Path: csiph.com!fu-berlin.de!uni-berlin.de!individual.net!not-for-mail From: rbowman Newsgroups: comp.os.linux.advocacy,comp.os.linux.misc Subject: Re: Torvalds Slams Theoretical Security Date: 25 Oct 2024 19:36:48 GMT Lines: 23 Message-ID: References: <_OmcnZpYmdE-PYX6nZ2dnZfqn_udnZ2d@earthlink.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Trace: individual.net 2VZG9tX6EXJMq5YiiJRfrAOXEhtFFzvcjOeB/H4AKuSvJSc1rY Cancel-Lock: sha1:bPeZZvU2EB7iF0xqfYR2bUihyoQ= sha256:fjMs6ayrjeg+OoU1Fk9Sls4vrMzNC/+C+EuFQkxfW5Q= User-Agent: Pan/0.149 (Bellevue; 4c157ba) Xref: csiph.com comp.os.linux.advocacy:675099 comp.os.linux.misc:60014 On Fri, 25 Oct 2024 18:10:06 -0000 (UTC), candycanearter07 wrote: > Lawrence D'Oliveiro wrote at 22:19 this Thursday (GMT): >> On Thu, 24 Oct 2024 18:48:57 +0100, Richard Kettlewell wrote: >> >>> Lawrence D'Oliveiro writes: >>> >>>> Weak cryptography is easy to fix. The hard part to fix is weak random >>>> numbers. >>> >>> Other way round. A bad RNG can be swapped out for a better one with >>> little or no impact on anything else. >> >> Unfortunately, you can never be sure your RNG is good. > > > You could always do what random.org does and read background radiation. > Probably. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_random_number_generator Thermal noise is a problem when dealing with weak signals but can be used in RNG.