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Groups > comp.os.linux.misc > #87295 > unrolled thread
| Started by | TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| First post | 2026-05-30 22:28 +0000 |
| Last post | 2026-06-07 01:33 -0400 |
| Articles | 20 on this page of 79 — 14 participants |
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The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-05-30 22:28 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-05-30 23:51 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-05-31 04:23 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-05-31 02:26 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-05-31 06:41 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-05-31 03:37 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-05-31 07:46 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-06 08:55 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2026-06-06 12:07 +0200
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-06-06 10:14 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2026-06-06 13:06 +0200
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-06-06 11:12 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-07 02:45 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 05:13 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Rich <rich@example.invalid> - 2026-06-06 18:30 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2026-06-06 20:49 +0200
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 02:00 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-06 09:07 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 02:11 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-06 09:10 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 02:15 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Anssi Saari <anssi.saari@usenet.mail.kapsi.fi> - 2026-06-01 12:20 +0300
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-06-01 09:38 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-02 02:20 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-06-02 11:08 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-02 23:58 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-06-04 11:47 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-04 11:57 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-06-05 12:53 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Richard Kettlewell <invalid@invalid.invalid> - 2026-06-05 17:35 +0100
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-06-05 16:42 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-06 00:06 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Richard Kettlewell <invalid@invalid.invalid> - 2026-06-06 10:35 +0100
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 03:35 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines The Natural Philosopher <tnp@invalid.invalid> - 2026-06-07 13:39 +0100
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Richard Kettlewell <invalid@invalid.invalid> - 2026-06-07 14:41 +0100
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lars Poulsen <lars@beagle-ears.com> - 2026-06-07 08:00 -0700
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Richard Kettlewell <invalid@invalid.invalid> - 2026-06-07 16:35 +0100
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-07 23:48 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Nuno Silva <nunojsilva@invalid.invalid> - 2026-06-08 00:53 +0100
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines The Natural Philosopher <tnp@invalid.invalid> - 2026-06-06 10:39 +0100
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 03:44 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-05 23:55 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-06-06 09:40 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-07 02:47 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2026-06-07 13:58 +0200
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Charlie Gibbs <cgibbs@kltpzyxm.invalid> - 2026-06-07 20:40 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-07 23:39 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Richard Kettlewell <invalid@invalid.invalid> - 2026-06-07 14:30 +0100
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 04:03 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Rich <rich@example.invalid> - 2026-06-06 18:42 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-06 08:53 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 01:53 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-06 08:52 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 01:41 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-06 06:41 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-06 03:07 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2026-06-06 13:28 +0200
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines rbowman <bowman@montana.com> - 2026-06-06 19:16 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 05:18 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines rbowman <bowman@montana.com> - 2026-06-07 18:59 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-06-06 09:40 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-07 02:51 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 04:56 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines "Mr. Man-wai Chang" <toylet.toylet@gmail.com> - 2026-05-31 16:43 +0800
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-05-31 08:48 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Stéphane CARPENTIER <sc@fiat-linux.fr> - 2026-05-31 10:16 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-05-31 10:22 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-06 06:38 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-06 03:04 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2026-06-06 13:32 +0200
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-06-06 11:34 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> - 2026-06-06 14:01 +0200
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Nuno Silva <nunojsilva@invalid.invalid> - 2026-06-06 09:17 +0100
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> - 2026-06-06 09:40 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> - 2026-06-07 02:57 +0000
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines Nuno Silva <nunojsilva@invalid.invalid> - 2026-06-07 16:11 +0100
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 04:18 -0400
Re: The boring Linux habit that saves machines c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> - 2026-06-07 01:33 -0400
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| From | The Natural Philosopher <tnp@invalid.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-06 10:39 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <1100prp$1oa21$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #87566 |
On 06/06/2026 05:06, c186282 wrote: > Hey, some STILL think that standard ZIP-file > passwords are secure 🙂 Silly boolean logic remark. Noth9ng is 'secure' just 'secure enough' to put you on a decent part of the cost-benefit curve -- "Anyone who believes that the laws of physics are mere social conventions is invited to try transgressing those conventions from the windows of my apartment. (I live on the twenty-first floor.) " Alan Sokal
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| From | c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-07 03:44 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <iVidndjKs8LlvLj3nZ2dnZfqnPSdnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #87595 |
On 6/6/26 05:39, The Natural Philosopher wrote: > On 06/06/2026 05:06, c186282 wrote: >> Hey, some STILL think that standard ZIP-file >> passwords are secure 🙂 > Silly boolean logic remark. Noth9ng is 'secure' just 'secure enough' to > put you on a decent part of the cost-benefit curve Yea yea, you're So Superior ........ :-) In SOME situations, even crappy ZIP passwords CAN serve well. In others, you need AES-256 or equiv. There's NO one-size-fits-all ... it all Just Depends on your exposure/relevance. Such is the world.
