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Groups > comp.theory > #23621 > unrolled thread
| Started by | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2020-09-28 16:22 -0500 |
| Last post | 2020-09-29 13:18 -0500 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 408 — 15 participants |
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Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-28 16:22 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-28 15:29 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-28 16:36 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-28 16:31 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-28 19:00 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-28 19:04 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-28 22:00 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 01:48 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 10:49 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 12:34 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 14:17 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 11:31 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 12:40 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 14:34 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 14:06 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 15:47 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 16:44 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-29 23:26 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 19:40 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 02:12 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 21:38 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 12:43 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 11:38 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 20:07 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 14:42 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 21:24 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 15:45 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 21:32 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 22:47 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Keith Thompson <Keith.S.Thompson+u@gmail.com> - 2020-09-29 21:29 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 22:54 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Keith Thompson <Keith.S.Thompson+u@gmail.com> - 2020-09-29 22:47 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-30 06:33 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 16:40 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 19:51 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 02:38 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 21:46 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-09-30 06:45 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 12:40 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 10:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 19:55 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 14:25 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 21:01 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 15:12 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-09-30 15:30 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-30 08:57 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 12:04 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 19:40 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 14:21 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 20:50 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 14:57 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-09-30 15:42 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 21:25 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 22:41 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-29 22:22 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 00:54 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Richard Damon <Richard@Damon-Family.org> - 2020-09-30 09:08 -0400
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 10:39 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-09-29 21:04 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 22:28 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 11:42 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 14:03 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 20:44 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 14:55 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-09-30 21:40 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 17:48 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-01 01:17 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 19:33 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-30 16:22 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 17:51 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-30 19:10 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 20:41 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-09-30 20:06 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-30 21:37 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-01 12:15 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-01 14:34 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-01 14:32 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-01 16:29 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-03 11:11 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-05 08:04 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Malcolm McLean <malcolm.arthur.mclean@gmail.com> - 2020-10-05 07:37 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-05 09:43 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-05 12:27 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-07 10:18 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-07 12:44 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-07 13:10 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-07 15:44 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-07 16:26 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-07 19:39 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-07 20:45 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-08 00:56 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-08 15:42 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-08 20:15 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-08 22:33 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-09 00:31 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 09:04 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-09 10:39 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 11:55 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-09 13:23 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 15:06 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-08 23:53 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-08 23:44 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 09:28 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-09 09:26 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 11:17 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-09 10:40 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 15:28 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-09 14:39 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 16:26 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-09 15:00 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-09 19:11 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-09 21:35 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 00:24 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-10 03:37 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-10 07:00 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-10 10:26 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-10 16:43 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-12 07:23 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-10 17:29 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 13:17 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-10 18:51 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 14:37 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-10 20:24 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 19:09 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-11 09:01 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 10:12 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-11 16:51 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 17:31 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-12 09:59 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) R Kym Horsell <kym@kymhorsell.com> - 2020-10-12 11:13 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-12 05:40 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) R Kym Horsell <kym@kymhorsell.com> - 2020-10-12 13:18 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-12 09:23 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-12 16:27 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-12 20:21 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-12 22:48 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 01:05 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Smaill <smaill@foxtrot.inf.ed.ac.uk> - 2020-10-13 09:29 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 10:18 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Kaz Kylheku <793-849-0957@kylheku.com> - 2020-10-13 16:31 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 12:43 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-13 11:14 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-13 07:51 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-13 20:56 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 15:07 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-14 08:09 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-14 08:39 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-14 09:28 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) DV <xlt.pjw@gmail.com> - 2020-10-14 12:17 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 10:12 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-13 09:55 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 16:47 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-14 00:25 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 10:34 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-14 10:47 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 13:12 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 19:14 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 05:55 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 09:35 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 10:31 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 11:40 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 11:02 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 12:46 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 12:26 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 14:07 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 13:26 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 14:46 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 13:49 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 14:59 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 14:25 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 15:41 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 21:29 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 23:30 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-16 03:07 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 09:19 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-16 08:34 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 09:50 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-16 09:07 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 10:27 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-16 09:43 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 11:45 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-16 10:50 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 12:27 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-16 21:03 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 15:20 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 15:25 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-16 22:15 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 16:32 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 16:56 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-17 00:33 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 18:54 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-17 01:33 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 19:53 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-17 13:32 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 09:36 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-18 02:25 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 21:23 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-17 21:31 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 22:53 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 14:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-18 15:34 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:24 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 10:42 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 15:01 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 14:18 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 17:21 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 21:11 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 01:21 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Keith Thompson <Keith.S.Thompson+u@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 00:48 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 09:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-18 16:07 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:18 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 09:05 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:16 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 10:44 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 13:04 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 15:55 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 18:05 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-19 01:17 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 20:52 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-19 21:29 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 15:59 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-20 01:53 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 20:16 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-20 02:56 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 21:43 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-21 02:04 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-20 20:22 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-21 03:13 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-20 23:41 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-21 14:25 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 08:13 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 10:16 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 09:40 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 11:57 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 11:25 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 13:00 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 12:29 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 14:59 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 14:42 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-21 14:05 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 19:41 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-21 20:57 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 23:12 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-21 17:29 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 12:10 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 11:41 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 13:16 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-21 12:49 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-21 21:13 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-21 20:13 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-22 03:00 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 18:54 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 21:33 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-19 09:39 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 11:41 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Malcolm McLean <malcolm.arthur.mclean@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 09:44 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 13:47 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:12 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-18 21:25 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 21:28 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-19 09:38 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 11:38 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-19 11:05 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 12:19 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-19 11:43 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 12:57 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-19 11:41 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 14:09 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Malcolm McLean <malcolm.arthur.mclean@gmail.com> - 2020-10-19 12:46 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 14:52 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-19 13:08 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 14:36 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-19 14:21 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 16:24 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-20 01:49 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-20 10:42 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-20 21:50 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-17 07:33 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 09:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 14:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-16 22:00 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 16:16 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-17 07:23 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 09:46 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 01:14 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:09 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 10:40 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 14:21 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-18 20:59 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 21:00 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-19 21:47 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-19 17:27 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-16 11:29 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) R Kym Horsell <kym@kymhorsell.com> - 2020-10-16 18:42 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-16 19:02 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 13:11 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-17 07:26 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-17 17:07 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 13:45 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-15 20:32 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 15:36 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-13 21:20 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 15:37 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-13 23:43 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 19:42 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-14 05:46 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 10:46 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-14 00:42 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 10:42 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-14 10:44 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 13:06 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-14 19:10 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 14:35 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-14 20:11 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 15:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 18:54 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-15 05:52 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 09:29 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-13 11:41 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-13 08:53 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 16:37 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-14 00:17 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 10:14 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory [ sound argument ] olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 19:35 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory [ sound argument ] David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-14 21:42 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory [ sound argument ] olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 00:13 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-13 13:06 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-13 22:10 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-13 21:41 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-14 15:15 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-14 12:39 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-14 22:59 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-15 15:57 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 11:06 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-15 17:54 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 12:00 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-15 21:12 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 15:33 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-15 23:23 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-15 17:31 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-16 06:23 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-16 09:35 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-16 18:12 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-17 04:11 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-17 00:00 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> - 2020-10-17 12:55 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-17 16:25 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 13:15 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-17 11:34 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 13:45 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-17 15:32 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-17 12:45 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 13:55 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-10-17 15:24 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-17 16:35 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 01:24 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Malcolm McLean <malcolm.arthur.mclean@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 06:31 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 10:58 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> - 2020-10-18 09:18 -0700
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:13 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 10:35 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 11:45 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-18 11:14 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-18 15:38 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-10 13:24 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 14:59 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-10 14:20 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 15:30 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Alan Mackenzie <acm@muc.de> - 2020-10-10 20:49 +0000
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 10:02 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-10 09:58 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 21:29 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-11 06:33 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 09:49 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-11 18:05 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Andy Walker <anw@cuboid.co.uk> - 2020-10-11 13:52 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 09:05 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-11 17:55 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 22:45 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-11 21:56 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 23:07 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-11 22:45 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-12 00:07 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-11 23:14 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-12 01:24 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-12 03:18 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-12 09:41 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-12 08:56 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 15:01 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-13 23:36 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 19:01 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-14 01:37 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-13 19:42 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> - 2020-10-14 15:19 +0100
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-14 10:11 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-11 23:09 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-10 02:09 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 09:47 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> - 2020-10-10 09:18 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-10 20:40 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-10-02 10:22 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-09-28 23:29 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 01:02 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-09-29 01:01 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 10:20 -0500
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> - 2020-09-29 12:06 -0600
Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory (updated) olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> - 2020-09-29 13:18 -0500
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| From | André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-13 08:53 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <rm4f1c$ttp$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #23801 |
On 2020-10-13 05:41, Alan Mackenzie wrote: > olcott <NoOne@nowhere.com> wrote: >> If is is not true that: >> -- A theory T is incomplete if and only if there is some sentence φ >> -- such that (T ⊬ φ) and (T ⊬ ¬φ). > > It is neither true nor false - it is a definition of what incomplete > means. I'd disagree with the above. It is true. But Olcott doesn't seem to understand what 'true by definition' means. I think he has the notion that there is some sort of Platonic ideal of 'incompleteness' out there which the above is attempting to capture and has somehow gotten wrong, but that isn't how mathematical definitions work. A property of formal systems has been precisely described and given a name. One could potentially argue about whether a particular property is interesting or useful, but it makes absolutely no sense to argue about whether it is correctly defined. Unfortunately, he is determined to attribute to the term 'incompleteness' various connotations which he thinks are present in the non-mathematical usage of the term (which he seems to think means 'flawed' or 'broken' or something along those lines) and to assume that they are also present in the mathematical usage of the term. In mathematics, 'incompleteness' means what is given above. Importantly, it doesn't mean anything beyond what is given above, i.e. it doesn't imply anything about something being flawed, broken, or anything else; merely that there are propositions which can neither be proven nor disproven. André -- To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail service.
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| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-13 16:37 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <gd2dnQyupK-TgxvCnZ2dnUU7-YXNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23803 |
On 10/13/2020 9:53 AM, André G. Isaak wrote: > On 2020-10-13 05:41, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >> olcott <NoOne@nowhere.com> wrote: > >>> If is is not true that: >>> -- A theory T is incomplete if and only if there is some sentence φ >>> -- such that (T ⊬ φ) and (T ⊬ ¬φ). >> >> It is neither true nor false - it is a definition of what incomplete >> means. > > I'd disagree with the above. It is true. But Olcott doesn't seem to > understand what 'true by definition' means. > > I think he has the notion that there is some sort of Platonic ideal of > 'incompleteness' out there which the above is attempting to capture and > has somehow gotten wrong, but that isn't how mathematical definitions work. > > A property of formal systems has been precisely described and given a > name. One could potentially argue about whether a particular property is > interesting or useful, but it makes absolutely no sense to argue about > whether it is correctly defined. > > Unfortunately, he is determined to attribute to the term > 'incompleteness' various connotations which he thinks are present in the > non-mathematical usage of the term (which he seems to think means > 'flawed' or 'broken' or something along those lines) and to assume that > they are also present in the mathematical usage of the term. > > In mathematics, 'incompleteness' means what is given above. Importantly, > it doesn't mean anything beyond what is given above, i.e. it doesn't > imply anything about something being flawed, broken, or anything else; > merely that there are propositions which can neither be proven nor > disproven. > > André > Incompleteness means that not all analytical truths can be proved and this is simply not true. To say that an analytical truth cannot be proved is exactly the same thing as saying that an argument is sound but not valid. -- Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
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| From | André G. Isaak <agisaak@gm.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-14 00:17 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <rm656a$2lv$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #23816 |
On 2020-10-13 15:37, olcott wrote: > On 10/13/2020 9:53 AM, André G. Isaak wrote: >> On 2020-10-13 05:41, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>> olcott <NoOne@nowhere.com> wrote: >> >>>> If is is not true that: >>>> -- A theory T is incomplete if and only if there is some sentence φ >>>> -- such that (T ⊬ φ) and (T ⊬ ¬φ). >>> >>> It is neither true nor false - it is a definition of what incomplete >>> means. >> >> I'd disagree with the above. It is true. But Olcott doesn't seem to >> understand what 'true by definition' means. >> >> I think he has the notion that there is some sort of Platonic ideal of >> 'incompleteness' out there which the above is attempting to capture >> and has somehow gotten wrong, but that isn't how mathematical >> definitions work. >> >> A property of formal systems has been precisely described and given a >> name. One could potentially argue about whether a particular property >> is interesting or useful, but it makes absolutely no sense to argue >> about whether it is correctly defined. >> >> Unfortunately, he is determined to attribute to the term >> 'incompleteness' various connotations which he thinks are present in >> the non-mathematical usage of the term (which he seems to think means >> 'flawed' or 'broken' or something along those lines) and to assume >> that they are also present in the mathematical usage of the term. >> >> In mathematics, 'incompleteness' means what is given above. >> Importantly, it doesn't mean anything beyond what is given above, i.e. >> it doesn't imply anything about something being flawed, broken, or >> anything else; merely that there are propositions which can neither be >> proven nor disproven. >> >> André >> > > Incompleteness means that not all analytical truths can be proved and > this is simply not true. To say that an analytical truth cannot be > proved is exactly the same thing as saying that an argument is sound but > not valid. You've said this before. It is simply nonsensical. Truth refers to propositions. Soundness and validity refer to chains of inference. If φ is true but unprovable, that entails there is no chain of inference leading to φ, so there is no argument which you can attribute validity or soundness to. André -- To email remove 'invalid' & replace 'gm' with well known Google mail service.
