> some
> >>>>>> models and false in others.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
> >>>>> confusion
> >>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
> >>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
> >>>>> (up to
> >>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to
> >>>>> say
> >>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
> >>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
> >>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
> >>>>> sentence is
> >>>>> true.
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
> >>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
> >>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
> >>>> model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from wanting to
> >>>> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
> >>>> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
> >>>>
> >>>> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is true
> >>>> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply don't
> >>>> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange.
> >>>> (This isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL
> >>>> stuff. Maybe someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new
> >>>> question.)
> >>>>
> >>>> The key results needed are:
> >>>> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
> >>>> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
> >>>> T + {P} is also consistent.)
> >>>> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
> >>>> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
> >>>>
> >>>> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
> >>>> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition
> >>>> to the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says
> >>>> that we can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it
> >>>> follows that if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be
> >>>> consistent.
> >>>>
> >>>> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
> >>>> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL systems -
> >>>> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what proof
> >>>> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of
> >>>> variations here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural deduction
> >>>> style, sequent calculus and so on.)]
> >>>>
> >>>> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
> >>>>
> >>>> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
> >>>>
> >>>> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
> >>>> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
> >>>> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
> >>>> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
> >>>>
> >>>> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are models
> >>>> where G is false, and models where G is true.
> >>>
> >>> Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another example:
> >>> It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural numbers,
> >>> can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
> >>> true. From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say x+y=y+x is
> >>> true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
> >>> models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false. Does this
> >>> follow from what you said above?
> >>
> >> Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, an obvious method of proof for
> >> the claim that Q ⊬ ∀x∀y x+y=y+x would be to exhibit a model of Q in
> >> which this is false.
> > Thanks. I think I need to think about this some more. Oops! I wonder if
> > this thinking about thinking is the type of viscous self reference that
> > so terrifies PO?
>
> You have done an awfully terrible job in accurately characterizing my
> position. My position is that pathological self-reference specifies an
> infinitely recursive evaluation that is undecidable only because it is
> infinitely recursive.
Suppose "true" means a proposition is provable. "False" means
the negation of a proposition is provable. A proposition that
is neither true nor false is clearly false because otherwise it
could be used as a lemma in a proof.
PS: This is a parody.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 13:45 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <9_idnSY6xuVPphbCnZ2dnUU7-QPNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23926 |
On 10/17/2020 1:34 PM, David Kleinecke wrote:
> On Saturday, October 17, 2020 at 11:15:15 AM UTC-7, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/17/2020 1:00 AM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>> On 10/16/2020 9:11 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>> On 17/10/2020 01:12, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>>>> On 10/15/2020 8:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>>> <cut>
>>>>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
>>>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>>>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
>>>>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in
>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
>>>>>>> confusion
>>>>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
>>>>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
>>>>>>> (up to
>>>>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to
>>>>>>> say
>>>>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>>>>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
>>>>>>> sentence is
>>>>>>> true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>>>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
>>>>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>>>>> model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from wanting to
>>>>>> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
>>>>>> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is true
>>>>>> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply don't
>>>>>> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange.
>>>>>> (This isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL
>>>>>> stuff. Maybe someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new
>>>>>> question.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The key results needed are:
>>>>>> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
>>>>>> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
>>>>>> T + {P} is also consistent.)
>>>>>> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
>>>>>> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
>>>>>> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition
>>>>>> to the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says
>>>>>> that we can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it
>>>>>> follows that if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be
>>>>>> consistent.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
>>>>>> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL systems -
>>>>>> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what proof
>>>>>> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of
>>>>>> variations here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural deduction
>>>>>> style, sequent calculus and so on.)]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
>>>>>> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
>>>>>> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
>>>>>> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are models
>>>>>> where G is false, and models where G is true.
>>>>>
>>>>> Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another example:
>>>>> It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural numbers,
>>>>> can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
>>>>> true. From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say x+y=y+x is
>>>>> true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
>>>>> models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false. Does this
>>>>> follow from what you said above?
>>>>
>>>> Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, an obvious method of proof for
>>>> the claim that Q ⊬ ∀x∀y x+y=y+x would be to exhibit a model of Q in
>>>> which this is false.