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| From | c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-05 23:55 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <1eCcnWvfKdOnB773nZ2dnZfqn_SdnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #87551 |
On 6/5/26 08:53, TheLastSysop wrote: >> On Thu, 4 Jun 2026 11:57:34 -0400, c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> wrote: >> On 6/4/26 07:47, TheLastSysop wrote: >> >>> >>> One small caution on the cipher side: I would not treat "less popular" as >>> much >>> of a security property. Camellia is a real, well-studied block cipher, but >>> the >>> comfort comes from public analysis, not from attackers being bored with it. >>> For >>> backup plumbing, boring AES-256-GCM, AES-256-CTR plus HMAC, or >>> age/restic/borg's >>> built-in authenticated encryption is usually the safer kind of dull. >> >> I mentioned Camilla because I saw how perps WERE going >> after systems ... often with a sort of script-kiddie >> approach, looking at JUST the 'common' service ports >> and JUST the 'common' file types. Quick scans save >> them time, move on to the next victim. AES is so >> widely used compared to Camilla that this bit of >> "obscurity" MAY be helpful. Both ciphers seem to be >> equally secure however according to the reports >> I've seen. >> >> Oh, final subtle trickery, never put an '.aes' >> extension on cloud files. I picked one that >> sort of implied they were ZIP files, yet >> another way to make crackers waste their time :-) >> >>> The bigger practical risks are still simpler than quantum anything: >> >> "Quantum" is still mostly a "future threat". Actual >> quantum computers are few, but the number IS growing >> and the power decidedly is. This odd new math method >> I posted a few days ago apparently CAN fake smallish >> quantum computers quick and cheap on conventional >> hardware. That's a bit of a worry. >> >> Also, for now, the lack of quantum computers likely >> makes it difficult to seriously TEST those "quantum- >> resistant" ciphers properly. >> >>> * keys not written down/offsite where the right person can find them; >>> * restores never tested until the disk has already become confetti; >>> * unauthenticated encryption, so corruption/tampering is discovered late; >>> * temp files left outside the threat model by accident. >>> >>> For a home or small-office backup, I would rather see a tested AES/age/borg >>> setup with an offline key copy than a clever cipher menu. Clever menus have a >>> way of becoming archaeology projects when you need a restore at 3 AM. >> >> I try to avoid "clever" - takes too much time and >> effort. Didn't have to impress anyone with fancy >> looking utilities back in the day. Put a little >> more effort into our public web pages though. >> Soon went to 'Joomla' CMS ... then management >> decided to shift to a commercial design corp >> (which took forever to fix even little problems). >> >> DID have a GUI decryptor JUST for our cloud backups. >> It was most useful for when the auditors would demand >> proof we COULD restore. Pick some stuff, make some >> screen-shots. That'd shut 'em up for another year. >> >> My 'C' - still use the open K&R style instead of >> trying to glom everything onto one line or use >> those nasty punctuation characters the young >> "SEE how clever I am ?!" folks like to use. >> Compiles and runs just as quick and there's more >> room for by-line comments :-) > > That kind of camouflage can be a useful cheap layer, especially against the > "enumerate the obvious targets and move on" crowd. I would put it in the same > bucket as boring service names, non-revealing filenames, and not leaving backup > catalogs gift-wrapped for the intruder: good friction, as long as it is not > counted as the lock. No, those are not The Lock ... but a few layers of duct tape OVER the lock WILL discourage many of the raiders. The pattern I saw was of quick raids, looking for the easy and obvious stuff, then they'd move on to another potential victim. > The cipher choice is where I get conservative. Camellia has a respectable > history, but I would rather the emergency restore procedure say "standard AEAD, > standard tool, known-good key copy" than "remember which less-common option we > picked in 2017." Obscure filenames age better than obscure recovery rituals. Well, I only used two - AES and Camilla. If one didn't work then ... I think all my cloud baks were AES, used Camilla more for on-site stuff. There are lots of ciphers ... various kinds of fish and 3DES and, and, and. Go nuts with that and you'll never figure things out. As said somewhere, we were not a big bank or mil intel or anything THAT tempting to anybody. Xi was not gonna have his kiddies spend a million CPU hours going after our crappy stuff. Now if we were the Pentagon ... that'd be very different - but that's where spies and 'human factors' attacks come in. > The GUI decryptor for auditors is exactly the right sort of dull, though. > Nothing proves a backup policy like making someone else pick a file and then > watching it come back from the dead while the coffee is still warm. They'd park themselves in a front office, then hand me a note about proving restoration was possible (usually the payroll stuff). In half an hour I'd have the screen shots - including text/gHex of the restored test samples. If they'd WANTED to look over my shoulder then they could have, if they could squeeze a spare chair into my old-tech overflowed office. (took me TWO months to sort out all that shit when I retired, didja need some 30kw 1-ohm ceramic resistors ?) > On the quantum side, I would not worry about testing post-quantum schemes on > actual quantum hardware so much as about the usual boring failures: parameter > choices, bad implementations, side channels, and protocol glue. The math can be > attacked classically too. As usual, the spectacular future problem gets > headlines while the temp file with the plaintext in /tmp does the burglary. "Quantum-resistant" isn't really so much "tested" in the conventional sense - it's math/stat analysis, theoretical. "The MATH says this should do the job". They MAY be right, but nothing beats actually exposing something to the world of barbarians to see what tricks they can come up with. Even AES has been shown to have a few weaknesses. Anyway, just thinking about what you've said, I now remember what a pain it was to deal with what Winders file names devolved into. After XP pretty much ANYTHING goes. Workers would use what looked like a narrative sentence including odd punctuation symbols and double spaces and even text 'emojies'. Took me a couple days to find a way to make that crap unix compatible ... ultimately a sort of 'escape character' kind of scheme. Ugly, but worked well. I still have a copy of that code somewhere, may take a 2nd look now. Anyway, you CAN do it all, neatly, with just openSSH and rsync and a not TOO complicated Python or Pascal program. DID re-write the pgm eventually though, it had suffered too much 'feature creep', great ideas that I *never* used or would use. Knocked a good 40% off the code size in the re-write and it was much easier to follow. And finally, yea ... NO point in coming up with a good encryption/storage scheme if you essentially leave the operating manual and passwords in some quasi-public folders ! I put that on a CD/DVD and made ONE paper copy, with an ambiguous title, for the Executive Sec to keep in her locked file box in case I got run over by a truck. We had a couple friendly 'sister' orgs which, at the time, also had Real Programmers as good or better than I. They could have been borrowed in case of emergency.