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| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-14 10:14 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <wYadne93sOVbiBrCnZ2dnUU7-YednZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23825 |
On 10/14/2020 1:17 AM, André G. Isaak wrote: > On 2020-10-13 15:37, olcott wrote: >> On 10/13/2020 9:53 AM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>> On 2020-10-13 05:41, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>> olcott <NoOne@nowhere.com> wrote: >>> >>>>> If is is not true that: >>>>> -- A theory T is incomplete if and only if there is some sentence φ >>>>> -- such that (T ⊬ φ) and (T ⊬ ¬φ). >>>> >>>> It is neither true nor false - it is a definition of what incomplete >>>> means. >>> >>> I'd disagree with the above. It is true. But Olcott doesn't seem to >>> understand what 'true by definition' means. >>> >>> I think he has the notion that there is some sort of Platonic ideal >>> of 'incompleteness' out there which the above is attempting to >>> capture and has somehow gotten wrong, but that isn't how mathematical >>> definitions work. >>> >>> A property of formal systems has been precisely described and given a >>> name. One could potentially argue about whether a particular property >>> is interesting or useful, but it makes absolutely no sense to argue >>> about whether it is correctly defined. >>> >>> Unfortunately, he is determined to attribute to the term >>> 'incompleteness' various connotations which he thinks are present in >>> the non-mathematical usage of the term (which he seems to think means >>> 'flawed' or 'broken' or something along those lines) and to assume >>> that they are also present in the mathematical usage of the term. >>> >>> In mathematics, 'incompleteness' means what is given above. >>> Importantly, it doesn't mean anything beyond what is given above, >>> i.e. it doesn't imply anything about something being flawed, broken, >>> or anything else; merely that there are propositions which can >>> neither be proven nor disproven. >>> >>> André >>> >> >> Incompleteness means that not all analytical truths can be proved and >> this is simply not true. To say that an analytical truth cannot be >> proved is exactly the same thing as saying that an argument is sound >> but not valid. > > You've said this before. It is simply nonsensical. Truth refers to > propositions. Soundness and validity refer to chains of inference. If φ > is true but unprovable, that entails there is no chain of inference > leading to φ, so there is no argument which you can attribute validity > or soundness to. > > André Since every element of the body of analytical truth is only true by virtue of its definition then every element of this body has its defintion as its proof. THERE IS NO WAY AROUND THIS -- Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
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| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-14 19:35 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory [ sound argument ] |
| Message-ID | <AvOdnY4mVZnwBBrCnZ2dnUU7-THNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23825 |
On 10/14/2020 1:17 AM, André G. Isaak wrote: > On 2020-10-13 15:37, olcott wrote: >> On 10/13/2020 9:53 AM, André G. Isaak wrote: >>> On 2020-10-13 05:41, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>>> olcott <NoOne@nowhere.com> wrote: >>> >>>>> If is is not true that: >>>>> -- A theory T is incomplete if and only if there is some sentence φ >>>>> -- such that (T ⊬ φ) and (T ⊬ ¬φ). >>>> >>>> It is neither true nor false - it is a definition of what incomplete >>>> means. >>> >>> I'd disagree with the above. It is true. But Olcott doesn't seem to >>> understand what 'true by definition' means. >>> >>> I think he has the notion that there is some sort of Platonic ideal >>> of 'incompleteness' out there which the above is attempting to >>> capture and has somehow gotten wrong, but that isn't how mathematical >>> definitions work. >>> >>> A property of formal systems has been precisely described and given a >>> name. One could potentially argue about whether a particular property >>> is interesting or useful, but it makes absolutely no sense to argue >>> about whether it is correctly defined. >>> >>> Unfortunately, he is determined to attribute to the term >>> 'incompleteness' various connotations which he thinks are present in >>> the non-mathematical usage of the term (which he seems to think means >>> 'flawed' or 'broken' or something along those lines) and to assume >>> that they are also present in the mathematical usage of the term. >>> >>> In mathematics, 'incompleteness' means what is given above. >>> Importantly, it doesn't mean anything beyond what is given above, >>> i.e. it doesn't imply anything about something being flawed, broken, >>> or anything else; merely that there are propositions which can >>> neither be proven nor disproven. >>> >>> André >>> >> >> Incompleteness means that not all analytical truths can be proved and >> this is simply not true. To say that an analytical truth cannot be >> proved is exactly the same thing as saying that an argument is sound >> but not valid. > > You've said this before. It is simply nonsensical. I will not tolerate any more dodges of this point. The only possible way to verify that any analytical expression of language is true is when it is the conclusion of sound inference. This requires that a chain-of-inference from the premises to the conclusion is completed. This completed chain-of-inference is a proof. Therefore true and unprovable are impossible. I will key coming back to this same point again and again until you get it. This will be the only point that I will discuss with you until you get it. > Truth refers to > propositions. Soundness and validity refer to chains of inference. If φ > is true but unprovable, that entails there is no chain of inference > leading to φ, so there is no argument which you can attribute validity > or soundness to. > > André > > -- Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
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| From | David Kleinecke <dkleinecke@gmail.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-14 21:42 -0700 |
| Subject | Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory [ sound argument ] |
| Message-ID | <88d653ed-7588-48ec-b408-dc344ca46abfo@googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #23852 |
On Wednesday, October 14, 2020 at 5:36:05 PM UTC-7, olcott wrote: > > I will not tolerate any more dodges of this point. > > The only possible way to verify that any analytical expression of > language is true is when it is the conclusion of sound inference. > > This requires that a chain-of-inference from the premises to the > conclusion is completed. This completed chain-of-inference is a proof. > > Therefore true and unprovable are impossible. It has been clear for a long time that you wish to define "true" as meaning provable. Your privilege. Do not expect anyone to agree with you. Now - so what? All the old theorems remain their old selves because they are true in the old definition of "true" What new and interesting conclusions follow with your definition?