>>> Thanks. I think I need to think about this some more. Oops! I wonder if
>>> this thinking about thinking is the type of viscous self reference that
>>> so terrifies PO?
>>
>> You have done an awfully terrible job in accurately characterizing my
>> position. My position is that pathological self-reference specifies an
>> infinitely recursive evaluation that is undecidable only because it is
>> infinitely recursive.
>
> Suppose "true" means a proposition is provable. "False" means
> the negation of a proposition is provable.
> A proposition that is neither true nor false is clearly false
is a very stupid thing to say.
> because otherwise it
> could be used as a lemma in a proof.
>
> PS: This is a parody.
>
--
Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 15:32 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <rmfnuc$mnb$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #23928 |
On 10/17/2020 12:45 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 10/17/2020 1:34 PM, David Kleinecke wrote:
>> On Saturday, October 17, 2020 at 11:15:15 AM UTC-7, olcott wrote:
>>> On 10/17/2020 1:00 AM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>>> On 10/16/2020 9:11 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>> On 17/10/2020 01:12, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>>>>> On 10/15/2020 8:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>>>> <cut>
>>>>>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
>>>>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be
>>>>>>>>>> "clear in
>>>>>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers
>>>>>>>>>> {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are
>>>>>>>>> independent
>>>>>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in
>>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
>>>>>>>> confusion
>>>>>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the
>>>>>>>> formal
>>>>>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
>>>>>>>> (up to
>>>>>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to
>>>>>>>> say
>>>>>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>>>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models
>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
>>>>>>>> sentence is
>>>>>>>> true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>>>>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in
>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>>>>>> model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from
>>>>>>> wanting to
>>>>>>> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
>>>>>>> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is
>>>>>>> true
>>>>>>> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply
>>>>>>> don't
>>>>>>> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange.
>>>>>>> (This isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL
>>>>>>> stuff. Maybe someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new
>>>>>>> question.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The key results needed are:
>>>>>>> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
>>>>>>> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
>>>>>>> T + {P} is also consistent.)
>>>>>>> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
>>>>>>> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a
>>>>>>> model.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
>>>>>>> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition
>>>>>>> to the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says
>>>>>>> that we can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it
>>>>>>> follows that if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be
>>>>>>> consistent.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
>>>>>>> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL
>>>>>>> systems -
>>>>>>> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what
>>>>>>> proof
>>>>>>> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of
>>>>>>> variations here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural
>>>>>>> deduction
>>>>>>> style, sequent calculus and so on.)]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
>>>>>>> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
>>>>>>> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
>>>>>>> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are
>>>>>>> models
>>>>>>> where G is false, and models where G is true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another
>>>>>> example:
>>>>>> It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural
>>>>>> numbers,
>>>>>> can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
>>>>>> true. From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say
>>>>>> x+y=y+x is
>>>>>> true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
>>>>>> models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false. Does
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> follow from what you said above?
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, an obvious method of proof for
>>>>> the claim that Q ⊬ ∀x∀y x+y=y+x would be to exhibit a model of Q in
>>>>> which this is false.
>>>> Thanks. I think I need to think about this some more. Oops! I wonder if
>>>> this thinking about thinking is the type of viscous self reference that
>>>> so terrifies PO?
>>>
>>> You have done an awfully terrible job in accurately characterizing my
>>> position. My position is that pathological self-reference specifies an
>>> infinitely recursive evaluation that is undecidable only because it is
>>> infinitely recursive.
>> Suppose "true" means a proposition is provable. "False" means
>> the negation of a proposition is provable.
>
>> A proposition that is neither true nor false is clearly false
> is a very stupid thing to say.
You need to read https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parody to further your
education; also, see below. This is above.
>> because otherwise it
>> could be used as a lemma in a proof.
>>
>> PS: This is a parody.
PPS: This is below. Look just above. It will get easier if you read
whole posts before taking pot shots. Or, maybe you don't know what
"parody" means. (See above.)
PPPS: N.B. No nasty self-reference used above.