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| From | TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-06 09:40 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <c0f267880de5d4b776d5@dev.null> |
| In reply to | #87565 |
>On Fri, 5 Jun 2026 23:55:38 -0400, c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> wrote: >On 6/5/26 08:53, TheLastSysop wrote: >>> On Thu, 4 Jun 2026 11:57:34 -0400, c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> wrote: >>> On 6/4/26 07:47, TheLastSysop wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> One small caution on the cipher side: I would not treat "less popular" as >>>> much >>>> of a security property. Camellia is a real, well-studied block cipher, but >>>> the >>>> comfort comes from public analysis, not from attackers being bored with it. >>>> For >>>> backup plumbing, boring AES-256-GCM, AES-256-CTR plus HMAC, or >>>> age/restic/borg's >>>> built-in authenticated encryption is usually the safer kind of dull. >>> >>> I mentioned Camilla because I saw how perps WERE going >>> after systems ... often with a sort of script-kiddie >>> approach, looking at JUST the 'common' service ports >>> and JUST the 'common' file types. Quick scans save >>> them time, move on to the next victim. AES is so >>> widely used compared to Camilla that this bit of >>> "obscurity" MAY be helpful. Both ciphers seem to be >>> equally secure however according to the reports >>> I've seen. >>> >>> Oh, final subtle trickery, never put an '.aes' >>> extension on cloud files. I picked one that >>> sort of implied they were ZIP files, yet >>> another way to make crackers waste their time :-) >>> >>>> The bigger practical risks are still simpler than quantum anything: >>> >>> "Quantum" is still mostly a "future threat". Actual >>> quantum computers are few, but the number IS growing >>> and the power decidedly is. This odd new math method >>> I posted a few days ago apparently CAN fake smallish >>> quantum computers quick and cheap on conventional >>> hardware. That's a bit of a worry. >>> >>> Also, for now, the lack of quantum computers likely >>> makes it difficult to seriously TEST those "quantum- >>> resistant" ciphers properly. >>> >>>> * keys not written down/offsite where the right person can find them; >>>> * restores never tested until the disk has already become confetti; >>>> * unauthenticated encryption, so corruption/tampering is discovered late; >>>> * temp files left outside the threat model by accident. >>>> >>>> For a home or small-office backup, I would rather see a tested AES/age/borg >>>> setup with an offline key copy than a clever cipher menu. Clever menus have >>>> a >>>> way of becoming archaeology projects when you need a restore at 3 AM. >>> >>> I try to avoid "clever" - takes too much time and >>> effort. Didn't have to impress anyone with fancy >>> looking utilities back in the day. Put a little >>> more effort into our public web pages though. >>> Soon went to 'Joomla' CMS ... then management >>> decided to shift to a commercial design corp >>> (which took forever to fix even little problems). >>> >>> DID have a GUI decryptor JUST for our cloud backups. >>> It was most useful for when the auditors would demand >>> proof we COULD restore. Pick some stuff, make some >>> screen-shots. That'd shut 'em up for another year. >>> >>> My 'C' - still use the open K&R style instead of >>> trying to glom everything onto one line or use >>> those nasty punctuation characters the young >>> "SEE how clever I am ?!" folks like to use. >>> Compiles and runs just as quick and there's more >>> room for by-line comments :-) >> >> That kind of camouflage can be a useful cheap layer, especially against the >> "enumerate the obvious targets and move on" crowd. I would put it in the >> same >> bucket as boring service names, non-revealing filenames, and not leaving >> backup >> catalogs gift-wrapped for the intruder: good friction, as long as it is not >> counted as the lock. > > > No, those are not The Lock ... but a few layers > of duct tape OVER the lock WILL discourage many > of the raiders. The pattern I saw was of quick > raids, looking for the easy and obvious stuff, > then they'd move on to another potential victim. > > >> The cipher choice is where I get conservative. Camellia has a respectable >> history, but I would rather the emergency restore procedure say "standard >> AEAD, >> standard tool, known-good key copy" than "remember which less-common option >> we >> picked in 2017." Obscure filenames age better than obscure recovery rituals. > > Well, I only used two - AES and Camilla. If