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| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-15 00:13 -0500 |
| Subject | Re: Formal specification of Minimal Type Theory [ sound argument ] |
| Message-ID | <vN-dndjTV9TuRxrCnZ2dnUU7-R_NnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23853 |
On 10/14/2020 11:42 PM, David Kleinecke wrote: > On Wednesday, October 14, 2020 at 5:36:05 PM UTC-7, olcott wrote: >> >> I will not tolerate any more dodges of this point. >> >> The only possible way to verify that any analytical expression of >> language is true is when it is the conclusion of sound inference. >> >> This requires that a chain-of-inference from the premises to the >> conclusion is completed. This completed chain-of-inference is a proof. >> >> Therefore true and unprovable are impossible. > > It has been clear for a long time that you wish to define "true" > as meaning provable. > People are even denying that they know how sound deductive inference works, this is flat out dishonest. I won't tolerate it. > Your privilege. Do not expect anyone to agree with you. > > Now - so what? All the old theorems remain their old selves > because they are true in the old definition of "true" > > What new and interesting conclusions follow with your definition? > The key thing is that it is correct instead of incorrect. Only when we have a correct formalization of truth can we begin to take the first baby step into creating strong AI. Until we do this AI has a lobotomy. -- Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
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| From | Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-13 13:06 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <rm4trv$e2t$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #23801 |
On 10/13/2020 5:41 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: > olcott <NoOne@nowhere.com> wrote: >> On 10/12/2020 11:27 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: > There are no ways of "deciding" that a general expression is undecidable. > We just know that such expressions exist. Some can be demonstrated to be > undecidable, but not all. I think the Continuum Hypothesis in ZFC has > been demonstrated to be undecidable. What is usually said is that Set Theory is consistent with models in which the Continuum Hypothesis is true and models in which it is false. Thus, there can be no proof that the Hypothesis is true or false from the rest of the axioms. The same for the Axiom of Choice. This is different in character from Godel's proof of incompleteness where he generates an arithmetic proposition within an FOL that cannot be proved true or false in that logic. However that proposition can be proved true outside the FOL logic and must be true but not provable within. There are no models of the FOL in which the proposition is false. -- Jeff Barnett
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| From | Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-13 22:10 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <G-2dnWy5o7IiihvCnZ2dnUU78VOdnZ2d@brightview.co.uk> |
| In reply to | #23809 |
On 13/10/2020 20:06, Jeff Barnett wrote: > On 10/13/2020 5:41 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >> olcott <NoOne@nowhere.com> wrote: >>> On 10/12/2020 11:27 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: > >> There are no ways of "deciding" that a general expression is undecidable. >> We just know that such expressions exist. Some can be demonstrated to be >> undecidable, but not all. I think the Continuum Hypothesis in ZFC has >> been demonstrated to be undecidable. > > What is usually said is that Set Theory is consistent with models in > which the Continuum Hypothesis is true and models in which it is false. > Thus, there can be no proof that the Hypothesis is true or false from > the rest of the axioms. The same for the Axiom of Choice. > > This is different in character from Godel's proof of incompleteness > where he generates an arithmetic proposition within an FOL that cannot > be proved true or false in that logic. However that proposition can be > proved true outside the FOL logic and must be true but not provable > within. There are no models of the FOL in which the proposition is false. Maybe I misunderstand what you're saying here, but there are models of the FOL where the Godel sentence G is true, and other models where it is false. When we say G is "true but unprovable", that is referring specifically to "true in the standard model of arithmetic", i.e. true of the natural numbers with the normal operations of addition and multiplication. Regards, Mike.
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| From | Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-13 21:41 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <rm5s0m$nb7$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #23815 |
On 10/13/2020 3:10 PM, Mike Terry wrote: > On 13/10/2020 20:06, Jeff Barnett wrote: >> On 10/13/2020 5:41 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >>> olcott <NoOne@nowhere.com> wrote: >>>> On 10/12/2020 11:27 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote: >> >>> There are no ways of "deciding" that a general expression is >>> undecidable. >>> We just know that such expressions exist. Some can be demonstrated >>> to be >>> undecidable, but not all. I think the Continuum Hypothesis in ZFC has >>> been demonstrated to be undecidable. >> >> What is usually said is that Set Theory is consistent with models in >> which the Continuum Hypothesis is true and models in which it is false. >> Thus, there can be no proof that the Hypothesis is true or false from >> the rest of the axioms. The same for the Axiom of Choice. >> >> This is different in character from Godel's proof of incompleteness >> where he generates an arithmetic proposition within an FOL that cannot >> be proved true or false in that logic. However that proposition can be >> proved true outside the FOL logic and must be true but not provable >> within. There are no models of the FOL in which the proposition is false. > > Maybe I misunderstand what you're saying here, but there are models of > the FOL where the Godel sentence G is true, and other models where it is > false. When we say G is "true but unprovable", that is referring > specifically to "true in the standard model of arithmetic", i.e. true of > the natural numbers with the normal operations of addition and > multiplication. Recall that the FOL in question includes integer arithmetic and the proposition is that a particular formula is satisfied by integer substitution. In any model of that FOL, that proposition is true though it can not be demonstrate in the base system. That is not the case with Choice or Continuum; There are models in where either, neither, or both may be true (or equivalently, either, neither, or both might be false). The difference I was stressing is that the set theoretical stuff could swing from either side of the table but The Godel result is wired. -- Jeff Barnett
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| From | Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-14 15:15 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <Wf-dne_7RvuHlRrCnZ2dnUU78X3NnZ2d@brightview.co.uk> |
| In reply to | #23824 |
On 14/10/2020 04:41, Jeff Barnett wrote:
> On 10/13/2020 3:10 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>> On 13/10/2020 20:06, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>> On 10/13/2020 5:41 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
>>>> olcott <NoOne@nowhere.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 10/12/2020 11:27 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
>>>
>>>> There are no ways of "deciding" that a general expression is
>>>> undecidable.