--
Jeff Barnett
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 12:45 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <rmfe49$idg$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #23925 |
On 10/17/2020 12:15 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 10/17/2020 1:00 AM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>> On 10/16/2020 9:11 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>> On 17/10/2020 01:12, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>>> On 10/15/2020 8:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>> <cut>
>>>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
>>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers
>>>>>>>> {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are
>>>>>>> independent
>>>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in
>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
>>>>>> confusion
>>>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the
>>>>>> formal
>>>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
>>>>>> (up to
>>>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing
>>>>>> to say
>>>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>>>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
>>>>>> sentence is
>>>>>> true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
>>>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>>>> model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from wanting to
>>>>> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
>>>>> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>>>>>
>>>>> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is true
>>>>> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply don't
>>>>> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange.
>>>>> (This isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL
>>>>> stuff. Maybe someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new
>>>>> question.)
>>>>>
>>>>> The key results needed are:
>>>>> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
>>>>> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
>>>>> T + {P} is also consistent.)
>>>>> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
>>>>> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
>>>>>
>>>>> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
>>>>> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition
>>>>> to the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says
>>>>> that we can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it
>>>>> follows that if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be
>>>>> consistent.
>>>>>
>>>>> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
>>>>> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL systems -
>>>>> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what proof
>>>>> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of
>>>>> variations here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural deduction
>>>>> style, sequent calculus and so on.)]
>>>>>
>>>>> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>>>>>
>>>>> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>>>>>
>>>>> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
>>>>> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
>>>>> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
>>>>> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>>>>>
>>>>> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are models
>>>>> where G is false, and models where G is true.
>>>>
>>>> Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another
>>>> example:
>>>> It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural numbers,
>>>> can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
>>>> true. From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say
>>>> x+y=y+x is
>>>> true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
>>>> models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false. Does this
>>>> follow from what you said above?
>>>
>>> Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, an obvious method of proof for
>>> the claim that Q ⊬ ∀x∀y x+y=y+x would be to exhibit a model of Q in
>>> which this is false.
>> Thanks. I think I need to think about this some more. Oops! I wonder
>> if this thinking about thinking is the type of viscous self reference
>> that so terrifies PO?
>
> You have done an awfully terrible job in accurately characterizing my
> position. My position is that pathological self-reference specifies an
> infinitely recursive evaluation that is undecidable only because it is
> infinitely recursive.
It's amazing how little you understand about what you talk about. The
only sign of pathological self-reference that I see in these threads is
when you refer to one of your pathetically written and reasoned
documents. But, perhaps, citing a fool to support a foolish position is
appropriate. Since many other's many times have given you examples
without the type of self reference you abhor, let's just assume you are
in a time warp or simply demented. By the way we all wonder how one can
understand a fundamentally flawed position. How do you do it?
For a moment, let's just assume that you are a highly successful troll,
a perfectly reasonable assumption I might add. Now I must refer you to a
relevant book: Kurt Vonnegut's "Mother Night". also available as a great
movie. There's a line in it somewhere that is approximately "Beware what
you pretend to be. You might become it." Not an exact quote but you get
the idea. Now we combine this with the troll assumption and note that
you have now became the fool you thought was just an act. I think if you
were to seek self redemption (which, very unfortunately, requires self
reflective thinking), you should look to literature, not mathematics.
--
Jeff Barnett
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 13:55 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <DP-dndq1M9axoxbCnZ2dnUU7-T3NnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23927 |
On 10/17/2020 1:45 PM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
> On 10/17/2020 12:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/17/2020 1:00 AM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>> On 10/16/2020 9:11 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>> On 17/10/2020 01:12, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>>>> On 10/15/2020 8:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>>> <cut>
>>>>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
>>>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers
>>>>>>>>> {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are
>>>>>>>> independent
>>>>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true
>>>>>>>> in some
>>>>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
>>>>>>> confusion
>>>>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the
>>>>>>> formal
>>>>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
>>>>>>> (up to
>>>>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing
>>>>>>> to say
>>>>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>>>>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
>>>>>>> sentence is
>>>>>>> true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>>>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
>>>>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>>>>> model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from
>>>>>> wanting to
>>>>>> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
>>>>>> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is true
>>>>>> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply don't
>>>>>> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange.
