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Groups > comp.os.linux.networking > #800 > unrolled thread
| Started by | General Schvantzkoph <schvantzkoph@yahoo.com> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2011-11-14 19:15 +0000 |
| Last post | 2011-12-01 14:37 -0800 |
| Articles | 4 — 4 participants |
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ssh security question General Schvantzkoph <schvantzkoph@yahoo.com> - 2011-11-14 19:15 +0000
Re: ssh security question Jorgen Grahn <grahn+nntp@snipabacken.se> - 2011-11-14 20:02 +0000
Re: ssh security question Richard Kettlewell <rjk@greenend.org.uk> - 2011-11-14 21:05 +0000
Re: ssh security question David Schwartz <davids@webmaster.com> - 2011-12-01 14:37 -0800
| From | General Schvantzkoph <schvantzkoph@yahoo.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2011-11-14 19:15 +0000 |
| Subject | ssh security question |
| Message-ID | <9id7mmF8mjU1@mid.individual.net> |
I just regenerated the keys on one of my F14 systems. I am still able to access systems which don't have the new public key in their authorized_keys file. The one thing I did differently this time was that I did an ssh-add after I regenerated the keys. I did the ssh-add because putting the new public key into the authorized_keys files of my other systems wasn't sufficient to give me access. After the ssh-add I could access the other systems, however I could also access systems that don't have the new authorized_keys file. Does ssh-add keep the old keys in the authentication agent as well as the new key? This would negate the value of changing keys if true.
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| From | Jorgen Grahn <grahn+nntp@snipabacken.se> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2011-11-14 20:02 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <slrnjc2su0.1bk.grahn+nntp@frailea.sa.invalid> |
| In reply to | #800 |
On Mon, 2011-11-14, General Schvantzkoph wrote: ... > Does ssh-add keep the old keys in the authentication agent as well as the > new key? Ask your agent: ssh-add -l > This would negate the value of changing keys if true. If you delete your old key and plan to keep the agent running for a long time, you should probably remove the old key from the agent too, yes. Once again, use ssh-add to do that. /Jorgen -- // Jorgen Grahn <grahn@ Oo o. . . \X/ snipabacken.se> O o .
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| From | Richard Kettlewell <rjk@greenend.org.uk> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2011-11-14 21:05 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <8739dqtnws.fsf@araminta.anjou.terraraq.org.uk> |
| In reply to | #800 |
General Schvantzkoph <schvantzkoph@yahoo.com> writes: > I just regenerated the keys on one of my F14 systems. I am still able to > access systems which don't have the new public key in their > authorized_keys file. The one thing I did differently this time was that I > did an ssh-add after I regenerated the keys. I did the ssh-add because > putting the new public key into the authorized_keys files of my other > systems wasn't sufficient to give me access. After the ssh-add I could > access the other systems, however I could also access systems that don't > have the new authorized_keys file. > > Does ssh-add keep the old keys in the authentication agent as well as the > new key? This would negate the value of changing keys if true. I disagree. If you want to revoke the old key, you need to remove its public half from all the authorized_keys files that list it. -- http://www.greenend.org.uk/rjk/
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| From | David Schwartz <davids@webmaster.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2011-12-01 14:37 -0800 |
| Message-ID | <ca6ed6d1-f19a-4a6e-8630-4b56b6587409@w3g2000vbw.googlegroups.com> |
| In reply to | #800 |
On Nov 14, 11:15 am, General Schvantzkoph <schvantzk...@yahoo.com> wrote: > Does ssh-add keep the old keys in the authentication agent as well as the > new key? This would negate the value of changing keys if true. There's no point in changing keys. The point is in changing *locks*. Sure, if you change the locks on your back door, there's no security advantage to throwing away the key to your front door. But if you change *locks* so that only a new key is accepted *by* *the* *lock*, then there's a security advantage. Throwing away a key conveys no security advantage. That's is correct. DS
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