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Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot

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  Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> - 2016-02-04 02:16 -0500
    Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> - 2016-02-04 17:20 +0000
      Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> - 2016-02-04 16:54 -0500
        Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> - 2016-02-05 02:51 +0000
          Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> - 2016-02-05 11:17 -0800
            Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> - 2016-02-05 21:15 +0000
              Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> - 2016-02-05 18:07 -0800
                Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> - 2016-02-06 02:53 +0000
                  Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> - 2016-02-05 21:22 -0800
                    Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> - 2016-02-06 16:36 +0000
                      Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot Nathan Hale <nobody@remailer.org.uk> - 2016-02-07 07:28 +0000
                      Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot Anonymous <nobody@mixmin.net> - 2016-02-28 02:18 +0000
                        Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> - 2016-02-27 23:27 -0500
                          Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot Anonymous <nobody@mixmin.net> - 2016-03-01 04:42 +0000
    Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot Anonymous <nobody@mixmin.net> - 2016-02-24 21:47 +0000
      Re: Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot Nathan Hale <nobody@remailer.org.uk> - 2016-02-25 06:40 +0000

#5710 — Socat vulnerability shows that crypto backdoors can be hard to spot

Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a 
cryptographic flaw that left communications open to 
eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that 
members of the security community believe it could be an 
intentional backdoor.

http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
spot.html?google_editors_picks=true

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#5711

On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
> Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a 
> cryptographic flaw that left communications open to 
> eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that 
> members of the security community believe it could be an 
> intentional backdoor.
>
> http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
> vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
> spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
>

It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
checked by someone other than the proposer.
I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.

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#5712

In article <n9018u$ufq$1@dont-email.me>
William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
>
> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
> > Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
> > cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
> > eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
> > members of the security community believe it could be an
> > intentional backdoor.
> >
> > http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
> > vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
> > spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
> >
>
> It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
> prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
> straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
> very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
> that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
> checked by someone other than the proposer.

Couldn't you just fix this yourself by generating a new key and 
using it?

> I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
> believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.

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#5713

On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
> In article <n9018u$ufq$1@dont-email.me>
> William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
>>
>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>> > Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
>> > cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
>> > eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
>> > members of the security community believe it could be an
>> > intentional backdoor.
>> >
>> > http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
>> > vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
>> > spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
>> >
>>
>> It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
>> prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
>> straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
>> very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
>> that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
>> checked by someone other than the proposer.
>
> Couldn't you just fix this yourself by generating a new key and 
> using it?

Both sides need to use the same prime. In this case I guess they insist
on both using their "prime" (which is public knowledge). But their prime
was not prime meaning that deriving g^ab from g^a and g^b (all mod p, the
so called prime) became easier. Ie, no they want you to use theirs. 

>
>> I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
>> believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.

I guess it does work. All you use p for is to generate a key which you
can use in some other program (eg AES).

In RSA you actually use the primes to encrypt, and if they are not
primes, there is a chance (how big?) that the decryption of the
encryption will not give the original message. 



>

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#5714

On 02/04/16 18:51, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>> In article <n9018u$ufq$1@dont-email.me>
>> William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
>>>
>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>> Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
>>>> cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
>>>> eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
>>>> members of the security community believe it could be an
>>>> intentional backdoor.
>>>>
>>>> http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
>>>> vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
>>>> spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
>>>>
>>>
>>> It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
>>> prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
>>> straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
>>> very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
>>> that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
>>> checked by someone other than the proposer.
>>
>> Couldn't you just fix this yourself by generating a new key and 
>> using it?
> 
> Both sides need to use the same prime. In this case I guess they insist
> on both using their "prime" (which is public knowledge). But their prime
> was not prime meaning that deriving g^ab from g^a and g^b (all mod p, the
> so called prime) became easier. Ie, no they want you to use theirs. 
> 
>>
>>> I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
>>> believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.
> 
> I guess it does work. All you use p for is to generate a key which you
> can use in some other program (eg AES).
> 
> In RSA you actually use the primes to encrypt, and if they are not
> primes, there is a chance (how big?) that the decryption of the
> encryption will not give the original message. 

I suspect it's actually simpler than that - multiple key solutions for
non-prime [hence, non-secure]

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#5715

On 2016-02-05, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
> On 02/04/16 18:51, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>> In article <n9018u$ufq$1@dont-email.me>
>>> William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>>> Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
>>>>> cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
>>>>> eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
>>>>> members of the security community believe it could be an
>>>>> intentional backdoor.
>>>>>
>>>>> http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
>>>>> vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
>>>>> spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
>>>> prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
>>>> straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
>>>> very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
>>>> that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
>>>> checked by someone other than the proposer.
>>>
>>> Couldn't you just fix this yourself by generating a new key and 
>>> using it?
>> 
>> Both sides need to use the same prime. In this case I guess they insist
>> on both using their "prime" (which is public knowledge). But their prime
>> was not prime meaning that deriving g^ab from g^a and g^b (all mod p, the
>> so called prime) became easier. Ie, no they want you to use theirs. 
>> 
>>>
>>>> I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
>>>> believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.
>> 
>> I guess it does work. All you use p for is to generate a key which you
>> can use in some other program (eg AES).
>> 
>> In RSA you actually use the primes to encrypt, and if they are not
>> primes, there is a chance (how big?) that the decryption of the
>> encryption will not give the original message. 
>
> I suspect it's actually simpler than that - multiple key solutions for
> non-prime [hence, non-secure]
>
>