>>>>>> (This isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL
>>>>>> stuff. Maybe someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new
>>>>>> question.)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The key results needed are:
>>>>>> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
>>>>>> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
>>>>>> T + {P} is also consistent.)
>>>>>> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
>>>>>> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
>>>>>> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition
>>>>>> to the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says
>>>>>> that we can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it
>>>>>> follows that if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be
>>>>>> consistent.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
>>>>>> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL systems -
>>>>>> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what proof
>>>>>> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of
>>>>>> variations here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural deduction
>>>>>> style, sequent calculus and so on.)]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
>>>>>> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
>>>>>> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
>>>>>> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are models
>>>>>> where G is false, and models where G is true.
>>>>>
>>>>> Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another
>>>>> example:
>>>>> It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural numbers,
>>>>> can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
>>>>> true. From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say
>>>>> x+y=y+x is
>>>>> true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
>>>>> models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false. Does
>>>>> this
>>>>> follow from what you said above?
>>>>
>>>> Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, an obvious method of proof for
>>>> the claim that Q ⊬ ∀x∀y x+y=y+x would be to exhibit a model of Q in
>>>> which this is false.
>>> Thanks. I think I need to think about this some more. Oops! I wonder
>>> if this thinking about thinking is the type of viscous self reference
>>> that so terrifies PO?
>>
>> You have done an awfully terrible job in accurately characterizing my
>> position. My position is that pathological self-reference specifies an
>> infinitely recursive evaluation that is undecidable only because it is
>> infinitely recursive.
>
> It's amazing how little you understand about what you talk about. The
> only sign of pathological self-reference that I see in these threads is
> when you refer to one of your pathetically written and reasoned
> documents. But, perhaps, citing a fool to support a foolish position is
> appropriate. Since many other's many times have given you examples
> without the type of self reference you abhor,
You are providing the same sort of knuckle headed terminology that Ben
has. It is not a personal opinion that I have a dislike for pathological
self-reference, it is an objective truism that pathological
self-reference is an error.
This kind of knuckle-headed terminology comes from the attempt to use
rhetoric against logic in an attempt to win an argument on the basis of
persuasion rather than prove what the truth is on the basis of
comprehension.
> let's just assume you are
> in a time warp or simply demented. By the way we all wonder how one can
> understand a fundamentally flawed position. How do you do it?
>
> For a moment, let's just assume that you are a highly successful troll,
> a perfectly reasonable assumption I might add. Now I must refer you to a
> relevant book: Kurt Vonnegut's "Mother Night". also available as a great
> movie. There's a line in it somewhere that is approximately "Beware what
> you pretend to be. You might become it." Not an exact quote but you get
> the idea. Now we combine this with the troll assumption and note that
> you have now became the fool you thought was just an act. I think if you
> were to seek self redemption (which, very unfortunately, requires self
> reflective thinking), you should look to literature, not mathematics.
--
Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 15:24 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <rmfnf8$jle$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #23929 |
On 10/17/2020 12:55 PM, olcott wrote:
> On 10/17/2020 1:45 PM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>> On 10/17/2020 12:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>>> On 10/17/2020 1:00 AM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>>> On 10/16/2020 9:11 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>> On 17/10/2020 01:12, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>>>>> On 10/15/2020 8:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>>>> <cut>
>>>>>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
>>>>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be
>>>>>>>>>> "clear in
>>>>>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision
>>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers
>>>>>>>>>> {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are
>>>>>>>>> independent
>>>>>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true
>>>>>>>>> in some
>>>>>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
>>>>>>>> confusion
>>>>>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the
>>>>>>>> formal
>>>>>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one
>>>>>>>> model (up to
>>>>>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing
>>>>>>>> to say
>>>>>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>>>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models
>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
>>>>>>>> sentence is
>>>>>>>> true.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>>>>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in
>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>>>>>> model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from
>>>>>>> wanting to
>>>>>>> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
>>>>>>> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is
>>>>>>> true
>>>>>>> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply
>>>>>>> don't
>>>>>>> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange.