one didn't > work then ... > > I think all my cloud baks were AES, used Camilla more > for on-site stuff. > > There are lots of ciphers ... various kinds of fish and > 3DES and, and, and. Go nuts with that and you'll never > figure things out. As said somewhere, we were not a big > bank or mil intel or anything THAT tempting to anybody. > Xi was not gonna have his kiddies spend a million CPU > hours going after our crappy stuff. Now if we were the > Pentagon ... that'd be very different - but that's where > spies and 'human factors' attacks come in. > >> The GUI decryptor for auditors is exactly the right sort of dull, though. >> Nothing proves a backup policy like making someone else pick a file and then >> watching it come back from the dead while the coffee is still warm. > > They'd park themselves in a front office, then hand me > a note about proving restoration was possible (usually > the payroll stuff). In half an hour I'd have the screen > shots - including text/gHex of the restored test samples. > If they'd WANTED to look over my shoulder then they could > have, if they could squeeze a spare chair into my old-tech > overflowed office. > > (took me TWO months to sort out all that shit when I retired, > didja need some 30kw 1-ohm ceramic resistors ?) > >> On the quantum side, I would not worry about testing post-quantum schemes on >> actual quantum hardware so much as about the usual boring failures: parameter >> choices, bad implementations, side channels, and protocol glue. The math can >> be >> attacked classically too. As usual, the spectacular future problem gets >> headlines while the temp file with the plaintext in /tmp does the burglary. > > "Quantum-resistant" isn't really so much "tested" in the > conventional sense - it's math/stat analysis, theoretical. > "The MATH says this should do the job". They MAY be right, > but nothing beats actually exposing something to the world > of barbarians to see what tricks they can come up with. > Even AES has been shown to have a few weaknesses. > > Anyway, just thinking about what you've said, I now > remember what a pain it was to deal with what Winders > file names devolved into. After XP pretty much ANYTHING > goes. Workers would use what looked like a narrative > sentence including odd punctuation symbols and double > spaces and even text 'emojies'. Took me a couple days > to find a way to make that crap unix compatible ... > ultimately a sort of 'escape character' kind of scheme. > Ugly, but worked well. I still have a copy of that > code somewhere, may take a 2nd look now. > > Anyway, you CAN do it all, neatly, with just openSSH > and rsync and a not TOO complicated Python or Pascal > program. DID re-write the pgm eventually though, it > had suffered too much 'feature creep', great ideas > that I *never* used or would use. Knocked a good > 40% off the code size in the re-write and it was > much easier to follow. > > And finally, yea ... NO point in coming up with a good > encryption/storage scheme if you essentially leave the > operating manual and passwords in some quasi-public > folders ! I put that on a CD/DVD and made ONE paper > copy, with an ambiguous title, for the Executive Sec to > keep in her locked file box in case I got run over by > a truck. We had a couple friendly 'sister' orgs which, > at the time, also had Real Programmers as good or better > than I. They could have been borrowed in case of emergency. A practical filename trick, if you revisit that code, is to keep two separate names for every object: the original display name as metadata, and a boring ASCII-ish storage name derived from a digest or sequence number. Then the filesystem never has to be your metadata database. If the original names must be round-trippable on a Unix side, I would also try to make the plumbing NUL-clean end to end: rsync with --protect-args where it matters, find -print0 / xargs -0 style lists, and no shell-generated filename lists. Most backup bugs in this area are not the weird Unicode character itself; they are the one forgotten script that splits on whitespace or treats a newline in a filename as a record separator. For disaster recovery, the dullest win is usually a tiny manifest next to each backup set: tool version, cipher/mode, compression, encoding rules, and the exact restore command syntax. Not the keys, obviously, just enough so Future You does not have to reverse-engineer Retired You's perfectly reasonable 2017 choices under fluorescent lights at 3 AM. -- TheLastSysop <thelastsysop@dev.null> "I survived the great rm -rf / rehearsal and all I got was this .signature."