Depends on how hard it is to find one of those solutions. If it for
example only takes half the work to find one of two vs the time to find
a unique one, that is hardly less secure. If there are or order e^p more
solutions, then it would of course be trivial. But it is certainly
somewhere in between. Does it depend on the size of the largest factor?
the smallest factor? Ie, knowing g^a and g^b (mod p) how mush easier is
it to find g^ab (mod p)  if p is composite than if it is prime?

>

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#5716

On 02/05/16 13:15, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
> On 2016-02-05, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
>> On 02/04/16 18:51, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>> In article <n9018u$ufq$1@dont-email.me>
>>>> William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>>>> Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
>>>>>> cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
>>>>>> eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
>>>>>> members of the security community believe it could be an
>>>>>> intentional backdoor.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
>>>>>> vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
>>>>>> spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
>>>>> prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
>>>>> straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
>>>>> very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
>>>>> that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
>>>>> checked by someone other than the proposer.
>>>>
>>>> Couldn't you just fix this yourself by generating a new key and 
>>>> using it?
>>>
>>> Both sides need to use the same prime. In this case I guess they insist
>>> on both using their "prime" (which is public knowledge). But their prime
>>> was not prime meaning that deriving g^ab from g^a and g^b (all mod p, the
>>> so called prime) became easier. Ie, no they want you to use theirs. 
>>>
>>>>
>>>>> I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
>>>>> believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.
>>>
>>> I guess it does work. All you use p for is to generate a key which you
>>> can use in some other program (eg AES).
>>>
>>> In RSA you actually use the primes to encrypt, and if they are not
>>> primes, there is a chance (how big?) that the decryption of the
>>> encryption will not give the original message. 
>>
>> I suspect it's actually simpler than that - multiple key solutions for
>> non-prime [hence, non-secure]
>>
>>
> 
> Depends on how hard it is to find one of those solutions. If it for
> example only takes half the work to find one of two vs the time to find
> a unique one, that is hardly less secure. If there are or order e^p more
> solutions, then it would of course be trivial. But it is certainly
> somewhere in between. Does it depend on the size of the largest factor?
> the smallest factor? Ie, knowing g^a and g^b (mod p) how mush easier is
> it to find g^ab (mod p)  if p is composite than if it is prime?
> 
>>

yeah, some people that like mathematics for the sake of mathematics
might want to derive that.  Me, I just think in practical terms:  if it
takes half as many bots or half as many [stolen] cloudy threads to crack
my key, or it's done in HALF the time because multiple solutions exist
[due to use of non-prime], I think I'll take the extra few bits and use
primes...

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#5717

On 2016-02-06, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
> On 02/05/16 13:15, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>> On 2016-02-05, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
>>> On 02/04/16 18:51, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>>> In article <n9018u$ufq$1@dont-email.me>
>>>>> William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>>>>> Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
>>>>>>> cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
>>>>>>> eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
>>>>>>> members of the security community believe it could be an
>>>>>>> intentional backdoor.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
>>>>>>> vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
>>>>>>> spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
>>>>>> prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
>>>>>> straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
>>>>>> very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
>>>>>> that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
>>>>>> checked by someone other than the proposer.
>>>>>
>>>>> Couldn't you just fix this yourself by generating a new key and 
>>>>> using it?
>>>>
>>>> Both sides need to use the same prime. In this case I guess they insist
>>>> on both using their "prime" (which is public knowledge). But their prime
>>>> was not prime meaning that deriving g^ab from g^a and g^b (all mod p, the
>>>> so called prime) became easier. Ie, no they want you to use theirs. 
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
>>>>>> believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.
>>>>
>>>> I guess it does work. All you use p for is to generate a key which you
>>>> can use in some other program (eg AES).
>>>>
>>>> In RSA you actually use the primes to encrypt, and if they are not
>>>> primes, there is a chance (how big?) that the decryption of the
>>>> encryption will not give the original message. 
>>>
>>> I suspect it's actually simpler than that - multiple key solutions for
>>> non-prime [hence, non-secure]
>>>
>>>
>> 
>> Depends on how hard it is to find one of those solutions. If it for
>> example only takes half the work to find one of two vs the time to find
>> a unique one, that is hardly less secure. If there are or order e^p more
>> solutions, then it would of course be trivial. But it is certainly
>> somewhere in between. Does it depend on the size of the largest factor?
>> the smallest factor? Ie, knowing g^a and g^b (mod p) how mush easier is
>> it to find g^ab (mod p)  if p is composite than if it is prime?
>> 
>>>
>
> yeah, some people that like mathematics for the sake of mathematics
> might want to derive that.  Me, I just think in practical terms:  if it
> takes half as many bots or half as many [stolen] cloudy threads to crack
> my key, or it's done in HALF the time because multiple solutions exist
> [due to use of non-prime], I think I'll take the extra few bits and use
> primes...
>
Since the time might be a billion times the age of the universe, that
this would be half a billion times the age of the universe, your
position would be silly if that is what you based it on. After all
simply using two computers instead of one, also halves the time. 
Now I would strongly urge you to use a prime, and I suspect that the
reduction in time is much more than a factor of 2.  But it would be
intellectually interesting to know how much. 