>>>> We just know that such expressions exist. Some can be demonstrated
>>>> to be
>>>> undecidable, but not all. I think the Continuum Hypothesis in ZFC has
>>>> been demonstrated to be undecidable.
>>>
>>> What is usually said is that Set Theory is consistent with models in
>>> which the Continuum Hypothesis is true and models in which it is false.
>>> Thus, there can be no proof that the Hypothesis is true or false from
>>> the rest of the axioms. The same for the Axiom of Choice.
>>>
>>> This is different in character from Godel's proof of incompleteness
>>> where he generates an arithmetic proposition within an FOL that cannot
>>> be proved true or false in that logic. However that proposition can be
>>> proved true outside the FOL logic and must be true but not provable
>>> within. There are no models of the FOL in which the proposition is
>>> false.
>>
>> Maybe I misunderstand what you're saying here, but there are models of
>> the FOL where the Godel sentence G is true, and other models where it
>> is false. When we say G is "true but unprovable", that is referring
>> specifically to "true in the standard model of arithmetic", i.e. true
>> of the natural numbers with the normal operations of addition and
>> multiplication.
>
> Recall that the FOL in question includes integer arithmetic and the
> proposition is that a particular formula is satisfied by integer
> substitution.
First a trivial comment: usually, theories of arithmetic such as PA,
Robinson's Q, etc. target the natural numbers rather than the integers,
although targeting the integers does not significantly change what's
going on. (So I'll continue talking about natural numbers rather than
integers.)
I'm pretty sure you're talking here about the Godel sentence G? And
also that you are talking about FOL models of the theory of arithmetic
being discussed, and whether G is true or false in those models. It
seems to me you are claiming that G is true in all such models, but
that's just mistaken assuming the normal understanding of what a FOL
model is.
We have axiomatised theories of arithmetic such as PA (first order Peano
Arithmetic) and Robinson's Q (much less powerful). These have an
/intended/ model which is the natural numbers, along with the normal
operations of addition and multiplication etc.. This is also referred to
as the standard model. However they also have other models, which are
referred to collectively as non-standard models of arithmetic.
In all FOL models, variables range over whatever is in the domain of the
model. For the intended model, the domain is just the standard naturals
{1,2,3,4,...}, but for the non-standard models there will be extra
(non-standard) numbers within the domain, and any variables must range
over those non-standard numbers too. In fact there is no way of getting
around this, since there is no predicate in the language of arithmetic
that can pick out just the "standard" numbers.
So it is not really the case that we are considering only substitution
by /standard/ naturals (or integers). We are considering substitution
by whatever is in the domain of the model, including any non-standard
numbers.
The Godel sentence G is true in the /intended/ model (natural numbers),
but is false in some non-standard models. In those models there will be
some non-standard number representing the variable which in the Godel
proof can be interpreted (in the standard model) as ranging over the
Godel numbers of all the proofs within the theory being considered.
Since this non-standard number does not correspond to any proof in the
theory, there is not a problem here.
> In any model of that FOL, that proposition is true though
> it can not be demonstrate in the base system.
No that's just wrong, unless by "model of that FOL" you mean "model of
that FOL which contains only the standard numbers"! If that is what you
mean, then:
- there is essentially only one such model (the naturals).
So it would be better to just say G is true in the
standard model.
- this is not how logicians would read your "any model of
that FOL"! (Why say "any model" if you only allow one model?)
It is true that there is no proof of G (or of ¬G) in the base system,
although in a more powerful theory there can be such a proof.
> That is not the case with
> Choice or Continuum; There are models in where either, neither, or both
> may be true (or equivalently, either, neither, or both might be false).
>
> The difference I was stressing is that the set theoretical stuff could
> swing from either side of the table but The Godel result is wired.
Well, it's only wired if you fix on the intended model and exclude the
"non-statndard" models, but those models are perfectly valid FOL models
of the theory of arithmetic being considered. I.e. all the axioms of
PA/Q/whatever will hold in those models, along with all the derived
theorems...
Similarly, if you were to fix a specific model for set theory then the
continuum hypothesis would either hold or not hold. (And if that were
the only model we considered valid, we could trivially say the same is
true in "every" FOL model of set theory. :))
I think the difference here is really that for theories of arithmetic
we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/ model.
Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in our heads"
about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the cumulative hierarchy
of well-founded sets, but can we envision that as clearly as we can the
familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I think clearly not, but this
is way beyond me!)
Mike.
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| From | Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-14 12:39 -0600 |
| Message-ID | <rm7gk9$kts$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #23829 |
On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
> On 14/10/2020 04:41, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>> On 10/13/2020 3:10 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>> On 13/10/2020 20:06, Jeff Barnett wrote:
>>>> On 10/13/2020 5:41 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
>>>>> olcott <NoOne@nowhere.com> wrote:
>>>>>> On 10/12/2020 11:27 AM, Alan Mackenzie wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> There are no ways of "deciding" that a general expression is
>>>>> undecidable.
>>>>> We just know that such expressions exist. Some can be demonstrated
>>>>> to be
>>>>> undecidable, but not all. I think the Continuum Hypothesis in ZFC has
>>>>> been demonstrated to be undecidable.
>>>>
>>>> What is usually said is that Set Theory is consistent with models in
>>>> which the Continuum Hypothesis is true and models in which it is false.
>>>> Thus, there can be no proof that the Hypothesis is true or false from
>>>> the rest of the axioms. The same for the Axiom of Choice.
