Path: csiph.com!usenet.pasdenom.info!aioe.org!news.stack.nl!newsfeed.xs4all.nl!newsfeed3.news.xs4all.nl!xs4all!newsgate.cistron.nl!newsgate.news.xs4all.nl!post.news.xs4all.nl!not-for-mail Return-Path: X-Original-To: python-list@python.org Delivered-To: python-list@mail.python.org X-Spam-Status: OK 0.028 X-Spam-Evidence: '*H*': 0.94; '*S*': 0.00; 'say,': 0.05; 'subject:Python': 0.06; 'compiler': 0.07; 'detect': 0.07; 'elegant': 0.07; 'intel': 0.07; 'inserted': 0.09; 'insertion': 0.09; 'cc:addr:python-list': 0.11; "wouldn't": 0.14; 'binary,': 0.16; 'chip': 0.16; 'nsa': 0.16; 'received:mac.com': 0.16; 'stepping': 0.16; 'wrote:': 0.18; 'received:10.0.1': 0.19; 'cc:addr:python.org': 0.22; 'cc:2**1': 0.23; 'certainly': 0.24; 'cc:no real name:2**0': 0.24; 'nearly': 0.26; 'michael': 0.29; 'am,': 0.29; "doesn't": 0.30; 'originally': 0.30; 'url:mailman': 0.30; 'code': 0.31; 'sep': 0.31; 'with,': 0.31; 'quite': 0.32; 'url:python': 0.33; 'level.': 0.33; 'maybe': 0.34; "i'd": 0.34; 'could': 0.34; 'common': 0.35; 'problem.': 0.35; 'beyond': 0.35; 'but': 0.35; 'there': 0.35; 'really': 0.36; '(we': 0.36; 'sequence': 0.36; 'url:listinfo': 0.36; 'charset:us-ascii': 0.36; 'possible': 0.36; 'subject:?': 0.36; 'received:10.0': 0.36; 'url:org': 0.36; 'level': 0.37; 'received:10': 0.37; 'being': 0.38; 'system,': 0.38; 'received:17': 0.38; 'same.': 0.38; 'pm,': 0.38; 'url:mail': 0.40; 'subject:Can': 0.60; 'gone': 0.61; 'hardware': 0.61; 'skip:n 10': 0.64; 'to:addr:gmail.com': 0.65; 'computers': 0.72; 'secret': 0.74; '*really*': 0.84; 'header:In- reply-to:1': 0.84; 'recognition': 0.84; 'territory': 0.84; 'territory,': 0.84; '2013,': 0.91; 'execution,': 0.91; 'ago!': 0.93; 'tough': 0.93 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:5.10.8794,1.0.431,0.0.0000 definitions=2013-09-09_06:2013-09-09,2013-09-09,1970-01-01 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 bulkscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=7.0.1-1305240000 definitions=main-1309090084 Content-type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii MIME-version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 6.5 \(1508\)) Subject: Re: Can I trust downloading Python? From: William Ray Wing In-reply-to: <522DF5FA.5090202@gmail.com> Date: Mon, 09 Sep 2013 12:40:45 -0400 Content-transfer-encoding: quoted-printable References: <522c6e4e$0$29988$c3e8da3$5496439d@news.astraweb.com> <522d97e1$0$29893$c3e8da3$5496439d@news.astraweb.com> <522DAABA.6040307@gmail.com> <522DF5FA.5090202@gmail.com> To: Michael Torrie X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.1508) Cc: python-list@python.org, William Ray Wing X-BeenThere: python-list@python.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.15 Precedence: list List-Id: General discussion list for the Python programming language List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Newsgroups: comp.lang.python Message-ID: Lines: 30 NNTP-Posting-Host: 2001:888:2000:d::a6 X-Trace: 1378744855 news.xs4all.nl 15939 [2001:888:2000:d::a6]:52010 X-Complaints-To: abuse@xs4all.nl Xref: csiph.com comp.lang.python:53878 On Sep 9, 2013, at 12:23 PM, Michael Torrie wrote: > On 09/09/2013 05:02 AM, Anthony Papillion wrote: >> But (and this is stepping into *really* paranoid territory here. But >> maybe not beyond the realm of possibility) it would not be so hard to >> compromise compilers at the chip level. If the NSA were to strike an >> agreement with, say, Intel so that every time a compiler ran on the >> system, secret code was discreetly inserted into the binary, it would = be >> nearly impossible to detect and a very elegant solution to a tough = problem. >=20 > Indeed it is really paranoid territory, but now doesn't seem quite as > far fetched as one originally thought a few years ago! We'll still > trust (we have to; we have no other choice), but the level of trust in > computers in general has certainly gone down a notch and will never > quite be the same. >=20 >=20 > --=20 > https://mail.python.org/mailman/listinfo/python-list I think that is pretty far fetched. It requires recognition that a = compiler is being compiled. I'd be REALLY surprised if there were a = unique sequence of hardware instructions that was common across every = possible compiler (current and future) and which wouldn't (couldn't) = exist in arbitrary non-compiller execution, which could be used to = trigger insertion of a backdoor. -Bill=