>>>>>>> (This isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL
>>>>>>> stuff. Maybe someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new
>>>>>>> question.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> The key results needed are:
>>>>>>> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
>>>>>>> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
>>>>>>> T + {P} is also consistent.)
>>>>>>> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
>>>>>>> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
>>>>>>> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition
>>>>>>> to the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says
>>>>>>> that we can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it
>>>>>>> follows that if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be
>>>>>>> consistent.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
>>>>>>> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL
>>>>>>> systems -
>>>>>>> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what
>>>>>>> proof
>>>>>>> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of
>>>>>>> variations here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural
>>>>>>> deduction
>>>>>>> style, sequent calculus and so on.)]
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
>>>>>>> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
>>>>>>> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
>>>>>>> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are
>>>>>>> models
>>>>>>> where G is false, and models where G is true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another
>>>>>> example:
>>>>>> It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural
>>>>>> numbers,
>>>>>> can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
>>>>>> true. From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say
>>>>>> x+y=y+x is
>>>>>> true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
>>>>>> models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false. Does
>>>>>> this
>>>>>> follow from what you said above?
>>>>>
>>>>> Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, an obvious method of proof for
>>>>> the claim that Q ⊬ ∀x∀y x+y=y+x would be to exhibit a model of Q in
>>>>> which this is false.
>>>> Thanks. I think I need to think about this some more. Oops! I wonder
>>>> if this thinking about thinking is the type of viscous self
>>>> reference that so terrifies PO?
>>>
>>> You have done an awfully terrible job in accurately characterizing my
>>> position. My position is that pathological self-reference specifies
>>> an infinitely recursive evaluation that is undecidable only because
>>> it is infinitely recursive.
>>
>> It's amazing how little you understand about what you talk about. The
>> only sign of pathological self-reference that I see in these threads
>> is when you refer to one of your pathetically written and reasoned
>> documents. But, perhaps, citing a fool to support a foolish position
>> is appropriate. Since many other's many times have given you examples
>> without the type of self reference you abhor,
>
> You are providing the same sort of knuckle headed terminology that Ben
> has. It is not a personal opinion that I have a dislike for pathological
> self-reference, it is an objective truism that pathological
> self-reference is an error.
>
> This kind of knuckle-headed terminology comes from the attempt to use
> rhetoric against logic in an attempt to win an argument on the basis of
> persuasion rather than prove what the truth is on the basis of
> comprehension.
As an admitted mathematical light weight you are incapable of
formulating a compelling logical or mathematical argument. That is to
say YOU ARE THE ONE USING PERSUASION RATHER THAN TECHNICAL. Son, you are
totally out of your dept; You are like the kid at the playground who is
told, truthfully, by another kid that you've got poop on your shoes (and
you really do). Who then turns to the poop caller and yells "You too!"
Hey, he can be as nasty as the other kid. The point is PO, your the only
one with poop on your arguments: style, content, evaluation of other's,
and so on, and so on.
>> let's just assume you are in a time warp or simply demented. By the
>> way we all wonder how one can understand a fundamentally flawed
>> position. How do you do it?
>>
>> For a moment, let's just assume that you are a highly successful
>> troll, a perfectly reasonable assumption I might add. Now I must refer
>> you to a relevant book: Kurt Vonnegut's "Mother Night". also available
>> as a great movie. There's a line in it somewhere that is approximately
>> "Beware what you pretend to be. You might become it." Not an exact
>> quote but you get the idea. Now we combine this with the troll
>> assumption and note that you have now became the fool you thought was
>> just an act. I think if you were to seek self redemption (which, very
>> unfortunately, requires self reflective thinking), you should look to
>> literature, not mathematics.