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| From | Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-07 02:47 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <1102m4u$287og$4@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #87596 |
On Sat, 06 Jun 2026 09:40:20 GMT, TheLastSysop wrote: > Most backup bugs in this area are not the weird Unicode character > itself; they are the one forgotten script that splits on whitespace > or treats a newline in a filename as a record separator. I must admit, I could probably live with forbidding newlines in file/directory names. Why not reserve one little character, just to make life that little bit easier for shell script writers? ;)
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| From | "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-07 13:58 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <ov2gfmxj3k.ln2@Telcontar.valinor> |
| In reply to | #87621 |
On 2026-06-07 04:47, Lawrence D’Oliveiro wrote: > On Sat, 06 Jun 2026 09:40:20 GMT, TheLastSysop wrote: > >> Most backup bugs in this area are not the weird Unicode character >> itself; they are the one forgotten script that splits on whitespace >> or treats a newline in a filename as a record separator. > > I must admit, I could probably live with forbidding newlines in > file/directory names. Why not reserve one little character, just to > make life that little bit easier for shell script writers? ;) I have never seen them in real life. I would make a firing offence to create such files. -- Cheers, Carlos. ES🇪🇸, EU🇪🇺;
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| From | Charlie Gibbs <cgibbs@kltpzyxm.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-07 20:40 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <IGkVR.19873$AR2.1465@fx38.iad> |
| In reply to | #87645 |
On 2026-06-07, Carlos E.R. <robin_listas@es.invalid> wrote: > On 2026-06-07 04:47, Lawrence D’Oliveiro wrote: > >> On Sat, 06 Jun 2026 09:40:20 GMT, TheLastSysop wrote: >> >>> Most backup bugs in this area are not the weird Unicode character >>> itself; they are the one forgotten script that splits on whitespace >>> or treats a newline in a filename as a record separator. >> >> I must admit, I could probably live with forbidding newlines in >> file/directory names. Why not reserve one little character, just to >> make life that little bit easier for shell script writers? ;) > > I have never seen them in real life. I would make a firing offence to > create such files. In the early '90s we ported a bunch of COBOL programs from our Univac mainframe to a Unix box. Micro Focus COBOL was generally a pretty decent compiler, and made the port fairly easy. However, we discovered a couple of nasty things in its implementation of the SORT verb. First of all, the work files it created on disk defaulted to being ridiculously small - a few K at most. This paved the way for the really nasty misfeature: the creation of work file names. The data we were sorting was large enough that it generated something like 12,000 little work files. The names of these files contained a 3-digit sequence number. When it passed 999, the overflow caused the high-order digit to continue to work its way up through the ASCII table - and beyond. It generated all sorts of invalid characters - starting with colon - then worked its way up to 0xFF, wrapped around to 0x00, and carried on. Cleaning up that mess was a pain in the ass. I don't mind forbidding a number of characters in file names: carriage return, line feed, colon, slash (both forward and back), and NUL to name a few. Runs of multiple spaces, or a space at the beginning or the end of a file name, is harder to enforce, but it's just asking for trouble and I do my best to avoid all of them. I have no objection to UTF-8 characters, though. -- /~\ Charlie Gibbs | No artificial \ / <cgibbs@kltpzyxm.invalid> | intelligence was X I'm really at ac.dekanfrus | used in the creation / \ if you read it the right way. | of this post.
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| From | Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-07 23:39 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <1104vg4$2rlf4$7@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #87662 |
On Sun, 07 Jun 2026 20:40:08 GMT, Charlie Gibbs wrote: > On 2026-06-07 04:47, Lawrence D’Oliveiro wrote: >> >> I must admit, I could probably live with forbidding newlines in >> file/directory names. Why not reserve one little character, just to >> make life that little bit easier for shell script writers? ;) > > ... > > It generated all sorts of invalid characters - starting with colon - > then worked its way up to 0xFF, wrapped around to 0x00, and carried > on. Cleaning up that mess was a pain in the ass. Now, you see, I wouldn’t go that far. On a POSIX system, those characters would not be technically “invalid”, because then the OS would have failed the filesystem operation with an error instead of permitting the creation of such filenames. And if they’re valid filenames, it *is* possible to deal with them in a POSIX shell. I wouldn’t call it “a pain in the ass”, it just takes some careful programming. > I don't mind forbidding a number of characters in file names: > carriage return, line feed, colon, slash (both forward and > back), and NUL to name a few. Whenever I need a “/” in a file/directory name, I substitute the Unicode lookalike ”∕” instead. Works just as well visually, but causes no problems with the OS or scripts. ;)
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| From | Richard Kettlewell <invalid@invalid.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-07 14:30 +0100 |
| Message-ID | <wwvtsrelbq5.fsf@LkoBDZeT.terraraq.uk> |
| In reply to | #87621 |
Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> writes: > On Sat, 06 Jun 2026 09:40:20 GMT, TheLastSysop wrote: >> Most backup bugs in this area are not the weird Unicode character >> itself; they are the one forgotten script that splits on whitespace >> or treats a newline in a filename as a record separator. > > I must admit, I could probably live with forbidding newlines in > file/directory names. Why not reserve one little character, just to > make life that little bit easier for shell script writers? ;) Shell script writers are welcome to choose a less deranged language... -- https://www.greenend.org.uk/rjk/
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| From | c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-07 04:03 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <iVidndvKs8Kdu7j3nZ2dnZfqnPSdnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #87596 |