By the way, has anyone managed to factor the "p" that was actually used?
What is the largest factor?

>

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#5718

On 02/05/16 18:53, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
> On 2016-02-06, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
>> On 02/05/16 13:15, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>>> On 2016-02-05, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
>>>> On 02/04/16 18:51, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>>>> In article <n9018u$ufq$1@dont-email.me>
>>>>>> William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>> Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
>>>>>>>> cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
>>>>>>>> eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
>>>>>>>> members of the security community believe it could be an
>>>>>>>> intentional backdoor.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
>>>>>>>> vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
>>>>>>>> spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
>>>>>>> prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
>>>>>>> straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
>>>>>>> very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
>>>>>>> that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
>>>>>>> checked by someone other than the proposer.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Couldn't you just fix this yourself by generating a new key and 
>>>>>> using it?
>>>>>
>>>>> Both sides need to use the same prime. In this case I guess they insist
>>>>> on both using their "prime" (which is public knowledge). But their prime
>>>>> was not prime meaning that deriving g^ab from g^a and g^b (all mod p, the
>>>>> so called prime) became easier. Ie, no they want you to use theirs. 
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
>>>>>>> believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.
>>>>>
>>>>> I guess it does work. All you use p for is to generate a key which you
>>>>> can use in some other program (eg AES).
>>>>>
>>>>> In RSA you actually use the primes to encrypt, and if they are not
>>>>> primes, there is a chance (how big?) that the decryption of the
>>>>> encryption will not give the original message. 
>>>>
>>>> I suspect it's actually simpler than that - multiple key solutions for
>>>> non-prime [hence, non-secure]
>>>>
>>>>
>>>
>>> Depends on how hard it is to find one of those solutions. If it for
>>> example only takes half the work to find one of two vs the time to find
>>> a unique one, that is hardly less secure. If there are or order e^p more
>>> solutions, then it would of course be trivial. But it is certainly
>>> somewhere in between. Does it depend on the size of the largest factor?
>>> the smallest factor? Ie, knowing g^a and g^b (mod p) how mush easier is
>>> it to find g^ab (mod p)  if p is composite than if it is prime?
>>>
>>>>
>>
>> yeah, some people that like mathematics for the sake of mathematics
>> might want to derive that.  Me, I just think in practical terms:  if it
>> takes half as many bots or half as many [stolen] cloudy threads to crack
>> my key, or it's done in HALF the time because multiple solutions exist
>> [due to use of non-prime], I think I'll take the extra few bits and use
>> primes...
>>
> Since the time might be a billion times the age of the universe, that
> this would be half a billion times the age of the universe, your
> position would be silly if that is what you based it on. After all
> simply using two computers instead of one, also halves the time. 
> Now I would strongly urge you to use a prime, and I suspect that the
> reduction in time is much more than a factor of 2.  But it would be
> intellectually interesting to know how much. 

well, considering how keys though "uncrackable" as little as 10 years
ago are now crackable using cloud services or distributed nodes of some
kind, sometimes in 'real time' enough to be useful.  anyway, never hurts
to make it as secure as possible [and that's the point].