>>>>
>>>> This is different in character from Godel's proof of incompleteness
>>>> where he generates an arithmetic proposition within an FOL that cannot
>>>> be proved true or false in that logic. However that proposition can be
>>>> proved true outside the FOL logic and must be true but not provable
>>>> within. There are no models of the FOL in which the proposition is
>>>> false.
>>>
>>> Maybe I misunderstand what you're saying here, but there are models of
>>> the FOL where the Godel sentence G is true, and other models where it
>>> is false. When we say G is "true but unprovable", that is referring
>>> specifically to "true in the standard model of arithmetic", i.e. true
>>> of the natural numbers with the normal operations of addition and
>>> multiplication.
>>
>> Recall that the FOL in question includes integer arithmetic and the
>> proposition is that a particular formula is satisfied by integer
>> substitution.
>
> First a trivial comment: usually, theories of arithmetic such as PA,
> Robinson's Q, etc. target the natural numbers rather than the integers,
> although targeting the integers does not significantly change what's
> going on. (So I'll continue talking about natural numbers rather than
> integers.)
>
> I'm pretty sure you're talking here about the Godel sentence G? And
> also that you are talking about FOL models of the theory of arithmetic
> being discussed, and whether G is true or false in those models. It
> seems to me you are claiming that G is true in all such models, but
> that's just mistaken assuming the normal understanding of what a FOL
> model is.
>
> We have axiomatised theories of arithmetic such as PA (first order Peano
> Arithmetic) and Robinson's Q (much less powerful). These have an
> /intended/ model which is the natural numbers, along with the normal
> operations of addition and multiplication etc.. This is also referred to
> as the standard model. However they also have other models, which are
> referred to collectively as non-standard models of arithmetic.
>
> In all FOL models, variables range over whatever is in the domain of the
> model. For the intended model, the domain is just the standard naturals
> {1,2,3,4,...}, but for the non-standard models there will be extra
> (non-standard) numbers within the domain, and any variables must range
> over those non-standard numbers too. In fact there is no way of getting
> around this, since there is no predicate in the language of arithmetic
> that can pick out just the "standard" numbers.
>
> So it is not really the case that we are considering only substitution
> by /standard/ naturals (or integers). We are considering substitution
> by whatever is in the domain of the model, including any non-standard
> numbers.
>
> The Godel sentence G is true in the /intended/ model (natural numbers),
> but is false in some non-standard models. In those models there will be
> some non-standard number representing the variable which in the Godel
> proof can be interpreted (in the standard model) as ranging over the
> Godel numbers of all the proofs within the theory being considered.
> Since this non-standard number does not correspond to any proof in the
> theory, there is not a problem here.
>
>> In any model of that FOL, that proposition is true though
>> it can not be demonstrate in the base system.
>
> No that's just wrong, unless by "model of that FOL" you mean "model of
> that FOL which contains only the standard numbers"! If that is what you
> mean, then:
> - there is essentially only one such model (the naturals).
> So it would be better to just say G is true in the
> standard model.
> - this is not how logicians would read your "any model of
> that FOL"! (Why say "any model" if you only allow one model?)
>
> It is true that there is no proof of G (or of ¬G) in the base system,
> although in a more powerful theory there can be such a proof.
>
>> That is not the case with
>> Choice or Continuum; There are models in where either, neither, or both
>> may be true (or equivalently, either, neither, or both might be false).
>>
>> The difference I was stressing is that the set theoretical stuff could
>> swing from either side of the table but The Godel result is wired.
>
> Well, it's only wired if you fix on the intended model and exclude the
> "non-statndard" models, but those models are perfectly valid FOL models
> of the theory of arithmetic being considered. I.e. all the axioms of
> PA/Q/whatever will hold in those models, along with all the derived
> theorems...
>
> Similarly, if you were to fix a specific model for set theory then the
> continuum hypothesis would either hold or not hold. (And if that were
> the only model we considered valid, we could trivially say the same is
> true in "every" FOL model of set theory. :))
>
> I think the difference here is really that for theories of arithmetic
> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/ model.
> Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in our heads"
> about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the cumulative hierarchy
> of well-founded sets, but can we envision that as clearly as we can the
> familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I think clearly not, but this
> is way beyond me!)
Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent of
the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel constructed
sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in some models and
false in others.
Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
--
Jeff Barnett
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Ben Bacarisse <ben.usenet@bsb.me.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-14 22:59 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <87a6wosc2r.fsf@bsb.me.uk> |
| In reply to | #23843 |
Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
<cut>
>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of arithmetic
>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>
> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in some
> models and false in others.
>
> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of confusion
is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model (up to
isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to say
in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the sentence is
true.
--
Ben.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-15 15:57 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <7-2dnY8Pn7PA_hXCnZ2dnUU78cHNnZ2d@brightview.co.uk> |
| In reply to | #23849 |
On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>
>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
> <cut>
>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of arithmetic
>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>
>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in some
>> models and false in others.
>>
>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>
> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of confusion
> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model (up to
> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to say
> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the sentence is
> true.
>
Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
model.) And after all, the interest in all this comes from wanting to
understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
@Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is true
and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply don't
believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange. (This
isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL stuff. Maybe
someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new question.)
The key results needed are:
1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
T + {P} is also consistent.)
2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
(1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition to
the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says that we
can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it follows that
if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be consistent.
[Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL systems -
although the details for this depend completely on exactly what proof
calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of variations
here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural deduction style,
sequent calculus and so on.)]
(2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
- G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
- so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
- so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
- in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are models
where G is false, and models where G is true.
Regards,
Mike.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-15 11:06 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <r-SdnQ2dPIoY7hXCnZ2dnUU7-UXNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23859 |
On 10/15/2020 9:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>
>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>> <cut>
>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of arithmetic
>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>
>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in some
>>> models and false in others.
>>>
>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>
>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of confusion
>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model (up to
>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to say
>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the sentence is
>> true.
>>
>
> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
> model.)
By what-so-ever process that an expression of language is shown to be
true that is its proof. If an expression of language is true in the
standard model of arithmetic then it is provable in the standard model
of arithmetic.
