Path: csiph.com!x330-a1.tempe.blueboxinc.net!usenet.pasdenom.info!news.albasani.net!fu-berlin.de!uni-berlin.de!individual.net!not-for-mail From: Dirk Bruere at NeoPax Newsgroups: comp.lang.java.programmer Subject: Re: The halting problem revisited Date: Tue, 05 Apr 2011 01:32:28 +0100 Organization: Dirk Bruere at Neopax Lines: 74 Message-ID: <8vv68cF4voU2@mid.individual.net> References: <8v727mF46lU1@mid.individual.net> <8vbuiaFbm7U1@mid.individual.net> <8vd51lFlq1U1@mid.individual.net> <8ve17fFto9U1@mid.individual.net> <8vedndFt19U1@mid.individual.net> <8vef1uF8n9U1@mid.individual.net> <8ver27F5ouU1@mid.individual.net> Reply-To: dirk.bruere@gmail.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Trace: individual.net 1A+nmlbsmRbFLWixJ+gGqQB4BDHcWoRakie9jpRvbHh+O5O5ii Cancel-Lock: sha1:lBG3lf8RSuhIEe7bb3zI1X1Y0+I= User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.9.2.15) Gecko/20110303 Thunderbird/3.1.9 In-Reply-To: Xref: x330-a1.tempe.blueboxinc.net comp.lang.java.programmer:2870 On 05/04/2011 01:26, javax.swing.JSnarker wrote: > On 30/03/2011 5:35 AM, Michal Kleczek wrote: >> javax.swing.JSnarker wrote: >>> Non sequitur. >> >> How about: if a theory leads to conclusions that are not verfifyable >> by (or >> even contradictory to) "common sense" ( Myself ) - it means the theory is >> useless (hence parallel world assumption is useless - hence there are >> either >> a) other sentences more useful "falling out" from QM or b) QM is >> useless :) >> ). > > But there is no parallel world "assumption". There is a parallel world > *conclusion* from the Schroedinger equations, *absent* a *collapse* > assumption. > > And there is no evidence for the need for a collapse assumption. > > Ockham's Razor applies to the complexity of the theory's *hypotheses*, > not its *conclusions*. > > In fact, the general preferred theory for phenomenon X should be: > > * Of those that do not make already-falsified predictions > * Of those that explain the most already-observed phenomena > * Of those with the fewest hypotheses > * The one with the greatest number of consequences > > The first point eliminates outright-wrong theories. > > The second prefers the theories that predict not only X but as many > other phenomena as possible -- so, Maxwell's electromagnetism to > separate theories of electricity and magnetism, and quantum > electrodynamics to either. Essentially, the ones with greatest > explanatory power regarding what we already know. > > The third is Ockham's razor. > > The fourth prefers, among equally-simple theories, the one that will > have the greatest predictive power regarding what we still *don't* know. > In particular, it's probably the easiest to falsify, because the more > yet-untested consequences the theory has, the more opportunities the > universe (or an experimenter) has to prove it wrong. > > Whereupon it gets eliminated by the first point in the list above, the > is replaced by its first runner-up in the competition. :) > >> My point is that if "parallel world" theory cannot get rid of "the >> noise" in >> "this world" it is of no use to me. There is no difference between >> uncertainty of >> a) which world I am in >> b) the cat was dead or not a couple of hours in the past > > Funnily enough, there is. In case a), but not in case b), you can > potentially create interference patterns in cat alive-or-dead-ness. :) > >> But I think don't really follow and I am not capable of discussing it >> further. It may be because: >> a) my English is not good enough to comprehend such advanced discussions >> b) I don't have enought background - do you have some pointers that would >> introduce me to the concepts you're talking about? > > http://wiki.lesswrong.com/wiki/The_Quantum_Physics_Sequence > MWI subjectively verifiable by suicide -- Dirk http://www.neopax.com/technomage/ - My new book - Magick and Technology