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#5719

On 2016-02-06, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
> On 02/05/16 18:53, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>> On 2016-02-06, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
>>> On 02/05/16 13:15, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>>>> On 2016-02-05, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
>>>>> On 02/04/16 18:51, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>>>>> In article <n9018u$ufq$1@dont-email.me>
>>>>>>> William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
>>>>>>>>> cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
>>>>>>>>> eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
>>>>>>>>> members of the security community believe it could be an
>>>>>>>>> intentional backdoor.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
>>>>>>>>> vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
>>>>>>>>> spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
>>>>>>>> prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
>>>>>>>> straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
>>>>>>>> very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
>>>>>>>> that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
>>>>>>>> checked by someone other than the proposer.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Couldn't you just fix this yourself by generating a new key and 
>>>>>>> using it?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Both sides need to use the same prime. In this case I guess they insist
>>>>>> on both using their "prime" (which is public knowledge). But their prime
>>>>>> was not prime meaning that deriving g^ab from g^a and g^b (all mod p, the
>>>>>> so called prime) became easier. Ie, no they want you to use theirs. 
>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
>>>>>>>> believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I guess it does work. All you use p for is to generate a key which you
>>>>>> can use in some other program (eg AES).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In RSA you actually use the primes to encrypt, and if they are not
>>>>>> primes, there is a chance (how big?) that the decryption of the
>>>>>> encryption will not give the original message. 
>>>>>
>>>>> I suspect it's actually simpler than that - multiple key solutions for
>>>>> non-prime [hence, non-secure]
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Depends on how hard it is to find one of those solutions. If it for
>>>> example only takes half the work to find one of two vs the time to find
>>>> a unique one, that is hardly less secure. If there are or order e^p more
>>>> solutions, then it would of course be trivial. But it is certainly
>>>> somewhere in between. Does it depend on the size of the largest factor?
>>>> the smallest factor? Ie, knowing g^a and g^b (mod p) how mush easier is
>>>> it to find g^ab (mod p)  if p is composite than if it is prime?
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>
>>> yeah, some people that like mathematics for the sake of mathematics
>>> might want to derive that.  Me, I just think in practical terms:  if it
>>> takes half as many bots or half as many [stolen] cloudy threads to crack
>>> my key, or it's done in HALF the time because multiple solutions exist
>>> [due to use of non-prime], I think I'll take the extra few bits and use
>>> primes...
>>>
>> Since the time might be a billion times the age of the universe, that
>> this would be half a billion times the age of the universe, your
>> position would be silly if that is what you based it on. After all
>> simply using two computers instead of one, also halves the time. 
>> Now I would strongly urge you to use a prime, and I suspect that the
>> reduction in time is much more than a factor of 2.  But it would be
>> intellectually interesting to know how much. 
>
> well, considering how keys though "uncrackable" as little as 10 years
> ago are now crackable using cloud services or distributed nodes of some
> kind, sometimes in 'real time' enough to be useful.  anyway, never hurts
> to make it as secure as possible [and that's the point].

No, that is never the point. to make it as secure as possible disconnect
your computer from all networks remove any wireless/bluetooth/...
devices, and install it in a concrete and copper lined room. Oh, you
want to do something else with it or do not have the money? But you said
the whole point was "make it as secure as possible". 

The question I was asking is how insecure does having a non-prime for DH
make it. If it requires 10 years of computation with 10million dollars
of equipment to make use of it, then, unless your secret is worth
billions, it is not too much of a treat. If it takes 2 min on a 1988 PC,
then it is a huge threat. 

I have done some googling, and it seems that if the factors are
small enough (eg 512 bits)  and if the number is used widely enough, it become
worthwhile precomputing a variety of things (what I am not sure of)
which allows breaking the encryption (finding g^ab from g^a and g^b)
"easily" And that if you make the factors large enough (eg 512 bits)  it it highly
unlikely that an examiner would be able to factor the number. (on the
other hand, testing that p is prime is not that hard). It also seems
that having many more systems use their own generated primes instead of
using universal primes (ie ones everyone else also uses) is not a good
idea. 
>
>
>