It is not the case that the standard model of arithmetic shows that an
expression of language is true on the basis of a wild guess. There are a
sequence of steps that show that this expression of language is true in
this model and this sequence of steps is the proof of this expression of
language in this model.
> And after all, the interest in all this comes from wanting to
> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>
> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is true
> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply don't
> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange. (This
> isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL stuff. Maybe
> someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new question.)
>
> The key results needed are:
> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
> T + {P} is also consistent.)
> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
>
> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition to
> the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says that we
> can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it follows that
> if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be consistent.
>
> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL systems -
> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what proof
> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of variations
> here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural deduction style,
> sequent calculus and so on.)]
>
> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>
> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>
> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>
> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are models
> where G is false, and models where G is true.
>
> Regards,
> Mike.
>
--
Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-15 17:54 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <c5udnXTvA-JW4xXCnZ2dnUU78aHNnZ2d@brightview.co.uk> |
| In reply to | #23860 |
On 15/10/2020 17:06, olcott wrote:
> On 10/15/2020 9:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>
>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>> <cut>
>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of arithmetic
>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>
>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in some
>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>
>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>
>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of confusion
>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model (up to
>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to say
>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the sentence is
>>> true.
>>>
>>
>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>> model.)
>
> By what-so-ever process that an expression of language is shown to be
> true that is its proof. If an expression of language is true in the
> standard model of arithmetic then it is provable in the standard model
> of arithmetic.
>
"Provable in the standard model of arithmetic" does not make sense. And
GIT is concerned with provability in particular formal systems.
> It is not the case that the standard model of arithmetic shows that an
> expression of language is true on the basis of a wild guess. There are a
> sequence of steps that show that this expression of language is true in
> this model and this sequence of steps is the proof of this expression of
> language in this model.
>
>> And after all, the interest in all this comes from wanting to
>> understand proofs about /regular/ arithmetic - the additional models
>> here are sort of an annoyance we can't avoid in FOL.
>>
>> @Jeff: I'll try to explain /why/ there are models in which G is true
>> and also models in which ¬G is true. In the end, if you simply don't
>> believe me you can always check elsewhere e.g. on StackExchange.
>> (This isn't a controversial or obscure claim - just regular FOL
>> stuff. Maybe someone has already asked this, or you could ask a new
>> question.)
>>
>> The key results needed are:
>> 1) If a theory T /doesn't/ prove a sentence ¬P, then we can
>> consistently add P to the theory. (I.e. the new theory
>> T + {P} is also consistent.)
>> 2) The completeness theorem for FOL, in one of it's forms, says
>> that if a theory T is consistent if and only if it has a model.
>>
>> (1) Seems reasonable, and is actually the principle of Reductio Ad
>> Absurdum (RAA) in disguise. For suppose that assuming P in addition
>> to the theory T allows us to deduce a contradiction. Now RAA says
>> that we can deduce ¬P in the original T. Turning this around, it
>> follows that if we /can't/ deduce ¬P in T, then T + {P} must be
>> consistent.
>>
>> [Of course, just quoting a name RAA doesn't constitute a proof, but
>> there is indeed a proof that the principle holds within FOL systems -
>> although the details for this depend completely on exactly what proof
>> calculus is being employed, and there are probably dozens of
>> variations here! (Hilbert style, analytic tableaux, natural deduction
>> style, sequent calculus and so on.)]
>>
>> (2) is a key (and well known) result of FOL.
>>
>> Anyway, given (1) and (2) we can see:
>>
>> - G is not provable in T [Godel proves this]
>> - so T + {¬G} is consistent [(1) above]
>> - so T + {¬G} has a model [(2) above]
>> - in that model, ¬G is true, and so G is false.
>>
>> A similar argument applies with ¬G in place of G, so there are models
>> where G is false, and models where G is true.
>>
>> Regards,
>> Mike.
>>
>
>
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-15 12:00 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <KJednSotB8iNHRXCnZ2dnUU7-IHNnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23863 |
On 10/15/2020 11:54 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
> On 15/10/2020 17:06, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/15/2020 9:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>
>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>> <cut>
>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of arithmetic
>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>
>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in some
>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>
>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>
>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of confusion
>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
>>>> (up to
>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to say
>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the sentence is
>>>> true.
>>>>
>>>
>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>> model.)
>>
>> By what-so-ever process that an expression of language is shown to be
>> true that is its proof. If an expression of language is true in the
>> standard model of arithmetic then it is provable in the standard model
>> of arithmetic.
>>
>
> "Provable in the standard model of arithmetic" does not make sense.
How so?
We have PA and the application of PA to the domain of natural numbers.
By what-so-ever sequence of steps that any expression-of-language is
shown to be true is the formal proof of this expression-of-language even
if conventional terms-of-the-art do not call it this.
--
Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-15 21:12 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <y6Wdne0mdZOJMBXCnZ2dnUU78YPNnZ2d@brightview.co.uk> |
| In reply to | #23864 |
On 15/10/2020 18:00, olcott wrote:
> On 10/15/2020 11:54 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>> On 15/10/2020 17:06, olcott wrote:
>>> On 10/15/2020 9:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>> <cut>
>>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are independent
>>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in
>>>>>> some
>>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>>
>>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
>>>>> confusion
>>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the formal
>>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
>>>>> (up to
>>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to
>>>>> say
>>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
>>>>> sentence is
>>>>> true.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
>>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>>> model.)
>>>
>>> By what-so-ever process that an expression of language is shown to be
>>> true that is its proof. If an expression of language is true in the
>>> standard model of arithmetic then it is provable in the standard model
>>> of arithmetic.
>>>
>>
>> "Provable in the standard model of arithmetic" does not make sense.
>
> How so?
Because things are proved in formal logic systems, for example in PA or
in Robinson's Q, or whatever. The standard model of arithmetic is just
a language structure (a domain, with operations of addition,
multiplication etc. defined). It is not a proof system, and statements
are not "proved" in it.
Also there are informal (regular mathematical) proofs, although that is
really a different use of the word "proof". Many authors prefer the
phrase "derivation" for the first kind of proof to avoid this kind of
confusion. Godel's GIT is concerned with derivations in particular
formal systems rather than informal proofs.
Mike.
