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Re: comp.lang.prolog Frequently Asked Questions

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From Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm>
Newsgroups comp.lang.prolog
Subject Re: comp.lang.prolog Frequently Asked Questions
Date Fri, 20 Sep 2024 20:38:55 +0200
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The problem is the analogue of
the pager explosion:

 > package manager directly talks to https

Thats correct, I get:

 > ?- setting(prolog_pack:server, ServerBase).
 > ServerBase = 'https://www.swi-prolog.org/pack/'.

The pack server could nevertheless act as a
multiplier of malicious software. For example
if we look at supply chain attacks, then the
weakest link determines the overall security.

How do you initially compute the hash? @kuniaki.mukai
page doesn’t have HTTP to HTTPS promotion, and
here he has published a HTTP url:

Package “pac”
1.9.8 526129e98f3910766eace5d63eaf7097739a7c5b 3 
http://web.sfc.keio.ac.jp/~mukai/pac-1.9.8.tgz

https://www.swi-prolog.org/pack/list?p=pac

And the hash is listed side by side with a
HTTP URL, doesn’t make much sense to me,
since its not a HTTPS URL. A hacker can use
this as a gateway to distribute a tampered

.tar that automatically has a tampered hash.
And its not a blockchain and/or distributed,
you compute the hash from the downloaded .tar

alone at client side, and what is computed at
client side is identical to the server side,
so there is no additional security. Or maybe

there is additional security? How is the pack
upload realized on the packager side? I don’t know…

Mild Shock schrieb:
> Since spoofing GIT content is so easy and
> non-sandboxed Prolog code is a rather sensitive
> thing, I guess this is why bother with HTTPS
> 
> and a HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security)
> policy could be important. SWI-Prolog packs are
> non-sandboxed, unlike SWISH notebooks, right?
> 
> Here is what ChatGPT says:
> 
> An HTTP to HTTPS redirect vulnerability occurs
> when an insecure HTTP connection is used to
> redirect users to a secure HTTPS connection,
> but the initial HTTP request is not adequately
> protected. Here’s how this vulnerability might be exploited:
> 
> - Man-in-the-Middle Attack (MitM): Since HTTP is
> unencrypted, an attacker intercepting the
> initial HTTP request could manipulate the
> redirection process before the user reaches
> the secure HTTPS site. This could involve:
> 
> * Redirecting the user to a malicious site that
> looks identical to the intended destination.
> * Modifying the content in transit, such as
> injecting malicious scripts.
> 
> - Downgrade Attacks: Attackers could attempt to
> keep users on an HTTP connection instead of
> redirecting them to HTTPS, leaving communication
> vulnerable to eavesdropping or tampering.
> 
> The severity of an HTTP to HTTPS redirect
> vulnerability can vary depending on the
> context, but it is generally considered
> moderate to high, depending on the following factors:
> 
> - Moderate: For non-sensitive sites where the
> main risk is traffic manipulation (e.g., content
> modification or ads injection) without
> significant consequences.
> 
> - High: For sites handling sensitive user data
> (e.g., financial services, medical information),
> especially when users are likely to connect
> over insecure networks like public Wi-Fi.

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comp.lang.prolog Frequently Asked Questions Markus Triska <triska@logic.at> - 2024-09-16 04:59 +0000
  broken and insecure links (Was: comp.lang.prolog Frequently Asked Questions) Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2024-09-20 10:02 +0200
    Re: broken and insecure links (Was: comp.lang.prolog Frequently Asked Questions) Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2024-09-20 10:39 +0200
      Re: broken and insecure links (Was: comp.lang.prolog Frequently Asked Questions) Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2024-09-20 10:42 +0200
        Re: broken and insecure links (Was: comp.lang.prolog Frequently Asked Questions) Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2024-09-20 10:59 +0200
          Re: broken and insecure links (Was: comp.lang.prolog Frequently Asked Questions) Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2024-09-20 11:19 +0200
  Re: comp.lang.prolog Frequently Asked Questions Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2024-09-20 14:04 +0200
    Re: comp.lang.prolog Frequently Asked Questions Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2024-09-20 20:38 +0200
      Re: comp.lang.prolog Frequently Asked Questions Mild Shock <janburse@fastmail.fm> - 2024-09-20 20:41 +0200

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