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#5720

In article <n957e3$4nq$1@dont-email.me>
William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
>
> On 2016-02-06, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
> > On 02/05/16 18:53, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
> >> On 2016-02-06, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
> >>> On 02/05/16 13:15, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
> >>>> On 2016-02-05, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
> >>>>> On 02/04/16 18:51, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
> >>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
> >>>>>>> In article <n9018u$ufq$1@dont-email.me>
> >>>>>>> William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>> Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
> >>>>>>>>> cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
> >>>>>>>>> eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
> >>>>>>>>> members of the security community believe it could be an
> >>>>>>>>> intentional backdoor.
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
> >>>>>>>>> vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
> >>>>>>>>> spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
> >>>>>>>> prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
> >>>>>>>> straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
> >>>>>>>> very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
> >>>>>>>> that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
> >>>>>>>> checked by someone other than the proposer.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Couldn't you just fix this yourself by generating a new key and
> >>>>>>> using it?
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> Both sides need to use the same prime. In this case I guess they insist
> >>>>>> on both using their "prime" (which is public knowledge). But their prime
> >>>>>> was not prime meaning that deriving g^ab from g^a and g^b (all mod p, the
> >>>>>> so called prime) became easier. Ie, no they want you to use theirs.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
> >>>>>>>> believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I guess it does work. All you use p for is to generate a key which you
> >>>>>> can use in some other program (eg AES).
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> In RSA you actually use the primes to encrypt, and if they are not
> >>>>>> primes, there is a chance (how big?) that the decryption of the
> >>>>>> encryption will not give the original message.
> >>>>>
> >>>>> I suspect it's actually simpler than that - multiple key solutions for
> >>>>> non-prime [hence, non-secure]
> >>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> Depends on how hard it is to find one of those solutions. If it for
> >>>> example only takes half the work to find one of two vs the time to find
> >>>> a unique one, that is hardly less secure. If there are or order e^p more
> >>>> solutions, then it would of course be trivial. But it is certainly
> >>>> somewhere in between. Does it depend on the size of the largest factor?
> >>>> the smallest factor? Ie, knowing g^a and g^b (mod p) how mush easier is
> >>>> it to find g^ab (mod p)  if p is composite than if it is prime?
> >>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>
> >>> yeah, some people that like mathematics for the sake of mathematics
> >>> might want to derive that.  Me, I just think in practical terms:  if it
> >>> takes half as many bots or half as many [stolen] cloudy threads to crack
> >>> my key, or it's done in HALF the time because multiple solutions exist
> >>> [due to use of non-prime], I think I'll take the extra few bits and use
> >>> primes...
> >>>
> >> Since the time might be a billion times the age of the universe, that
> >> this would be half a billion times the age of the universe, your
> >> position would be silly if that is what you based it on. After all
> >> simply using two computers instead of one, also halves the time.
> >> Now I would strongly urge you to use a prime, and I suspect that the
> >> reduction in time is much more than a factor of 2.  But it would be
> >> intellectually interesting to know how much.
> >
> > well, considering how keys though "uncrackable" as little as 10 years
> > ago are now crackable using cloud services or distributed nodes of some
> > kind, sometimes in 'real time' enough to be useful.  anyway, never hurts
> > to make it as secure as possible [and that's the point].
>
> No, that is never the point. to make it as secure as possible disconnect
> your computer from all networks remove any wireless/bluetooth/...
> devices, and install it in a concrete and copper lined room. Oh, you
> want to do something else with it or do not have the money? But you said
> the whole point was "make it as secure as possible".
>
> The question I was asking is how insecure does having a non-prime for DH
> make it. If it requires 10 years of computation with 10million dollars
> of equipment to make use of it, then, unless your secret is worth
> billions, it is not too much of a treat. If it takes 2 min on a 1988 PC,
> then it is a huge threat.
>
> I have done some googling, and it seems that if the factors are
> small enough (eg 512 bits)  and if the number is used widely enough, it become
> worthwhile precomputing a variety of things (what I am not sure of)
> which allows breaking the encryption (finding g^ab from g^a and g^b)
> "easily" And that if you make the factors large enough (eg 512 bits)  it it highly
> unlikely that an examiner would be able to factor the number. (on the
> other hand, testing that p is prime is not that hard). It also seems
> that having many more systems use their own generated primes instead of
> using universal primes (ie ones everyone else also uses) is not a good
> idea.

There is a lot of computing power in a bitcoin rig that can be 
harnessed to crack keys.  Just sayin'

https://securityledger.com/2012/12/new-25-gpu-monster-devours-
passwords-in-seconds/

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=87476.0

http://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/7236/bitcoin-mining-
asics-used-for-cryptographic-application-rainbow-tables/7264#7264

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#5727

William Unruh:
> On 2016-02-06, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
>> On 02/05/16 18:53, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>>> On 2016-02-06, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
>>>> On 02/05/16 13:15, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>>>>> On 2016-02-05, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
>>>>>> On 02/04/16 18:51, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>>>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>> In article <n9018u$ufq$1@dont-email.me>
>>>>>>>> William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
>>>>>>>>>> cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
>>>>>>>>>> eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
>>>>>>>>>> members of the security community believe it could be an
>>>>>>>>>> intentional backdoor.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
>>>>>>>>>> vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
>>>>>>>>>> spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
>>>>>>>>> prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
>>>>>>>>> straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
>>>>>>>>> very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
>>>>>>>>> that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
>>>>>>>>> checked by someone other than the proposer.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> Couldn't you just fix this yourself by generating a new key and 
>>>>>>>> using it?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Both sides need to use the same prime. In this case I guess they insist
>>>>>>> on both using their "prime" (which is public knowledge). But their prime
>>>>>>> was not prime meaning that deriving g^ab from g^a and g^b (all mod p, the
>>>>>>> so called prime) became easier. Ie, no they want you to use theirs. 
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
>>>>>>>>> believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I guess it does work. All you use p for is to generate a key which you
>>>>>>> can use in some other program (eg AES).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> In RSA you actually use the primes to encrypt, and if they are not
>>>>>>> primes, there is a chance (how big?) that the decryption of the
>>>>>>> encryption will not give the original message. 
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I suspect it's actually simpler than that - multiple key solutions for
>>>>>> non-prime [hence, non-secure]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Depends on how hard it is to find one of those solutions. If it for
>>>>> example only takes half the work to find one of two vs the time to find
>>>>> a unique one, that is hardly less secure. If there are or order e^p more
>>>>> solutions, then it would of course be trivial. But it is certainly
>>>>> somewhere in between. Does it depend on the size of the largest factor?
>>>>> the smallest factor? Ie, knowing g^a and g^b (mod p) how mush easier is
>>>>> it to find g^ab (mod p)  if p is composite than if it is prime?
>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> yeah, some people that like mathematics for the sake of mathematics
>>>> might want to derive that.  Me, I just think in practical terms:  if it
>>>> takes half as many bots or half as many [stolen] cloudy threads to crack
>>>> my key, or it's done in HALF the time because multiple solutions exist
>>>> [due to use of non-prime], I think I'll take the extra few bits and use
>>>> primes...
>>>>
>>> Since the time might be a billion times the age of the universe, that
>>> this would be half a billion times the age of the universe, your
>>> position would be silly if that is what you based it on. After all
>>> simply using two computers instead of one, also halves the time. 
>>> Now I would strongly urge you to use a prime, and I suspect that the
>>> reduction in time is much more than a factor of 2.  But it would be
>>> intellectually interesting to know how much. 
>>
>> well, considering how keys though "uncrackable" as little as 10 years
>> ago are now crackable using cloud services or distributed nodes of some
>> kind, sometimes in 'real time' enough to be useful.  anyway, never hurts
>> to make it as secure as possible [and that's the point].
> 
> No, that is never the point. to make it as secure as possible disconnect
> your computer from all networks remove any wireless/bluetooth/...
> devices, and install it in a concrete and copper lined room. Oh, you
> want to do something else with it or do not have the money? But you said
> the whole point was "make it as secure as possible". 