--
Jeff Barnett
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-17 16:35 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <69ednfuNv_UC_hbCnZ2dnUU7-IPNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23930 |
On 10/17/2020 4:24 PM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
> On 10/17/2020 12:55 PM, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/17/2020 1:45 PM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>> On 10/17/2020 12:15 PM, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 10/17/2020 1:00 AM, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>>>> On 10/16/2020 9:11 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>> On 17/10/2020 01:12, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>>>>>> On 10/15/2020 8:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>>>>> <cut>
>>>>>>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
>>>>>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be
>>>>>>>>>>> "clear in
>>>>>>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we
>>>>>>>>>>> envision that
>>>>>>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers
>>>>>>>>>>> {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are
>>>>>>>>>> independent
>>>>>>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>>>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true
>>>>>>>>>> in some
>>>>>>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
>>>>>>>>> confusion
>>>>>>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the
>>>>>>>>> formal
>>>>>>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one
>>>>>>>>> model (up to
>>>>>>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable
>>>>>>>>> thing to say
>>>>>>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>>>>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models
>>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
>>>>>>>>> sentence is
>>>>>>>>> true.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>>>>>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in
>>>>>>>> other
>>>>>>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>>>>>>> model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from
>>>>>>>> wanting to
>>>>>>>> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional
>>>>>>>> models
>>>>>>>> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is
>>>>>>>> true
>>>>>>>> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply
>>>>>>>> don't
>>>>>>>> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange.
>>>>>>>> (This isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL
>>>>>>>> stuff. Maybe someone has already asked this, or you could ask a
>>>>>>>> new
>>>>>>>> question.)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> The key results needed are:
>>>>>>>> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
>>>>>>>> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
>>>>>>>> T + {P} is also consistent.)
>>>>>>>> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
>>>>>>>> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a
>>>>>>>> model.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
>>>>>>>> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in
>>>>>>>> addition
>>>>>>>> to the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says
>>>>>>>> that we can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it
>>>>>>>> follows that if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be
>>>>>>>> consistent.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
>>>>>>>> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL
>>>>>>>> systems -
>>>>>>>> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what
>>>>>>>> proof
>>>>>>>> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of
>>>>>>>> variations here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural
>>>>>>>> deduction
>>>>>>>> style, sequent calculus and so on.)]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
>>>>>>>> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
>>>>>>>> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
>>>>>>>> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are
>>>>>>>> models
>>>>>>>> where G is false, and models where G is true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Sorry for the delay - I didn't see this msg. Let's take another
>>>>>>> example:
>>>>>>> It's been claimed here that Q, a simplified theory of natural
>>>>>>> numbers,
>>>>>>> can not prove the general proposition x+y=y+x though we "know" it's
>>>>>>> true. From what you are saying above, it's not correct to say
>>>>>>> x+y=y+x is
>>>>>>> true though not provable in Q, rather we are to know that there are
>>>>>>> models of Q in which it is true and others where it is false.
>>>>>>> Does this
>>>>>>> follow from what you said above?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Yes, that's exactly right. In fact, an obvious method of proof
>>>>>> for the claim that Q ⊬ ∀x∀y x+y=y+x would be to exhibit a model of
>>>>>> Q in which this is false.
>>>>> Thanks. I think I need to think about this some more. Oops! I
>>>>> wonder if this thinking about thinking is the type of viscous self
>>>>> reference that so terrifies PO?
>>>>
>>>> You have done an awfully terrible job in accurately characterizing
>>>> my position. My position is that pathological self-reference
>>>> specifies an infinitely recursive evaluation that is undecidable
>>>> only because it is infinitely recursive.
>>>
>>> It's amazing how little you understand about what you talk about. The
>>> only sign of pathological self-reference that I see in these threads
>>> is when you refer to one of your pathetically written and reasoned
>>> documents. But, perhaps, citing a fool to support a foolish position
>>> is appropriate. Since many other's many times have given you examples
>>> without the type of self reference you abhor,
>>
>> You are providing the same sort of knuckle headed terminology that Ben
>> has. It is not a personal opinion that I have a dislike for
>> pathological self-reference, it is an objective truism that
>> pathological self-reference is an error.
>>
>> This kind of knuckle-headed terminology comes from the attempt to use
>> rhetoric against logic in an attempt to win an argument on the basis
>> of persuasion rather than prove what the truth is on the basis of
>> comprehension.
>
> As an admitted mathematical light weight you are incapable of
> formulating a compelling logical or mathematical argument.