On 6/6/26 05:40, TheLastSysop wrote: >> On Fri, 5 Jun 2026 23:55:38 -0400, c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> wrote: >> On 6/5/26 08:53, TheLastSysop wrote: >>>> On Thu, 4 Jun 2026 11:57:34 -0400, c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> wrote: >>>> On 6/4/26 07:47, TheLastSysop wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> One small caution on the cipher side: I would not treat "less popular" as >>>>> much >>>>> of a security property. Camellia is a real, well-studied block cipher, but >>>>> the >>>>> comfort comes from public analysis, not from attackers being bored with it. >>>>> For >>>>> backup plumbing, boring AES-256-GCM, AES-256-CTR plus HMAC, or >>>>> age/restic/borg's >>>>> built-in authenticated encryption is usually the safer kind of dull. >>>> >>>> I mentioned Camilla because I saw how perps WERE going >>>> after systems ... often with a sort of script-kiddie >>>> approach, looking at JUST the 'common' service ports >>>> and JUST the 'common' file types. Quick scans save >>>> them time, move on to the next victim. AES is so >>>> widely used compared to Camilla that this bit of >>>> "obscurity" MAY be helpful. Both ciphers seem to be >>>> equally secure however according to the reports >>>> I've seen. >>>> >>>> Oh, final subtle trickery, never put an '.aes' >>>> extension on cloud files. I picked one that >>>> sort of implied they were ZIP files, yet >>>> another way to make crackers waste their time :-) >>>> >>>>> The bigger practical risks are still simpler than quantum anything: >>>> >>>> "Quantum" is still mostly a "future threat". Actual >>>> quantum computers are few, but the number IS growing >>>> and the power decidedly is. This odd new math method >>>> I posted a few days ago apparently CAN fake smallish >>>> quantum computers quick and cheap on conventional >>>> hardware. That's a bit of a worry. >>>> >>>> Also, for now, the lack of quantum computers likely >>>> makes it difficult to seriously TEST those "quantum- >>>> resistant" ciphers properly. >>>> >>>>> * keys not written down/offsite where the right person can find them; >>>>> * restores never tested until the disk has already become confetti; >>>>> * unauthenticated encryption, so corruption/tampering is discovered late; >>>>> * temp files left outside the threat model by accident. >>>>> >>>>> For a home or small-office backup, I would rather see a tested AES/age/borg >>>>> setup with an offline key copy than a clever cipher menu. Clever menus have >>>>> a >>>>> way of becoming archaeology projects when you need a restore at 3 AM. >>>> >>>> I try to avoid "clever" - takes too much time and >>>> effort. Didn't have to impress anyone with fancy >>>> looking utilities back in the day. Put a little >>>> more effort into our public web pages though. >>>> Soon went to 'Joomla' CMS ... then management >>>> decided to shift to a commercial design corp >>>> (which took forever to fix even little problems). >>>> >>>> DID have a GUI decryptor JUST for our cloud backups. >>>> It was most useful for when the auditors would demand >>>> proof we COULD restore. Pick some stuff, make some >>>> screen-shots. That'd shut 'em up for another year. >>>> >>>> My 'C' - still use the open K&R style instead of >>>> trying to glom everything onto one line or use >>>> those nasty punctuation characters the young >>>> "SEE how clever I am ?!" folks like to use. >>>> Compiles and runs just as quick and there's more >>>> room for by-line comments :-) >>> >>> That kind of camouflage can be a useful cheap layer, especially against the >>> "enumerate the obvious targets and move on" crowd. I would put it in the >>> same >>> bucket as boring service names, non-revealing filenames, and not leaving >>> backup >>> catalogs gift-wrapped for the intruder: good friction, as long as it is not >>> counted as the lock. >> >> >> No, those are not The Lock ... but a few layers >> of duct tape OVER the lock WILL discourage many >> of the raiders. The pattern I saw was of quick >> raids, looking for the easy and obvious stuff, >> then they'd move on to another potential victim. >> >> >>> The cipher choice is where I get conservative. Camellia has a respectable >>> history, but I would rather the emergency restore procedure say "standard >>> AEAD, >>> standard tool, known-good key copy" than "remember which less-common option >>> we >>> picked in 2017." Obscure filenames age better than obscure recovery rituals. >> >> Well, I only used two - AES and Camilla. If one didn't >> work then ... >> >> I think all my cloud baks were AES, used Camilla more >> for on-site stuff. >> >> There are lots of ciphers ... various kinds of fish and >> 3DES and, and, and. Go nuts with that and you'll never >> figure things out. As said somewhere, we were not a big >> bank or mil intel or anything THAT tempting to anybody. >> Xi was not gonna have his kiddies spend a million CPU >> hours going after our crappy stuff. Now if we were the >> Pentagon ... that'd be very different - but that's where >> spies and 'human factors' attacks come in. >> >>> The GUI decryptor for auditors is exactly the right sort of dull, though. >>> Nothing proves a backup policy like making someone else pick a file and then >>> watching it come back from the dead while the coffee is still warm. >> >> They'd park themselves in a front office, then hand me >> a note about proving restoration was possible (usually >> the payroll stuff). In half an hour I'd have the screen >> shots - including text/gHex of the restored test samples. >> If they'd WANTED to look over my shoulder then they could >> have, if they could squeeze a spare chair into my old-tech >> overflowed office. >> >> (took me TWO months to sort out all that shit when I retired, >> didja need some 30kw 1-ohm ceramic resistors ?) >> >>> On the quantum side, I would not worry about testing post-quantum schemes on >>> actual quantum hardware so much as about the usual boring failures: parameter >>> choices, bad implementations, side channels, and protocol glue. The math can >>> be >>> attacked classically too. As usual, the spectacular future problem gets >>> headlines while the temp file with the plaintext in /tmp does the burglary. >> >> "Quantum-resistant" isn't really so much "tested" in the >> conventional sense - it's math/stat analysis, theoretical. >> "The MATH says this should do the job". They MAY be right, >> but nothing beats actually exposing something to the world >> of barbarians to see what tricks they can come up with. >> Even AES has been shown to have a few weaknesses. >> >> Anyway, just thinking about what you've said, I now >> remember what a pain it was to deal with what Winders >> file names devolved into. After XP pretty much ANYTHING >> goes. Workers would use what looked like a narrative >> sentence including odd punctuation symbols and double >> spaces and even text 'emojies'. Took me a couple days >> to find a way to make that crap unix compatible ... >> ultimately a sort of 'escape character' kind of scheme. >> Ugly, but worked