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Groups > linux.debian.maint.python > #16328
| From | Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> |
|---|---|
| Newsgroups | linux.debian.devel, linux.debian.maint.python, linux.debian.maint.dpkg |
| Subject | Re: Alternative signature mechanisms for upstream source verification |
| Date | 2024-10-05 12:40 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <JuamB-h549-5@gated-at.bofh.it> (permalink) |
| References | (1 earlier) <JswUh-g2I4-11@gated-at.bofh.it> <JswUh-g2I4-9@gated-at.bofh.it> <JtvW9-gG49-3@gated-at.bofh.it> <JtyKl-gHL8-7@gated-at.bofh.it> <JtVdU-gVnJ-5@gated-at.bofh.it> |
| Organization | linux.* mail to news gateway |
Cross-posted to 3 groups.
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Stefano Rivera <stefanor@debian.org> writes: > Should we expand this to include some of these new mechanisms? > Things brought up in the debian-python thread include: > 1. sigstore https://docs.sigstore.dev/ > 2. ssh signatures > 3. signify https://man.openbsd.org/signify.1 +1 I believe all signatures we trust should be encoded in a non-mutable transparency log like Sigstore/Sigsum etc. But the first step towards that is to add support for verifying that property. > There is a general trend towards getting upstream sources from Git > rather than tarballs in Debian, but we're a long way from moving across > completely, or even finding consensus to do so. > These signature mechanisms can generally be applied to git commits as > well as tarballs. Signatures of git commits is the same as a signature on a SHA1 object which is broken for authentication purposes. But it is possible to discuss these issues separately, paving the way for git commit signing to be trustworthy when GitHub/GitLab moves to SHA256. /Simon
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python devs are planning to stop signing with gpg Salvo Tomaselli <ltworf@debian.org> - 2024-09-30 23:50 +0200
Re: python devs are planning to stop signing with gpg Salvo Tomaselli <ltworf@debian.org> - 2024-10-01 00:20 +0200
Re: python devs are planning to stop signing with gpg Brian May <bam@debian.org> - 2024-10-01 02:00 +0200
Re: python devs are planning to stop signing with gpg Stefano Rivera <stefanor@debian.org> - 2024-10-03 17:30 +0200
Re: python devs are planning to stop signing with gpg Louis-Philippe Véronneau <pollo@debian.org> - 2024-10-03 20:30 +0200
Re: python devs are planning to stop signing with gpg Jeremy Stanley <fungi@yuggoth.org> - 2024-10-03 22:30 +0200
Alternative signature mechanisms for upstream source verification Stefano Rivera <stefanor@debian.org> - 2024-10-04 20:30 +0200
Re: Alternative signature mechanisms for upstream source verification Mathias Behrle <mbehrle@debian.org> - 2024-10-04 21:30 +0200
Re: Alternative signature mechanisms for upstream source verification Guillem Jover <guillem@debian.org> - 2024-10-05 03:40 +0200
Re: Alternative signature mechanisms for upstream source verification Stefano Rivera <stefanor@debian.org> - 2024-10-05 06:10 +0200
Re: Alternative signature mechanisms for upstream source verification Martin <debacle@debian.org> - 2024-10-05 10:30 +0200
Re: Alternative signature mechanisms for upstream source verification Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org> - 2024-10-05 12:40 +0200
Re: python devs are planning to stop signing with gpg Brian May <bam@debian.org> - 2024-10-01 00:30 +0200
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