Security does not exist in a vacuum, idiot. It is not an absolute
condition existing separately from the environment in which you assess
it. An isolated system cannot be called secure or insecure because
security is a measure of how well a condition can be maintained relative
to the risks in would incur from vulnerability to environmental processes.

This is why we can say that one workstation is more secure than another
one while both exist in the same environment. Once you remove both from
enfironmental influences, both maintain their conditions relative to
each other. The concept of security entails a realization of being
secure from what. When conditions change, security changes, but security
does not exist in the absense of change.

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#5728

In article <natldo$g9$1@news.mixmin.net>
Anonymous <nobody@mixmin.net> wrote:
>
> William Unruh:
> > On 2016-02-06, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
> >> On 02/05/16 18:53, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
> >>> On 2016-02-06, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
> >>>> On 02/05/16 13:15, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
> >>>>> On 2016-02-05, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
> >>>>>> On 02/04/16 18:51, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
> >>>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
> >>>>>>>> In article <n9018u$ufq$1@dont-email.me>
> >>>>>>>> William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
> >>>>>>>>>> Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
> >>>>>>>>>> cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
> >>>>>>>>>> eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
> >>>>>>>>>> members of the security community believe it could be an
> >>>>>>>>>> intentional backdoor.
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>> http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
> >>>>>>>>>> vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
> >>>>>>>>>> spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
> >>>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
> >>>>>>>>> prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
> >>>>>>>>> straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
> >>>>>>>>> very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
> >>>>>>>>> that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
> >>>>>>>>> checked by someone other than the proposer.
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>> Couldn't you just fix this yourself by generating a new key and
> >>>>>>>> using it?
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Both sides need to use the same prime. In this case I guess they insist
> >>>>>>> on both using their "prime" (which is public knowledge). But their prime
> >>>>>>> was not prime meaning that deriving g^ab from g^a and g^b (all mod p, the
> >>>>>>> so called prime) became easier. Ie, no they want you to use theirs.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>
> >>>>>>>>> I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
> >>>>>>>>> believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> I guess it does work. All you use p for is to generate a key which you
> >>>>>>> can use in some other program (eg AES).
> >>>>>>>
> >>>>>>> In RSA you actually use the primes to encrypt, and if they are not
> >>>>>>> primes, there is a chance (how big?) that the decryption of the
> >>>>>>> encryption will not give the original message.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> I suspect it's actually simpler than that - multiple key solutions for
> >>>>>> non-prime [hence, non-secure]
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Depends on how hard it is to find one of those solutions. If it for
> >>>>> example only takes half the work to find one of two vs the time to find
> >>>>> a unique one, that is hardly less secure. If there are or order e^p more
> >>>>> solutions, then it would of course be trivial. But it is certainly
> >>>>> somewhere in between. Does it depend on the size of the largest factor?
> >>>>> the smallest factor? Ie, knowing g^a and g^b (mod p) how mush easier is
> >>>>> it to find g^ab (mod p)  if p is composite than if it is prime?
> >>>>>
> >>>>>>
> >>>>
> >>>> yeah, some people that like mathematics for the sake of mathematics
> >>>> might want to derive that.  Me, I just think in practical terms:  if it
> >>>> takes half as many bots or half as many [stolen] cloudy threads to crack
> >>>> my key, or it's done in HALF the time because multiple solutions exist
> >>>> [due to use of non-prime], I think I'll take the extra few bits and use
> >>>> primes...
> >>>>
> >>> Since the time might be a billion times the age of the universe, that
> >>> this would be half a billion times the age of the universe, your
> >>> position would be silly if that is what you based it on. After all
> >>> simply using two computers instead of one, also halves the time.
> >>> Now I would strongly urge you to use a prime, and I suspect that the
> >>> reduction in time is much more than a factor of 2.  But it would be
> >>> intellectually interesting to know how much.
> >>
> >> well, considering how keys though "uncrackable" as little as 10 years
> >> ago are now crackable using cloud services or distributed nodes of some
> >> kind, sometimes in 'real time' enough to be useful.  anyway, never hurts
> >> to make it as secure as possible [and that's the point].
> >
> > No, that is never the point. to make it as secure as possible disconnect
> > your computer from all networks remove any wireless/bluetooth/...
> > devices, and install it in a concrete and copper lined room. Oh, you
> > want to do something else with it or do not have the money? But you said
> > the whole point was "make it as secure as possible".
>
> Security does not exist in a vacuum, idiot. It is not an absolute
> condition existing separately from the environment in which you assess
> it. An isolated system cannot be called secure or insecure because
> security is a measure of how well a condition can be maintained relative
> to the risks in would incur from vulnerability to environmental processes.

