Path: csiph.com!eternal-september.org!feeder.eternal-september.org!aioe.org!bofh.it!news.nic.it!robomod From: Kees Cook Newsgroups: linux.kernel Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 0/2] introduce post-init read-only memory Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 18:30:03 +0100 Message-ID: References: X-Original-To: Mathias Krause Dkim-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=google.com; s=20120113; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject :from:to:cc:content-type; bh=trJKhp4MgnAaiX0jllV682Hoo4ix9hd8nPQq9PmB55c=; b=psVQ3CY29Uxlr8nevM8tFC9XEOUxk6OXqJ/13OvPDBp3RXBSlIhbEqw7SKwEA0kSTQ zrfuAnQJ87/TJK07VHkI2B5qWSLceyfEN3/3a2ZH0Htg3T5x4hoit2UJ85v5934a/Bgp TUqZqM+rnEAKzbdd741MC3r1xLRI2DatCJ4TBQK3DJgdTt7CM7QYN9Rwm9z7tohTWNWh GNWLDT50qoOcMvXB5YlfaUGhvwgYbkmBh1w/tDjgzeNkGdQltJxl3EwsgygAnSvBnL5i BgGKEVE3OKb7vCR0MMUmRLm2BTN+/sqc6tQUF7lEsmhERAfq1hlhyWmbz9T70Ms41kNU zKww== Dkim-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=chromium.org; s=google; h=mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date:message-id:subject :from:to:cc:content-type; bh=trJKhp4MgnAaiX0jllV682Hoo4ix9hd8nPQq9PmB55c=; b=Xg4uMTfxViMjnAxIeWJFyNoICkUvdNdERry4xND9xyI8L1TzWQ+aVUt62rcu35tr5o hQg47FBtnZTzrBzJmhq51ai9Mg7t9ttJg6OFo8I9S5bHf5Zwi557PZYfw09pSzxwG3D8 lXlnl5uvc12f5IuN4S/lEeFkvT/3X4SQUOKSs= X-Google-Dkim-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20130820; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:sender:in-reply-to:references:date :message-id:subject:from:to:cc:content-type; bh=trJKhp4MgnAaiX0jllV682Hoo4ix9hd8nPQq9PmB55c=; b=hA00fB5pBMxZ1msQKfk8MNxqnF9FGFpbpMVwhui6XDLINAEO9+xLdFOU7htH0VzFAe +U5myWcC38t8X/zXzwuI/WIiFPcORB/h2Q5vEPZ6ymvyzbhxzELVPsMgy9f6YAspIalV fJmgNnxHgw3SAiuZltz/8s4TgOUHE5+VIXjJGoiUW8msK9sKf0fBDYdwvLc2ubCS919D roxMVs2h5zTbJvwalVerhNLqeBypvXJfoOaxPdLHwTS//h1z7GNUZJT9E6lgCLyuDpJd tWVU50YtRF3h0nhIXDd4FNN9iy+tAsC/qTn93J4Ev+WWaE/7ueJA/z7fNVXZ3zKAHPZT 1ZxQ== X-Gm-Message-State: ALoCoQm/JDEJTGgKZ7aHZoBhwcEgw2zhXQ9QPz+y2FJz3Cn91Rmb/zvBK6o/ZrvqEs429eebR15/ MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Received: by 10.50.65.101 with SMTP id w5mr5307673igs.3.1448472382759; Wed, 25 Nov 2015 09:26:22 -0800 (PST) X-Google-Sender-Auth: XUuASypgJiNetpIAQu5axVHKFhw Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: robomod@news.nic.it List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Approved: robomod@news.nic.it Lines: 60 Organization: linux.* mail to news gateway X-Original-Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , Andy Lutomirski , Ingo Molnar , Thomas Gleixner , "H. Peter Anvin" , x86-ml , Arnd Bergmann , Michael Ellerman , linux-arch , PaX Team , Emese Revfy X-Original-Date: Wed, 25 Nov 2015 09:26:22 -0800 X-Original-Message-ID: X-Original-References: <1448401114-24650-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> X-Original-Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Xref: csiph.com linux.kernel:1277626 On Wed, Nov 25, 2015 at 1:13 AM, Mathias Krause wrote: > On 24 November 2015 at 22:38, Kees Cook wrote: >> Many things are written to only during __init, and never changed >> again. These cannot be made "const" since the compiler will do the wrong >> thing (we do actually need to write to them). Instead, move these items >> into a memory region that will be made read-only during mark_rodata_ro() >> which happens after all kernel __init code has finished. >> >> This introduces __read_only as a way to mark such memory, and uses it on >> the x86 vDSO to kill an extant kernel exploitation method. > > ...just some random notes on the experience with kernels implementing > such a feature for quite a lot of locations, not just the vDSO. > > While having that annotation makes perfect sense, not only from a > security perspective but also from a micro-optimization point of view > (much like the already existing __read_mostly annotation), it has its > drawbacks. Violating the "r/o after init" rule by writing to such > annotated variables from non-init code goes unnoticed as far as it > concerns the toolchain. Neither the compiler nor the linker will flag > that incorrect use. It'll just trap at runtime and that's bad. Well, or, it's good: that's the point of it. Either from the perspective of robustness or from that of security. > I myself had some educating experience seeing my machine triple fault > when resuming from a S3 sleep. The root cause was a variable that was > annotated __read_only but that was (unnecessarily) modified during CPU > bring-up phase. Debugging that kind of problems is sort of a PITA, you > could imagine. As PaX Team mentions, it should be easy to catch these traps and report them. That could certainly be a nice addition. > So, prior extending the usage of the __read_only annotation some > toolchain support is needed. Maybe a gcc plugin that'll warn/error on > code that writes to such a variable but is not __init itself. The > initify and checker plugins from the PaX patch might be worth to look > at for that purpose, as they're doing similar things already. Adding > such a check to sparse might be worth it, too. > A modpost check probably won't work as it's unable to tell if it's a > legitimate access (r/o) or a violation (/w access). So the gcc plugin > is the way to go, IMHO. There are many more pieces to add to the annotation use, but I don't want to risk getting us into a Catch-22. Emese's work on the plugin side will see this usage and utility grow, and I think getting these basic building blocks in place is the right place to start. -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/