It is the philosophical underpinning of the meta mathematics that is the
only correct basis of the aspects of the things that I have been
discussing.
Clueless wonders that dismiss the ultimate basis of the notion of truth
itself as philosophical mumbo jumbo prove that they are totally out of
their depth.
> That is to
> say YOU ARE THE ONE USING PERSUASION RATHER THAN TECHNICAL. Son, you are
> totally out of your dept; You are like the kid at the playground who is
> told, truthfully, by another kid that you've got poop on your shoes (and
> you really do). Who then turns to the poop caller and yells "You too!"
> Hey, he can be as nasty as the other kid. The point is PO, your the only
> one with poop on your arguments: style, content, evaluation of other's,
> and so on, and so on.
>
>>> let's just assume you are in a time warp or simply demented. By the
>>> way we all wonder how one can understand a fundamentally flawed
>>> position. How do you do it?
>>>
>>> For a moment, let's just assume that you are a highly successful
>>> troll, a perfectly reasonable assumption I might add. Now I must
>>> refer you to a relevant book: Kurt Vonnegut's "Mother Night". also
>>> available as a great movie. There's a line in it somewhere that is
>>> approximately "Beware what you pretend to be. You might become it."
>>> Not an exact quote but you get the idea. Now we combine this with the
>>> troll assumption and note that you have now became the fool you
>>> thought was just an act. I think if you were to seek self redemption
>>> (which, very unfortunately, requires self reflective thinking), you
>>> should look to literature, not mathematics.
--
Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
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| From | André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-18 01:24 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <rmgqiq$3au$2@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #23925 |
On 2020-10-17 12:15, olcott wrote:
> You have done an awfully terrible job in accurately characterizing my
> position. My position is that pathological self-reference specifies an
> infinitely recursive evaluation that is undecidable only because it is
> infinitely recursive.
Incompleteness/undecidability has absolutely nothing to do with
self-reference ('pathological' or otherwise). Natural language might
provide a mechanism for expressing self-reference. FOL does not. So your
notion of 'pathological self-reference' is entirely irrelevant to logic.
André
--
To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail
service.
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| From | Malcolm McLean <malcolm.arthur.mclean@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-18 06:31 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <55cb934b-8c68-41c4-ad22-1e41f95e80b0n@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #23939 |
On Sunday, 18 October 2020 at 08:24:13 UTC+1, André G. Isaak wrote:
> On 2020-10-17 12:15, olcott wrote:
>
> > You have done an awfully terrible job in accurately characterizing my
> > position. My position is that pathological self-reference specifies an
> > infinitely recursive evaluation that is undecidable only because it is
> > infinitely recursive.
> Incompleteness/undecidability has absolutely nothing to do with
> self-reference ('pathological' or otherwise). Natural language might
> provide a mechanism for expressing self-reference. FOL does not. So your
> notion of 'pathological self-reference' is entirely irrelevant to logic.
> André
>
A paradox in natural language is caused by some form of self-reference
e.g. "this sentence is false" or "the barber of Seville shaves every man
except those who shave themselves". PO's case seems to be that
"undecideable" propositions are at root similar paradoxes caused by
self reference, and "minimal type theory" makes this obvious by providing
a grammar in which they become infinitely recursive.
However something like Goldbach's conjecture (every even number above 2
is the sum of two primes) is not a paradox in natural language. It's a normal
conjecture which must have a true / false answer. But in mathematics, it
might well be that no proof is possible. We don't know if it is true, false,
provable, disprovable, or unprovable. And it's unlikely that a simple grammar
change would tell us. PO would have to apply his minimal type theory to the
conjecture and show that it's either recursive or non-recursive. I don't think
he can do this - the central concept is there, but when you try to actually apply it,
it can't be made to work.
However I think the real problem here is tone. PO's idea isn't one that is
on its face unreasonable, or off-topic. But it is presented as a huge breakthrough
rather than as an embryonic idea that is under development. That annoys people
with more background and formal training.
