Path: csiph.com!fu-berlin.de!uni-berlin.de!individual.net!not-for-mail From: "Carlos E. R." Newsgroups: comp.os.linux.misc Subject: Re: Is It Time To Replace SSH ??? Date: Fri, 16 Dec 2022 09:11:45 +0100 Lines: 41 Message-ID: References: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Trace: individual.net DPR/oLkO6Fqvzxk8UzJQkQT3lLoNJxkYcMoLMUIvw1rsTs1lC3 Cancel-Lock: sha1:JZuL5vBZw7mkoSnZCq/p7MUbUHc= User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/102.5.1 Content-Language: es-ES, en-CA In-Reply-To: Xref: csiph.com comp.os.linux.misc:36494 On 16/12/2022 06.11, 26C.Z969 wrote: > On 12/15/22 3:39 AM, Richard Kettlewell wrote: >> "26C.Z969" <26C.Z969@noaada.net> writes: >>> SSH is a good oldie for sure. However, it seems to be increasingly >>> unfit for the modern realities. There are not many straight-up ways to >>> detect/intercept aggressive attackers. >> >> What do you think it’s failing to do? Disable password authentication >> and nobody’s getting in without an authorized private key. > >   Good for SOME users, preferably FEW, but what >   about when you need to accommodate mass logins, >   often from idiots ? If you make it too complex >   they'll shop elsewhere. If a mass of idiots go elsewhere, good riddance. Now, if they want to go shopping, with money, that money of them can create whatever software they want... >>> It was writ for a "kinder, gentler" IP universe where distributed >>> attacks did not exist. Coping with such threats really, badly, needs >>> to be very straight-up and incorporate at least a little "AI" >>> sensibility that can maybe "just tell" an aggressor from an ordinary >>> client. >> >> Not much intelligence needed, anything that gets more than a handful of >> password authentication error is an attacker and gets added to my >> ‘block’ ipset. > >   You make it sound SO easy  :-) > >   Which doesn't cover serious breeches, even at >   large tech-centric corps for some reason .... Links? -- Cheers, Carlos E.R.