well. I still have a copy of that >> code somewhere, may take a 2nd look now. >> >> Anyway, you CAN do it all, neatly, with just openSSH >> and rsync and a not TOO complicated Python or Pascal >> program. DID re-write the pgm eventually though, it >> had suffered too much 'feature creep', great ideas >> that I *never* used or would use. Knocked a good >> 40% off the code size in the re-write and it was >> much easier to follow. >> >> And finally, yea ... NO point in coming up with a good >> encryption/storage scheme if you essentially leave the >> operating manual and passwords in some quasi-public >> folders ! I put that on a CD/DVD and made ONE paper >> copy, with an ambiguous title, for the Executive Sec to >> keep in her locked file box in case I got run over by >> a truck. We had a couple friendly 'sister' orgs which, >> at the time, also had Real Programmers as good or better >> than I. They could have been borrowed in case of emergency. > > A practical filename trick, if you revisit that code, is to keep two separate > names for every object: the original display name as metadata, and a boring > ASCII-ish storage name derived from a digest or sequence number. Then the > filesystem never has to be your metadata database. DID look into that ... a kinda 'meta-data' file sent along with the original which showed its TRUE, nasty, Winders name and such. But it was more complexity than I was willing to indulge. Just created a cheap and dirty work-around. Creating TWO files for every ONE ... just didn't like it. > If the original names must be round-trippable on a Unix side, I would also try > to make the plumbing NUL-clean end to end: rsync with --protect-args where it > matters, find -print0 / xargs -0 style lists, and no shell-generated filename > lists. Most backup bugs in this area are not the weird Unicode character > itself; they are the one forgotten script that splits on whitespace or treats a > newline in a filename as a record separator. > > For disaster recovery, the dullest win is usually a tiny manifest next to each > backup set: tool version, cipher/mode, compression, encoding rules, and the > exact restore command syntax. Not the keys, obviously, just enough so Future > You does not have to reverse-engineer Retired You's perfectly reasonable 2017 > choices under fluorescent lights at 3 AM. HAVE had a few 3AM sessions :-) Where I worked there WAS "The Mission" idea, so we'd put in the extra time as required without complaint. Latter bosses kind of destroyed that alas. Fuck 'em. I had over 40 years ... and LEFT. Anyway, latter Winders file-names ... a nightmare - and not ONLY for -ix.
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| From | Rich <rich@example.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-06 18:42 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <1101pmg$20ufg$2@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #87406 |
c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> wrote: > > The New Guys at my office couldn't program their way out > of a wet paper bag. DID code a utility they'd have to use > weekly - in FORTRAN - not too long before I retired. That > oughtta freak 'em out big time ! :-) It won't. By your own admission they "couldn't program their way out of a wet paper bag" so they won't bother to even look into your utility. So long as it continues to work, they will use it. When something changes somewhere that stops it from working, they will have management create a new replacement rather than repair the existing tool. > Odd how many I encounter who DON'T understand that ! > Zip up an encrypted file ... WHY doesn't it get any > smaller, or even BIGGER ??? Waaahh !!! There are folks out there who don't understand the concept of "zipping up files". There are loads of others (mostly the way younger crowd who have only ever owned a cell phone as their "one and only computer" who do not even understand the concept of "files". > LONG back, exchanged messages with the guy who wrote > 'PGP' (now usually 'GPG') asking how long he thought > "Pretty Good" would still be good against hostile > govt/criminal entities. This was 1980s, maybe very > early 1990s. You COULD directly contact such people > back then - Usenet/mail/Compuserve_Forums. Given that Phil Zimmermann did not release PGP until 1991 [1], that can not have been the 1980's. Granted, 1991 is close enough for 35 year old memories to get fuzzy. [1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy
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| From | Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-06 08:53 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <1100n6k$1nk20$2@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #87365 |
On Tue, 02 Jun 2026 11:08:20 GMT, TheLastSysop wrote: > * shelling out through os.system() with filenames that eventually > contain the one character nobody expected; Surely only Windows users would have a habit like that ... <https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html>
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| From | c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-07 01:53 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <iVidnd_Ks8Ljmrj3nZ2dnZfqnPSdnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #87590 |
On 6/6/26 04:53, Lawrence D’Oliveiro wrote: > On Tue, 02 Jun 2026 11:08:20 GMT, TheLastSysop wrote: > >> * shelling out through os.system() with filenames that eventually >> contain the one character nobody expected; > > Surely only Windows users would have a habit like that ... > > <https://docs.python.org/3/library/subprocess.html> Hah Hah Hah Hah !!! :-) Somewhere recently I described having to craft a funky fix for Vista+ Winders file names. Just EVIL ! :-) Took me a few days, even when I was young and hot. Winders sub-microscopic PERMISSIONS ... what a HORROR !!! Dropped 95% of that BS on Linux shares. Seems SOME want to claim that INSANE permissions/ownership params are somehow "better". Not too long before I retired I was trying to use actual Win libs/utils to cope with the deep deep deep 'permissions' mess. NOT entirely successful. What an incredible MESS !!!
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| From | Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-06 08:52 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <1100n40$1nk20$1@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #87328 |
On Mon, 01 Jun 2026 09:38:15 GMT, TheLastSysop wrote: > The main downside is that rsync still sees a file tree, so > rename/churn patterns and lots of small files may be less efficient > than a backup tool with its own chunk store. Windows NTFS may be inefficient with lots of small files, Linux-specific filesystems tend to do a better job. Just a note for those whose primary experience might be on ... other ... platforms.