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| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-18 10:58 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <gpadnRn70diI-xHCnZ2dnUU7-VXNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23941 |
On 10/18/2020 8:31 AM, Malcolm McLean wrote:
> On Sunday, 18 October 2020 at 08:24:13 UTC+1, André G. Isaak wrote:
>> On 2020-10-17 12:15, olcott wrote:
>>
>>> You have done an awfully terrible job in accurately characterizing my
>>> position. My position is that pathological self-reference specifies an
>>> infinitely recursive evaluation that is undecidable only because it is
>>> infinitely recursive.
>> Incompleteness/undecidability has absolutely nothing to do with
>> self-reference ('pathological' or otherwise). Natural language might
>> provide a mechanism for expressing self-reference. FOL does not. So your
>> notion of 'pathological self-reference' is entirely irrelevant to logic.
>> André
>>
> A paradox in natural language is caused by some form of self-reference
> e.g. "this sentence is false" or "the barber of Seville shaves every man
> except those who shave themselves". PO's case seems to be that
> "undecideable" propositions are at root similar paradoxes caused by
> self reference, and "minimal type theory" makes this obvious by providing
> a grammar in which they become infinitely recursive.
>
> However something like Goldbach's conjecture (every even number above 2
> is the sum of two primes) is not a paradox in natural language. It's a normal
> conjecture which must have a true / false answer. But in mathematics, it
> might well be that no proof is possible. We don't know if it is true, false,
> provable, disprovable, or unprovable. And it's unlikely that a simple grammar
> change would tell us. PO would have to apply his minimal type theory to the
> conjecture and show that it's either recursive or non-recursive. I don't think
> he can do this - the central concept is there, but when you try to actually apply it,
> it can't be made to work.
>
> However I think the real problem here is tone. PO's idea isn't one that is
> on its face unreasonable, or off-topic. But it is presented as a huge breakthrough
> rather than as an embryonic idea that is under development. That annoys people
> with more background and formal training.
>
In other word the basis of the rebuttals of my work is not that I am
incorrect, it is that they are annoyed that I am correct. This is not
any logical basis at all.
The answers that I am deriving don't come from mathematics. They come
from the philosophical subject of foundationalism. Mathematics is not
free to independently derive its own notion of Truth.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/
Tarski "Proved" that truth is undefinable. Without truth being defined
every attempt to create strong AI is hobbled.
Here Tarski refers to the Liar Paradox (From Theorem I)
It would then be possible to reconstruct the antinomy
of the liar in the metalanguage, by forming in the language
itself a sentence x such that the sentence of the metalanguage
which is correlated with x asserts that x is not a true sentence. I
http://www.liarparadox.org/247_248.pdf
Here uses the Liar Paradox as his basis for the first step of his proof.
In accordance with the first
part of Theorem I we can obtain the negation of one of the sentences
in condition (α) of convention T of § 3 as a consequence of the
definition of the symbol 'Pr' (provided we replace 'Tr' in this
convention by 'Pr'). In other words we can construct a sentence
x of the science in question which satisfies the following
condition:
it is not true that x ∈ Pr if and only if p
or in equivalent formulation:
(1) x ∉ Pr if and only if p (x ∉ Pr ↔ p)
HERE IS THE PATHOLOGICAL SELF-REFERENCE:
where the symbol 'p' represents the whole sentence x
We shall show that the sentence x is actually undecidable
and at the same time true
http://www.liarparadox.org/Tarski_Proof_275_276.pdf
On the basis of the inability to prove the (incorrect expression of
language of) Liar Paradox Tarski concluded that Truth is undefinable.
--
Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
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| From | David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-18 09:18 -0700 |
| Message-ID | <d46094e1-85ae-40fc-be7a-6a826cb6d55fo@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #23945 |
On Sunday, October 18, 2020 at 8:58:21 AM UTC-7, olcott wrote:
> The answers that I am deriving don't come from mathematics. They come
> from the philosophical subject of foundationalism. Mathematics is not
> free to independently derive its own notion of Truth.
> https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-foundational/
>
> Tarski "Proved" that truth is undefinable. Without truth being defined
> every attempt to create strong AI is hobbled.
And the underlying question is:
Why should anyone be interested in strong AI?
What are the goals of strong AI and why are they useful to
humanity or the biosphere as a whole?
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