You mean like if you were using it.

> This is why we can say that one workstation is more secure than another
> one while both exist in the same environment. Once you remove both from
> enfironmental influences, both maintain their conditions relative to
> each other. The concept of security entails a realization of being
> secure from what. When conditions change, security changes, but security
> does not exist in the absense of change.

How many fallacies can we spot in that last paragraph?

[toc] | [prev] | [next] | [standalone]

#5729

Anonymous:
> In article <natldo$g9$1@news.mixmin.net>
> Anonymous <nobody@mixmin.net> wrote:
>>
>> William Unruh:
>>> On 2016-02-06, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
>>>> On 02/05/16 18:53, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>>>>> On 2016-02-06, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
>>>>>> On 02/05/16 13:15, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>>>>>>> On 2016-02-05, Big Bad Bob <BigBadBob-at-mrp3-dot-com@testing.local> wrote:
>>>>>>>> On 02/04/16 18:51, William Unruh so wittily quipped:
>>>>>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>> In article <n9018u$ufq$1@dont-email.me>
>>>>>>>>>> William Unruh <unruh@invalid.ca> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> On 2016-02-04, Anonymous <anonymous@foto.nl1.torservers.net> wrote:
>>>>>>>>>>>> Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
>>>>>>>>>>>> cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
>>>>>>>>>>>> eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
>>>>>>>>>>>> members of the security community believe it could be an
>>>>>>>>>>>> intentional backdoor.
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>> http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
>>>>>>>>>>>> vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
>>>>>>>>>>>> spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
>>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> It contains a stupid statement. "Checking whether a 1024-bit number is
>>>>>>>>>>> prime is doable, but is not exactly straightforward." It is very
>>>>>>>>>>> straightforward, and very doable (RSA key generation does 10s to 100s in a
>>>>>>>>>>> very short time.) While probabilistic even deterministic checking is not
>>>>>>>>>>> that hard. Certainly the lesson is that a long term key should be
>>>>>>>>>>> checked by someone other than the proposer.
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>> Couldn't you just fix this yourself by generating a new key and
>>>>>>>>>> using it?
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> Both sides need to use the same prime. In this case I guess they insist
>>>>>>>>> on both using their "prime" (which is public knowledge). But their prime
>>>>>>>>> was not prime meaning that deriving g^ab from g^a and g^b (all mod p, the
>>>>>>>>> so called prime) became easier. Ie, no they want you to use theirs.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>>>> I did not even know that DH would work with a non-prime key. RSA I
>>>>>>>>>>> believe would fall over if you used a non-prime key.
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> I guess it does work. All you use p for is to generate a key which you
>>>>>>>>> can use in some other program (eg AES).
>>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>> In RSA you actually use the primes to encrypt, and if they are not
>>>>>>>>> primes, there is a chance (how big?) that the decryption of the
>>>>>>>>> encryption will not give the original message.
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> I suspect it's actually simpler than that - multiple key solutions for
>>>>>>>> non-prime [hence, non-secure]
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Depends on how hard it is to find one of those solutions. If it for
>>>>>>> example only takes half the work to find one of two vs the time to find
>>>>>>> a unique one, that is hardly less secure. If there are or order e^p more
>>>>>>> solutions, then it would of course be trivial. But it is certainly
>>>>>>> somewhere in between. Does it depend on the size of the largest factor?
>>>>>>> the smallest factor? Ie, knowing g^a and g^b (mod p) how mush easier is
>>>>>>> it to find g^ab (mod p)  if p is composite than if it is prime?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> yeah, some people that like mathematics for the sake of mathematics
>>>>>> might want to derive that.  Me, I just think in practical terms:  if it
>>>>>> takes half as many bots or half as many [stolen] cloudy threads to crack
>>>>>> my key, or it's done in HALF the time because multiple solutions exist
>>>>>> [due to use of non-prime], I think I'll take the extra few bits and use
>>>>>> primes...
>>>>>>
>>>>> Since the time might be a billion times the age of the universe, that
>>>>> this would be half a billion times the age of the universe, your
>>>>> position would be silly if that is what you based it on. After all
>>>>> simply using two computers instead of one, also halves the time.
>>>>> Now I would strongly urge you to use a prime, and I suspect that the
>>>>> reduction in time is much more than a factor of 2.  But it would be
>>>>> intellectually interesting to know how much.
>>>>
>>>> well, considering how keys though "uncrackable" as little as 10 years
>>>> ago are now crackable using cloud services or distributed nodes of some
>>>> kind, sometimes in 'real time' enough to be useful.  anyway, never hurts
>>>> to make it as secure as possible [and that's the point].
>>>
>>> No, that is never the point. to make it as secure as possible disconnect
>>> your computer from all networks remove any wireless/bluetooth/...
>>> devices, and install it in a concrete and copper lined room. Oh, you
>>> want to do something else with it or do not have the money? But you said
>>> the whole point was "make it as secure as possible".
>>
>> Security does not exist in a vacuum, idiot. It is not an absolute
>> condition existing separately from the environment in which you assess
>> it. An isolated system cannot be called secure or insecure because
>> security is a measure of how well a condition can be maintained relative
>> to the risks in would incur from vulnerability to environmental processes.
> 
> You mean like if you were using it.
> 
>> This is why we can say that one workstation is more secure than another
>> one while both exist in the same environment. Once you remove both from
>> enfironmental influences, both maintain their conditions relative to
>> each other. The concept of security entails a realization of being
>> secure from what. When conditions change, security changes, but security
>> does not exist in the absense of change.
> 
> How many fallacies can we spot in that last paragraph?
> 
Man, if you cannot even see the truth in this last paragrapch, which I
tried to keep simple for you, then you are either a borderline clueless
retard, delusional, or just trying to fill this place with your bluff
and blunder.