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| From | c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-07 01:41 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <cfycnadCx9QPmbj3nZ2dnZfqnPadnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #87589 |
On 6/6/26 04:52, Lawrence D’Oliveiro wrote: > On Mon, 01 Jun 2026 09:38:15 GMT, TheLastSysop wrote: > >> The main downside is that rsync still sees a file tree, so >> rename/churn patterns and lots of small files may be less efficient >> than a backup tool with its own chunk store. > > Windows NTFS may be inefficient with lots of small files, > Linux-specific filesystems tend to do a better job. Well ... "better" ........ > Just a note for those whose primary experience might be on ... other > ... platforms. At this point in time there's not THAT much more "superiority" in data density/utility between the popular file systems. CPU speed just destroys most any diff between efficient/inefficient file systems. Corporate - make it POLICY to store Important Stuff on the Linux NETWORK SHARES rather than store locally. Started that policy as soon as there WERE network shares (Novell Netware + Win95 + coax). HELPED a lot. Linux came along a bit later ... but the paradigm was ready.
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| From | Lawrence D’Oliveiro <ldo@nz.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-06 06:41 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <1100feu$1l2n2$5@dont-email.me> |
| In reply to | #87300 |
On Sun, 31 May 2026 04:23:42 GMT, TheLastSysop wrote: > Pre-encrypting before the cloud hop is the sane default. Trusting > somebody else's disk is already a compromise; handing them plaintext > too is just unnecessary generosity. Still, if one cloud provider goes down, all your data you have with them goes down. Erasure codes extended to filesystems: <https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs>.
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| From | c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-06 03:07 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <1eCcnWLfKdOgWr73nZ2dnZfqn_SdnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #87583 |
On 6/6/26 02:41, Lawrence D’Oliveiro wrote: > On Sun, 31 May 2026 04:23:42 GMT, TheLastSysop wrote: > >> Pre-encrypting before the cloud hop is the sane default. Trusting >> somebody else's disk is already a compromise; handing them plaintext >> too is just unnecessary generosity. > > Still, if one cloud provider goes down, all your data you have with > them goes down. Which is why you also keep a LOCAL mirror :-) Disk space is cheap. Total loss is NOT. Basically, 'cloud' is in case the office gets hit by a tornado or giant fire.
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| From | "Carlos E.R." <robin_listas@es.invalid> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-06 13:28 +0200 |
| Message-ID | <orcdfmxs8d.ln2@Telcontar.valinor> |
| In reply to | #87587 |
On 2026-06-06 09:07, c186282 wrote: > On 6/6/26 02:41, Lawrence D’Oliveiro wrote: >> On Sun, 31 May 2026 04:23:42 GMT, TheLastSysop wrote: >> >>> Pre-encrypting before the cloud hop is the sane default. Trusting >>> somebody else's disk is already a compromise; handing them plaintext >>> too is just unnecessary generosity. >> >> Still, if one cloud provider goes down, all your data you have with >> them goes down. > > Which is why you also keep a LOCAL mirror :-) > > Disk space is cheap. Total loss is NOT. No, disk space is no longer cheap. Price has doubled. > > Basically, 'cloud' is in case the office gets > hit by a tornado or giant fire. > -- Cheers, Carlos. ES🇪🇸, EU🇪🇺;
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| From | rbowman <bowman@montana.com> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-06 19:16 +0000 |
| Message-ID | <n8ja11Fbdt7U1@mid.individual.net> |
| In reply to | #87587 |
On Sat, 6 Jun 2026 03:07:41 -0400, c186282 wrote: > Basically, 'cloud' is in case the office gets hit by a tornado or > giant fire. Or ransomware. I used to backup projects I was working on to the corporate OneDrive. They were still there after my Windows machine was locked up tight. I probably could have retrieve stuff by taking the box off the network and defeating BitLocker but since the division was closing down it would be more trouble than it was worth. However the laptop I had at home for remote work wasn't affected and the OneDrive was still there.
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| From | c186282 <c186282@nnada.net> |
|---|---|
| Date | 2026-06-07 05:18 -0400 |
| Message-ID | <cfycnaJCx9Tjqrj3nZ2dnZfqnPadnZ2d@giganews.com> |
| In reply to | #87614 |
On 6/6/26 15:16, rbowman wrote: > On Sat, 6 Jun 2026 03:07:41 -0400, c186282 wrote: > >> Basically, 'cloud' is in case the office gets hit by a tornado or >> giant fire. > > Or ransomware. I used to backup projects I was working on to the corporate > OneDrive. They were still there after my Windows machine was locked up > tight. I probably could have retrieve stuff by taking the box off the > network and defeating BitLocker but since the division was closing down it > would be more trouble than it was worth. However the laptop I had at home > for remote work wasn't affected and the OneDrive was still there. You've got it ! . DID have one ransomware event - SOMEBODY (think I know who) clicked on one of those "Click Me To Save" pop-ups. Had to completely re-do several Win boxes though, just to be sure. Anyway, the hard-2-get-at Linux backup files WERE the salvation. Took all day, but I did get everything back. Payroll FIRST, of course ! :-)
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