[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]
| From | olcott <NoOne@NoWhere.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-15 15:33 -0500 |
| Message-ID | <4cadnecttMBmLBXCnZ2dnUU7-d_NnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #23873 |
On 10/15/2020 3:12 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
> On 15/10/2020 18:00, olcott wrote:
>> On 10/15/2020 11:54 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>> On 15/10/2020 17:06, olcott wrote:
>>>> On 10/15/2020 9:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>> <cut>
>>>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
>>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision that
>>>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers
>>>>>>>> {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are
>>>>>>> independent
>>>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in
>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
>>>>>> confusion
>>>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the
>>>>>> formal
>>>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
>>>>>> (up to
>>>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to
>>>>>> say
>>>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>>>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
>>>>>> sentence is
>>>>>> true.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
>>>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>>>> model.)
>>>>
>>>> By what-so-ever process that an expression of language is shown to be
>>>> true that is its proof. If an expression of language is true in the
>>>> standard model of arithmetic then it is provable in the standard model
>>>> of arithmetic.
>>>>
>>>
>>> "Provable in the standard model of arithmetic" does not make sense.
>>
>> How so?
>
> Because things are proved in formal logic systems, for example in PA or
> in Robinson's Q, or whatever. The standard model of arithmetic is just
> a language structure (a domain, with operations of addition,
> multiplication etc. defined). It is not a proof system, and statements
> are not "proved" in it.
>
How can be have an operation of addition be defined for the domain of
natural numbers such that 2 + 3 = 5 is not proved?
There is some thingie called addition and there are other thingies
called natural numbers and some how these thingies do something or other.
--
Copyright 2020 Pete Olcott
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| From | Mike Terry <news.dead.person.stones@darjeeling.plus.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2020-10-15 23:23 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <Ic-dnTVwhO5XVhXCnZ2dnUU78b3NnZ2d@brightview.co.uk> |
| In reply to | #23876 |
On 15/10/2020 21:33, olcott wrote:
> On 10/15/2020 3:12 PM, Mike Terry wrote:
>> On 15/10/2020 18:00, olcott wrote:
>>> On 10/15/2020 11:54 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>> On 15/10/2020 17:06, olcott wrote:
>>>>> On 10/15/2020 9:57 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>> On 14/10/2020 22:59, Ben Bacarisse wrote:
>>>>>>> Jeff Barnett <jbb@notatt.com> writes:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 10/14/2020 8:15 AM, Mike Terry wrote:
>>>>>>> <cut>
>>>>>>>>> I think the difference here is really that for theories of
>>>>>>>>> arithmetic
>>>>>>>>> we're much clearer in our heads regarding what is the /intended/
>>>>>>>>> model. Maybe for set theory it's not even possible to be "clear in
>>>>>>>>> our heads" about its intended model? OK, we can say it's the
>>>>>>>>> cumulative hierarchy of well-founded sets, but can we envision
>>>>>>>>> that
>>>>>>>>> as clearly as we can the familiar natural numbers
>>>>>>>>> {0,1,2,3,...}? (I
>>>>>>>>> think clearly not, but this is way beyond me!)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Let me try this a different way: Choice and Continuum are
>>>>>>>> independent
>>>>>>>> of the other axioms of ZF set theory. I don't believe the Godel
>>>>>>>> constructed sentence is independent, i.e., that it can be true in
>>>>>>>> some
>>>>>>>> models and false in others.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Ben, do you have anything to say about this point?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Gosh, not really. I am no expect, but one possible source of
>>>>>>> confusion
>>>>>>> is that Gödel's paper uses (a slightly modified version of) the
>>>>>>> formal
>>>>>>> system in Principia Mathematica for which there is only one model
>>>>>>> (up to
>>>>>>> isomorphism). Thus "true but un-provable" is a reasonable thing to
>>>>>>> say
>>>>>>> in that context. But I see that first-order theories have been
>>>>>>> mentioned in this thread and in these, the existence of models other
>>>>>>> than the intended one does not allow one to assert that the
>>>>>>> sentence is
>>>>>>> true.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Well, we can say the sentence is true, considered as an arithmetic
>>>>>> statement about regular natural numbers, even if it is false in other
>>>>>> non-standard contexts. (I.e. we can say it's true in the standard
>>>>>> model.)
>>>>>
>>>>> By what-so-ever process that an expression of language is shown to be
>>>>> true that is its proof. If an expression of language is true in the
>>>>> standard model of arithmetic then it is provable in the standard model
>>>>> of arithmetic.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> "Provable in the standard model of arithmetic" does not make sense.
>>>
>>> How so?
>>
>> Because things are proved in formal logic systems, for example in PA
>> or in Robinson's Q, or whatever. The standard model of arithmetic is
>> just a language structure (a domain, with operations of addition,
>> multiplication etc. defined). It is not a proof system, and
>> statements are not "proved" in it.
>>
>
> How can be have an operation of addition be defined for the domain of
> natural numbers such that 2 + 3 = 5 is not proved?
>
Well, "2 + 3 = 5" is /true/ "in the standard model", because when we
take the interpretations in the model of the terms "2" and "3" and "5",
we get the individuals (natural numbers) 2 and 3 and 5 respectively, and
the interpretation of "+" in the model is the operation of ordinary
addition, and sure enough, 2 + 3 = 5 holds as a statement in the natural
numbers.
But I don't think that's what you were asking.
No notion of proving anything in a formal system was involved in my
first paragraph, as we haven't even made clear what formal system is
being considered. That is, we've not specified a "proof calculus"
(saying what constitutes a valid proof/derivation in the formal system)
or which axioms we are employing that pin down the "theory" we are
working within.
Both the theories PA (FOL version of Peano's Axioms) and Q have axioms
that are sufficient to enable 2 + 3 = 5 to be proved/derived within
those logical systems. I think it's fair to say that a theory that
lacked any derivation for "2 + 3 = 5" wouldn't warrent being referred to
as a "theory of arithmetic".
If you are asking literally how could we come up with a formal system
which has the standard model of arithmetic as a model of that system,
but where we can't derive "2 + 3 = 5" then one obvious way to do this
would be to take Q or PA, and remove all axioms relating to addition and
multiplication. It should be obvious that now that we could no longer
derive "2 + 3 = 5" in that system.
Mike.
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