Or do you really suppose you know more about secrity threats than
everyone else in the security community? It's time to get serious or
shut the fuck up.

Here is a relevant quotation from the SANS Institute InfoSec (you heard
of it, right?):

"Because risk is a function of both threat and vulnerability, an
effective risk analysis will reveal the extent of both. Just remember
that without both threat and vulnerability, there is no risk."


https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/testing/penetration-testing-third-party-hacker-264

So, dufus, there is no security risk with an isolated system because
there can be no threat to it. Security does not exist in a vacuum.  This
is fortunate for you, actually, because the vacuum in your head isolates
you from risk. Maybe that is why you feel secure in opening your dumbass
mouth?

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#5724

Anonymous:
> Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a 
> cryptographic flaw that left communications open to 
> eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that 
> members of the security community believe it could be an 
> intentional backdoor.
> 
> http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
> vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
> spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
> 

It does not make much sense to say that the backdoor was intentional
without more facts to substantiate it. If the folks at socat themselves
overlooked it, as well as the "security community", so might have the
person who submitted it. A "real" news reporter would have tried to get
the questionable party's opinion.

The really important point overlooked by your whole thread is that it
should be clear how open-source is not a magic panacea for fixing
faulty code if no controls are used by the "open-source community,"
whomever you think that includes, to vet it once it is published.

This story should be a good lesson to keep in mind here when depending
on the often touted excuse for trusting in Quicksilver based on the mere
fact that it is open=source. It is simply another seldom needed link in
the chain of programs stitched together for anonymity by the trolls of
yesteryear.

Socat's glaring problem was easily exploitable, not based on some
obscure bit of code, and it went undetected because it is not used by
many persons with enough sense to know you cannot depend on what you do
not understand. Slicksilver is a childish hack simply vulnerable to the
likes of NSA adversaries. They probably let it slide for laughs and
because they want to let idiots use it while thinking they are safe
doing so.

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#5725

In article <nal8dm$6oj$1@news.mixmin.net>
Anonymous <nobody@mixmin.net> wrote:
>
> Anonymous:
> > Developers of the Socat networking tool have fixed a
> > cryptographic flaw that left communications open to
> > eavesdropping for over a year. The error is so serious that
> > members of the security community believe it could be an
> > intentional backdoor.
> >
> > http://www.csoonline.com/article/3029369/security/socat-
> > vulnerability-shows-that-crypto-backdoors-can-be-hard-to-
> > spot.html?google_editors_picks=true
> >
>
> It does not make much sense to say that the backdoor was intentional
> without more facts to substantiate it. If the folks at socat themselves
> overlooked it, as well as the "security community", so might have the
> person who submitted it. A "real" news reporter would have tried to get
> the questionable party's opinion.
>
> The really important point overlooked by your whole thread is that it
> should be clear how open-source is not a magic panacea for fixing
> faulty code if no controls are used by the "open-source community,"
> whomever you think that includes, to vet it once it is published.
>
> This story should be a good lesson to keep in mind here when depending
> on the often touted excuse for trusting in Quicksilver based on the mere
> fact that it is open=source. It is simply another seldom needed link in
> the chain of programs stitched together for anonymity by the trolls of
> yesteryear.
>
> Socat's glaring problem was easily exploitable, not based on some
> obscure bit of code, and it went undetected because it is not used by
> many persons with enough sense to know you cannot depend on what you do
> not understand. Slicksilver is a childish hack simply vulnerable to the
> likes of NSA adversaries. They probably let it slide for laughs and
> because they want to let idiots use it while thinking they are safe
> doing so.

Don;'t enable anything you don't need and it minimizes the 
exploit possibility.

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